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Introduction
The liquidity of a financial security characterizes the speed and ease with which
any quantity can be purchased or sold. A liquid asset can be traded quickly and
without large price effects. From this point of view, liquidity is desirable for any
investor who wishes to buy or sell a security. While liquidity is widely accepted
as a component of transaction costs, the risk that arises from illiquidity has re-
ceived very little attention in the literature of finance. Most valuation models
like the standard CAPM or the Black Scholes option pricing formula even assume
frictionless markets with perfectly liquid assets. However, this assumption can
be very dangerous. For example, in the 1987 stock market crash and the 1998
bond market failure (see Figure 1.1) liquidity drained from the market dramati-
cally, which made it difficult to trade at all. The fall of the Long-Term Capital
Management (LTCM) hedge fund, which was strongly exposed to liquidity risk
in bond markets, highlights the impact that liquidity risk can have on portfolios.
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Figure 1.1: Stock and Bond Market Crashes
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Figure 1.1 shows the stock and bond market crashes in 1987 and 1998. Panel A plots the value
of the S&P100 Total Return Index (in index points) which fell by almost 50% in the autumn of
1987. Panel B plots the yield spread of Moody’s BAA bond index over US government bonds
with a constant 10 year maturity (in %). As a result of Russia’s default, the spread increased
dramatically.
Against this background I investigate the properties, magnitude and importance
of liquidity risk in today’s electronic limit order book markets.
1.1 Key Issues and Relevance
Nowadays all large stock exchanges like New York, London or Frankfurt and all
large electronic communication networks (ECNs) such as Island or Instinet are
organized as electronic trading facilities. While some trading venues also have
market maker features, they all operate on the basis of an open limit order book.
Therefore I focus on an investor’s liquidity risk in the context of electronic limit
order book markets.
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To understand the importance of liquidity risk for investors, imagine that an
investor who has a stock portfolio suddenly needs to liquidate some positions
to meet unexpected cash requirements. If the securities are illiquid at the time,
their liquidation will be very costly. Therefore the investor will have to sell more
than intended originally to meet his liabilities. This scenario shows that liquidity
risk typically constitutes the danger that prices deteriorate heavily in response
to trades. In such situations, securities can only be traded at unfavorable prices
if at all. Motivated by the demonstrated importance of liquidity risk, I address
the following three aspects of liquidity risk in my thesis:
1. How fast does a limit order book refill after liquidity has been taken away?
2. How strongly does liquidity risk spill over across different stocks?
3. To what extent does liquidity risk enter stock prices as a priced factor?
The first question is usually referred to as resiliency. It describes the extent
to which new liquidity flows back to the market after the order book has been
cleared. The second question addresses the co-movement of liquidity over time,
generally referred to as commonality in liquidity. The third question investigates
the link between liquidity risk and asset pricing to establish whether liquid assets
realize higher prices than their less liquid counterparts. Together, the resiliency,
commonality and pricing dimension give a comprehensive picture of liquidity risk
in limit order book markets.
To illustrate the economic relevance of liquidity risk, let us have a brief look
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at the LTCM case. After a strong decline in liquidity due to the Russian debt cri-
sis, LTCM’s portfolio value dropped dramatically (see Figure 1.2). In turn, this
triggered off margin calls that had to be met. The fund was forced liquidate large
parts of the portfolio in an environment in which it was very expensive to sell off
assets. Firstly, the markets for the individual securities were not resilient, which
meant that new liquidity did not flow back into the market. The unwinding of
large positions was accompanied by strong adverse price movements. Secondly,
LTCM found itself amidst a market-wide liquidity crisis. The strong commonality
of liquidity prohibited any protection through diversification effects of liquidity
risk across instruments. The combination of low resiliency and market-wide illiq-
uidity forced LTCM to its knees so strongly that a group of financials institutions
led by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York bailed the hedge fund out to avoid
complete bankruptcy. The downfall of the LTCM is an acute illustration that
investors are well advised to integrate liquidity risk into their risk management.
Before the downfall investors earned well from investing in LTCM which reflects
that the market compensates investors for taking on liquidity risk. However, high
liquidity risk also implies a higher probability of losses – something that occurred
very dramatically in the case of LTCM.
The relevance of liquidity risk at the market-wide level comes from the fact
that liquidity serves as the lifeblood of financial markets. It enables the transla-
tion of information into order flow and prices and thereby promotes the stability
of the trading environment. A sudden drop of liquidity in a certain segment or
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Figure 1.2: Rise and Fall of $1 Invested with LTCM
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Figure 1.2 shows the gross value of one dollar invested with LTCM from March 1994 to October
1998. LTCM’s funds had a value of $ 4.8 billion in April 1998 of which more than $ 4 billion
got wiped out in just a few months because liquidity dried out. The figure follows Lowenstein
(2000, p. XV) who gives a detailed account of the rise and fall of the infamous hedge fund.
geographic region can potentially spill over to further segments and countries to
lead market instability on a larger scale. Past crises like in Russia or Indonesia
show that the liquidity of whole regions and markets can dry out and lead to very
destabilizing effects. Therefore, the less resilient and the more systematic liquid-
ity risk is across stocks, the larger the potential for market-wide disruptions. A
deeper understanding of liquidity risk will be very desirable for legislators, regula-
tors, exchanges and financial institutions to enhance the stability and smoothness
of trading in financial markets.
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1.2 Contribution to the Literature
The initial interest in the microstructure of security markets and the liquidity
of financial assets is often traced back to Demsetz (1968) and Garman (1976).
From then on, the literature has produced an abundance of models of liquidity
in security markets. While too numerous to list exhaustively, the most promi-
nent approaches include the inventory models of Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll
(1981), the asymmetric information models of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and
Easely and O’Hara (1987) and the models of strategic trading as in Kyle (1985).
Their theoretical extensions and empirical tests also make up a large body of the
liquidity literature. While these approaches address the emergence of liquidity,
their extension to liquidity risk – models and tests in which liquidity is stochastic
– has only just begun.
The first pillar of liquidity risk that I consider is the resiliency of liquidity.
According to Garbade (1982) a market is resilient if price changes that result
from high order volumes quickly attract new limit orders which, in turn, pull
the price back again. In empirical applications, Holthausen, Leftwich and May-
ers (1987) and Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2005) study the resiliency of
prices, yet they do not consider liquidity or use liquidity measures, either. Coppe-
jans, Domowitz, Madhavan (2003) and Gomber, Schweickert and Theissen (2004)
analyze the dynamic properties of the limit order book, yet they only focus on the
level of liquidity or half-life measures. Degryse, Jong, Ravenswaaij and Wuyts
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(2005) capture resiliency indirectly by the aggressiveness of orders, yet they do
not model the refreshment process explicitly. Large (2005) sets up a model of
the probability that prices return to pre-trade levels, yet does not distinguish
the refreshment process that takes place in the limit order book. In contrast, I
extend the literature by directly implementing the Garbade (1982) definition of
resiliency. I set up a mean reversion model of liquidity that captures the change
in current liquidity in response to past liquidity. Furthermore, I interact the liq-
uidity changes with microstructural determinants to examine their impact on the
resiliency mechanism of the limit order book.
The second pillar of liquidity risk in my thesis is the stochastic covariation
of liquidity across assets. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) introduced
the idea of market-wide liquidity in an empirical study of US quote data. They
provide evidence that market liquidity has a significant impact on individual stock
liquidity. Brockman and Chung (2002) apply this approach to intraday data
from Hong Kong’s order-driven stock market with very similar results. Halka
and Huberman (2001) document correlation in the liquidity of different stock
portfolios. Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) on the other hand find little evidence
of commonality once deterministic time-of-day effects have been removed. The
mixed results and low levels of commonality do not make the current literature
very persuasive.1 An obvious shortcoming is the confinement to very narrowly
1The theoretical literature has developed several mechanisms through which the liquidity
supply of different stocks is linked. In these models, the correlation of liquidity preferences, in-
termediary behavior or informational shocks create contagion effects in the liquidity of different
stocks (see Allen and Gale (2000), Kyle and Xiong (2001), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Fer-
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defined measures of liquidity that do not do justice to liquidity risk in limit
order markets. Therefore I advance the study of commonality by modeling the
liquidity of a limit order book. The section is most closely related to the work of
Bauer (2004) and Domowitz, Hansch and Wang (2005). Bauer (2004) performs
a principal component analysis of the liquidity in the limit order book across
stocks. Domowitz, Hansch and Wang (2005) investigate the influence of order
flow and order type correlations on liquidity commonality. The most important
difference is that I focus on how commonality in liquidity depends on how deep
I look into the limit order book.
The third pillar of liquidity risk that I examine is its impact on expected
returns. The first empirical studies examined the relation between the level of
liquidity and expected stock returns (see Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Amihud
and Mendelson (1989), Eleswarapu (1997), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996),
Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) or Amihud (2002)). The next
generation of studies focused on the pricing of liquidity risk as opposed to the
level alone. They include Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003), Gibson and Mougeot
(2004) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005). Together these studies provide positive
evidence that the level and risk of liquidity get priced. They all consider liquidity
movements over long horizons (mostly monthly frequencies). However, liquidity
adjustments in limit order book markets are phenomenona that take place and can
nando (2003), Watanabe (2003) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005)). In empirical studies,
Coughenour and Saad (2004) relate commonality in liquidity to common market maker behav-
ior. Domowitz, Hansch and Wang (2005) argue that the correlation of order type choice is the
reason for the correlation of liquidity.
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only be observed acurately within hours or even within minutes. Furthermore,
most studies do not differentiate between level and risk effects in liquidity. I
therefore extend the literature to the pricing effects of liquidity measures that
are based on limit order book data. In addition, I separate level and risk effects
of liquidity and estimate their impact on returns simultaneously.
In all I bring together the diverse aspects of stochastic liquidity in an attempt
to give a comprehensive view of liquidity risk. All of the above issues are applied
to limit order book data from a purely quote-driven limit order book market. I
use three months of Frankfurt Stock Exchange’s (FSE) electronic protocol which
keeps record of all events that took place in their Xetra trading system. With the
help of some substantial computer programming that implemented the trading
rules of the Xetra system I was able to reconstruct the limit order book from
the raw data for any point in time.2 As the blue-chip segment of FSE has no
additional liquidity supply by specialists and does not face any notable compe-
tition from regional exchanges, the order book data enables a clinic view of the
liquidity risk of financial securities in electronic limit order book markets.
2 I thank Deutsche Boerse for the electronic trading protocols and initial order book. The
data was supplied and initially prepared in SAS. The subsequent reconstruction programming
took place Gauss. I gratefully acknowledge the support of Helena Beltran-Lopez (Universite´
Catholique de Louvain), Joachim Grammig and Stefan Frey (Universitaet Tuebingen) who
shared large parts of the programming sequences. The later data construction and econometric
programs were written in Matlab and Eviews. They are disclosed in part in Appendix C and
available upon request.
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1.3 Main Results and Procedure
In all, the study of the resiliency of the liquidity supply, the commonality in
liquidity and the pricing effects of liquidity risk yield the following results:
• The refill mechanism of the limit order books is strong. The findings
suggest that in general resiliency is high. Empty order books are refilled
promptly, which restores the normal level of liquidity reasonably fast. Re-
siliency is stronger if trading is high, yet if volatility is high, liquidity only
increases for investors who wish to buy whereas sales become more difficult.
Informed trading has a weak impact: evidently, liquidity suppliers cannot
anticipate the information content of trades in anonymous limit order book
markets as they cannot identify the traders behind individual trades.
• The liquidity co-movement in the order book is substantial. Com-
prehensive measures of limit order book liquidity as opposed to measures
at the best bid and ask price exhibit substantial co-movement: systematic
movements across stocks make up about 20% of their overall movement for
measures beyond best prices, while the systematic component for measures
at the best price is only 2%. These figures underline that market-wide liq-
uidity movements are too large to be neglected. Furthermore, commonality
is strongly time-varying: while commonality is lower in rising markets, it
increases considerably in falling markets.
• Liquidity levels and liquidity risk are priced factors. Both liquidity
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levels and liquidity risk get incorporated into stock returns. The higher the
level of stock liquidity is, the lower the expected return that an investor
will receive from buying that stock. Likewise, the higher the liquidity risk
of the stock is, the higher the return paid on the investment. The main
implication of these results is that, evidently, investors pay attention to the
tradability of stocks.
I proceed as follows: in Chapter 2, I present the basic microstructure theory
of securities markets and model the liquidity supply in a limit order book market.
In Chapter 3, I give some details on the market structure, the data that I use in
the empirical sections and some descriptive statistics. In Chapter 4, I examine
the resiliency of the limit order book. Chapter 5 addresses systematic liquidity
risk by focusing on the common movement of liquidity over time. Chapter 6 deals
with the pricing dimension of liquidity levels and liquidity risk. It incorporates
liquidity factors into a Fama-MacBeth framework to study their impact on stock
returns. Chapter 7 concludes.
12 1 Introduction
Chapter 2
Liquidity in Limit Order Book
Markets
The first section of this chapter gives an overview over the microstructure of
financial markets. In the second section I present a static of model of the limit
order book, while the third section develops a dynamic model of the limit order
book. In the fourth section I conclude how my further empirical research builds
on the theoretical literature.
2.1 Market Microstructure
Short-run price dynamics are an important force that drives the liquidity of assets
and markets. To understand this process fully, the following section explains
price formation on security markets. It shows how short-term price dynamics are
embedded in a more long-run valuation process and how short-lived deviations
from information efficiency are related to liquidity. Finally I apply these notions
to the limit order book.
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2.1.1 Price Formation with Market Frictions
One of the most prominent fields of modern finance is investment theory. Invest-
ment models deal with the equilibrium value of financial assets. They are mostly
set in a world in which markets are frictionless and efficient. In such markets,
asset prices reflect all available information and thus correspond to their expected
true values at any point in time. However, a second implication of frictionless
markets is that assets are perfectly liquid. Unfortunately, that is not the case in
the real world. This discrepancy is what the literature of market microstructure
addresses.
Market microstructure owes its name to Garman (1976) who defines a mar-
ket’s microstructure as the interaction of individual exchange actions along time
that, in aggregation, make up the market. Loosely speaking, we can think of
market microstructure theory as the field that deals with the actual mechanics of
financial markets. In particular, it explicitly introduces market frictions. A cen-
tral feature is that most microstructure models are characterized by a multitude
of prices: agents who offer to trade propose bid prices for sales and ask prices for
buys. Market participants who trade against these offers realize so-called trans-
action prices. Price data in the media and press usually reports midquotes, the
midpoint between the best bid and ask price.
A useful way of distinguishing the investment and microstructure view is by
their time horizons. The investment view considers long-run price dynamics. It
focuses on the asset’s value in the long run which it derives from fundamental
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factors about the company. In contrast, the microstructural view considers short-
run price dynamics which involve elements of the trading process itself such as
the order size, trading activity or market mechanism. In a general sense, mi-
crostructural price dynamics are short-run price disturbances around a long-term
value process – Hasbrouck (2004) uses the term overlay component.3
To illustrate the link between market efficiency and microstructure prices, let
us use a slightly more formal representation. Asset pricing theory states that, for
a market to be efficient, prices have to be martingales.4 The martingale property
implies that returns are serially uncorrelated and that prices reflect expectations
at all points in time. In a consumption-based asset pricing model, Cochrane
(2001) shows how under what conditions prices are martingales. Let ct denote an
agent’s consumption in t and let u denote utility from period consumption and
let U denote overall utility. An agent’s overall utility then depends on current
and future consumption,
U(ct, ct+1) = u(ct) + β · u(ct+1), (2.1)
where β is a time preference parameter. If pt denotes an asset’s price, Yt+1 is its
future payoff value. The future payoff corresponds to the sum of the price in t+1
and dividends d, Yt+1 = pt+1 + dt+1. If agents maximize utility, the price of the
3 The view of microstructure as a temporary noise component over a more fundamental value
process might explain why it is often considered as a second order effect and why microstructure
risk was neglected for a long time.
4 A martingale is a stochastic process for which, conditional on today’s information, today’s
price is the best prediction for tomorrow’s price. The random walk model is a popular version
of such a martingale process.
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asset is
pt = Et[β
u′(ct+1)
u′(ct)
Yt+1]. (2.2)
An important assumption is that for short time horizons time preference is
negligible, β = 1, and there are no dividends, dt+1 = 0. Denoting the marginal
rate of substitution as bt :=
u′(ct+1)
u′(ct) , we can under these assumptions set Yt+1 =
pt+1 and write the expected future price as
pt = Et[btpt+1]. (2.3)
Under the risk-neutral probability measure bt = 1 and Et[pt+1] = pt. Thus,
under a fairly simple set of assumptions, prices in frictionless markets are mar-
tingales.5 However, when we have several prices (for example for buy and sell
orders), the price process is not a martingale any longer. Hasbrouck (2004) shows
that for bid and ask prices, Equation 2.3 becomes
pBt ≤ Et[btYt+1] ≤ pAt (2.4)
and that the bid-ask spread prevents returns from being serially uncorrelated. In
other words, prices are not equal to expectations at all points in time and, sub-
sequently, the market is not informationally efficient. Roll (1984), Stoll (1989),
George, Kaul, Nimalendran (1991), Huang and Stoll (1997) and Madhavan and
Sofianos (1997) present empirical evidence for short-run return predictability that
5 A large part of the central predictions of asset pricing theory about risk-neutral valuation
goes back to the work of Ross (1976) and Ross (1978). Harrison and Kreps (1979) extended
this to a more formalized theory embedded in a martingale grounding.
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arises from microstructure phenomena. This result seems to imply that differing
bid and ask prices lead to return predictability and therefore are not consistent
with the notion of market efficiency which requires that prices are not predictable.
However, most models in the microstructure literature reconcile market efficiency
and microstructural frictions by including an unobservable true value of an asset.
Market participants do not observe the true value, but they receive signals Φt
which they use to form expectations of the true value, Et[Yt+1|Φt]. These expec-
tations are martingales again. Short-run prices can deviate from expectations,
but in the long run expectations ensure that prices are efficient.
The decomposition of microstructure prices into information efficient and non-
efficient components leads to another important concept of the microstructure
studies: liquidity. The fact that expected values and actual transaction prices
need not be the same means that some traders pay more or receive less than
the asset is really worth. These costs can vary from stock to stock. Liquidity
summarizes differences in prices of the same asset that arise from short-run di-
vergences of transaction prices from the expected true value of the asset. In very
general terms, assets are considered liquid if reasonable quantities can be traded
at prices pAt and p
B
t that are not too far from the true value, Yt. However, as
O’Hara (1995) and many others point out, this is a very blurry concept. What
is a reasonable quantity? When is a price too far from the true value?
While the above models of price dynamics and liquidity serve as a good frame-
work, the actual price process, asset liquidity and subsequent trading costs de-
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pend on further issues such as the institutional environment of trading. The most
common trading mechanisms nowadays are auction markets. Since the introduc-
tion of electronic trading platforms, traders are able to trade continuously when
the exchange is open. This is a so-called continuous double auction system. It
can be either quote-driven – a market maker supplies liquidity – or order-driven
– limit order traders are the only source of liquidity. In practice, markets will
often have hybrid structures which combine different elements and systems.
2.1.2 Elements of a Limit Order Book Market
In practice, nearly all markets operate on the basis of an electronic limit order
book. Most markets have some distinct features with regard to priority of order
execution, competition or transparency. For example, NYSE operates a hybrid
system of a limit order book combined with specialists. Paris Bourse and LSE
only disclose a fixed number of orders in the book. FSE on the other hand displays
each single price in the order book and has no market makers. However, all limit
order markets share a set of basic construction elements and rules. Firstly, they
all build on the archetypical order forms of limit and markets orders:
• Market orders carry no price limit and are executed immediately against
orders in the order book. In the rare case that the book is not liquid enough,
they are executed partially and the remaining order lot is executed at the
next possible point in time.
• Limit orders carry a pre-specified limit for execution. They are added to
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the limit order book and are executed against new incoming market orders
as soon as possible. If they are larger than the market order, they are
executed partially and the non-executed lot remains in the book.
The most important difference is that market orders have execution certainty,
while the execution of limit orders is uncertain. Handa and Schwartz (1996) point
out that submitting a limit order has similarities with an option. For example,
an investor who places a buy order writes a free put option to the market. Let
us assume that the investor places a buy limit order at 100 Euros. If the share
price falls below 100 Euros, any trader in the market can hit the limit order at
100 Euros and the option will be executed. This implies that the writer of the
option buys the stock above the market price. The lower the market price is,
the higher are the losses that result from the limit order. On the other hand, if
the market price rises, no trader will execute against the limit order because the
stock can be sold at a higher price. Therefore, the profits from the limit order are
zero if the stock price rises above 100 Euros. In all, the payoff is negative if the
market price falls below the limit price and zero if the market price rises above
the limit price. This payoff is identical to a put option. As market participants
decide whether to execute against the option, limit order placement is equivalent
to a short position in the put. By the same analogy, an investor who places a sell
limit order writes a free call option to the market.
The option characteristic of limit orders shows that limit orders supply liq-
uidity by enabling market participants to buy or sell at the prices in the order
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book. Limit order traders take over the role that the market maker has in a
dealer market. However, some important differences remain between the monop-
olistic market maker model and a limit order market: firstly, limit order traders
compete amongst each other for the supply of profitable liquidity. Secondly, they
know neither the size of incoming market orders nor the identity of the trader.
Therefore, limit order traders have less power to infer the information content of
trades than a market maker has in dealer market where he alone sets the quotes.
The differences between market maker quotes and limit orders have implica-
tions for the objectives with which limit orders are used. Traditionally, liquidity
supply only takes place through dealer quotes who make profits by quoting higher
sell prices than buy prices. Traders buy or sell securities because they have either
superior information or exogenous cash requirements. In limit order markets, the
use of limit orders is not confined to liquidity suppliers who submit trades on
both sides of the order book to capitalize the spread. For example, a trader who
has no need for immediacy might submit a limit order instead of a market order
to ensure a good price. On the other hand, not every market order requires su-
perior information or cash demands. A liquidity supplier might spot a stale limit
order and pick it off quickly by means of an immediate market order. In other
words, the choice of a liquidity-supplying limit order depends more strongly on
whether the trader can afford uncertainty of execution – in which case a limit
order is more likely – or whether the trader’s strategy requires immediacy – in
which case a limit order is less likely. Consequently, the notion of limit order
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traders as liquidity-supplying dealers is not sufficient. In the following section I
develop a formal framework of profit-maximizing limit order placement.
2.2 Static Models of the Limit Order Book
An early model of order placement was developed by Ho and Stoll (1983) where
dealers compete for the next incoming order to hit their quotes. Glosten (1994) is
the seminal paper on the theory of the limit order book market. Rock (1996) and
Seppi (1997) extend the model to include discretized prices and a time priority
rule for orders with the same limit price. Sand˚as (2001) and Frey and Grammig
(2005) relax some assumptions of the theoretical model and provide empirical
evidence. In the following sections I summarize the Sand˚as (2001) model. I do
not extend the theoretical framework. Instead, the aim is to use this model to
show why it is profitable to submit limit orders, why limit orders are submitted
at different prices and how this leads to an equilibrium limit order book.
2.2.1 Model Assumptions
The market consists of two types of agents: liquidity suppliers and traders. Liq-
uidity suppliers submit limit orders to the order book. They are risk-neutral and
profit-maximizing. Traders submit market orders that consume liquidity. They
trade either because they have private information or because they wish to satisfy
liquidity requirements.
The agents trade a risky asset whose true value at time t is denoted by Xt.
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This fundamental value of the asset is conditional on all publicly available infor-
mation. The law of motion is given by
Xt = Xt−1 + dt, (2.5)
where dt is a random innovation. The increment dt contains both new information
of trades and new non-trade information in t.
Trading occurs over periods indexed by t. In each period, liquidity suppliers
can submit new limit orders until no liquidity supplier wishes to supply a new
order anymore. Then a trader arrives and submits a market order that consumes
some of the liquidity in the order book. Finally, the new true value of the asset
is announced and the procedure starts again.
Let the price vector {p+1, p+2, ..., p+k}′ denote the ask prices in the order book
where a positive index indicates the ask side. It is ordered from the best price,
p+1, to the k − th best price p+k. Let {Q+1, Q+2, ..., Q+k}′ denote the volumes
that correspond to the prices of the same index. Likewise, {p−1, p−2, ..., p−k}′
and {Q−1, Q−2, ..., Q−k}′ represent bid side prices and quantities. The incoming
market order volume is denoted by mt where positive quantities, m > 0, are buy
orders and negative volumes correspond to sell orders, m < 0. Market orders
arrive at the ask side and the bid side with equal probability. Their volume is
exponentially distributed with parameter λ. The distribution of m is:
f(m) =
{
1
2λ
e−
m
λ if m > 0 (buy order)
1
2λ
e+
m
λ if m <= 0 (sell order).
(2.6)
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Figure 2.1: Density and Probability Function of Market Orders
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Figure 2.1 shows the density function (Panel A) and probability function (Panel B) of the
market order volume specified in Equation 2.6. The figure assumes λ = 5.
Fig. 2.1 illustrates the density and probability function of the market order vol-
ume. Furthermore, each order incurs an order processing cost γ that is quantity
invariant and equal for buy and sell orders.
2.2.2 Equilibrium Outcome
Limit order traders have no knowledge about the value of the random innovation
dt+1, yet they know that market order traders might be informed. Market order
volume is informative about the future value of the asset. The relation between
market order quantity and the change in the fundamental value of X is defined
by a non-decreasing price impact function, h(m). Limit order suppliers update
their beliefs about the future value of the asset subsequent to the volume of the
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market order:
E[Xt+1|Xt,m] = Xt + h(m) (2.7)
The specification of h(·) is assumed linear in the size of the incoming market
order m. This leads to the following revision of beliefs:
h(m) = αm (2.8)
A market buy order leads to an increase in revised beliefs and a sell order leads
to lower expectations of the asset value. All other things being equal, a larger
value of α corresponds to stronger price impacts and a higher revision in beliefs.
On the other hand, if α = 0 the price impact function is horizontal. Then beliefs
are not revised at all and the expectation of the future value is not influenced by
the size of the incoming market order.
Let us turn to the liquidity supplier’s decision problem whether it is profitable
to submit a limit order to the order book. If a limit order that has a price of
p+1 is executed, it generates an expected profit that depends on the size of the
subsequent market order:
p+1 − E[Xt+1|Xt,m]− γ = p+1 −Xt − αm− γ (2.9)
The above equation shows that the expected profit depends on the size of the
market order: large market orders are a signal of private information on the part
of the trader and lower the expected profits of limit order suppliers.
Most importantly however, the execution of a newly submitted limit order is
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uncertain. Let q denote the cumulative quantity of all limit orders that have price
and time priority. Any infinitesimally small new limit order only gets executed if
the incoming market order volume is at least as high as q, m ≥ q. Let I(m ≥ q)
denote an indicator function that yields I = 1 for order execution and zero
otherwise. At the best price level p1, the expected profit of a liquidity supplier
conditional on the execution of the limit order is:
E[p+1 −X − αm− γ | I = 1] =
∫ ∞
q
(p+1 −Xt − αm− γ)f(m)dm
=
∫ ∞
q
(p+1 −Xt − αm− γ) 1
2λ
e−
m
λ dm
= −e− qλ (Xt + γ + α(q + λ)− p+1) (2.10)
A limit order trader is indifferent to adding another order to the book at p+1
if the expected profit is zero. Thus, equating the above profit to zero yields the
equilibrium quantity Q+1:
Q+1 = max
{
p+1 − γ −Xt
α
− λ; 0
}
(2.11)
The zero profit condition can be extended to the quantity that will be offered at
the next best price, p+2, in the same way. Order execution is now dependent on
m ≥ q +Q1 which implies
E[p+2 −Xt − αm− γ | I = 1] =
∫ ∞
Q+1+q
(p+1 −Xt − αm− γ)f(m)dm (2.12)
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and yields the following equilibrium quantity Q+2:
Q+2 = max
{
p+2 − γ −Xt
α
−Q+1 − λ; 0
}
(2.13)
Let l be an index of the prices in the order book (with l = 1, 2, ..., k) and let pi
denote marginal profits for the case that the limit order gets executed (I = 1).
In the general case, we obtain the following marginal profits for the order book:
E[pi+l] = e
− q+Q+(l−1)
λ
[
(p+l −Xt)− α(q +Q+(l−1) + λ)− γ
]
(ask)
E[pi−l] = e+
q+Q+(l−1)
λ
[
(p+l −Xt)− α(q +Q+(l−1) − λ) + γ
]
(bid) (2.14)
The corresponding equilibrium quantities are as follows:
Q+l = max
{
p+l −Xt − γ
α
−Q+(l−1) − λ; 0
}
(ask)
Q−l = max
{
Xt − p−l − γ
α
−Q−(l−1) − λ; 0
}
(bid) (2.15)
The above equations summarize the status of the limit order book when it is in
equilibrium and limit order traders have exploited all profit opportunities that
yield a positive expected payoff.
2.2.3 Implications
In this section I highlight the intuition of Equation 2.14 and Equation 2.15 by
providing a numerical example. Then I discuss the implications that the model
has for the later sections of my thesis.
Figure 2.2 compares the price schedule and the expected payoffs to limit orders
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Figure 2.2: Order Book Schedule and Profit Opportunities
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Figure 2.2 shows the price schedule and profit opportunities of two limit order books. Panel A
and B (blue graphs) correspond to an order book that is in equilibrium, while Panel C and D
(red graphs) belong to a book with unexploited profit opportunities. The figures are numerical
examples of Equation 2.14 and Equation 2.15 computed for Xt = 100, α = 0.1, γ = 0 and
λ = 5. The y-axis is in ticks where the first tick is the first possible ask price p+1 > Xt.
traders for two different order books. Panel A and B show a limit order book
and payoff for the parameter constellation Xt = 100, α = 0.1, γ = 0 and λ = 5.
The book is in the equilibrium state implied by the Equations 2.14 and 2.15. In
contrast, Panel C and D show the snapshot of a hypothetical limit order book
which is not in equilibrium.
The most striking difference between the two order books is that the submitted
28 2 Liquidity in Limit Order Book Markets
limit order quantities of the non-equilibrium order book are smaller. Panels A
and C show the cumulative quantity in the book against their respective prices.
In equilibrium, the marginal break-even quantity at the first tick is 5 and at
the second tick it is 10. However, the bottom order book offers only 3 shares
at the first tick and only 5 shares at the second tick. Subsequently, it is still
profitable to offer 2 more shares at the first tick and 5 more at the second tick.
The unexploited profit opportunities are highlighted in Panels B and D. If we
compare the two panels we see that the graph in Panel B always falls to zero
before it jumps back up again, while the jumps of the graph in Panel D occur
for non-zero values. This underlines the fact that in the non-equilibrium book,
marginal profits are still positive.
The equilibrium properties of the Sand˚as (2001) model help us understand
why limit order traders submit liquidity to the limit order book. In particular, we
can derive implications that we use in the later sections for the empirical study of
the limit order book. The model formalizes the following behavior and incentives
of limit and market order traders:
1. Profitability of a Limit Order: Liquidity suppliers submit buy limit
orders at prices which are below their expectation of the future price (and
vice versa for sell limit orders). These limit orders get executed against
market orders and generate a profit for limit order traders. This implies
that, ceteris paribus, a higher amount of market order trading offers higher
profit opportunities for liquidity suppliers.
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2. Position in the Limit Order Queue: There are profit opportunities
along the whole price-quantity schedule of the limit order book. Limit
orders near the best tick have higher execution probability and lower con-
ditional profits, while limit orders further away have lower execution proba-
bility but higher conditional profits. This implies that limit order flows can
take place deeper in the book even if there is no change at the best price.
3. Transaction Costs of Market Orders: The equilibrium limit order book
shows that large market orders get executed against several different limit
order prices. The larger the market order, the larger the marginal costs that
it incurs. Large market orders take away depth from the limit order book
and shift the price-quantity schedule. This implies that liquidity beyond
best prices becomes relevant for large orders.
4. Information Signals: Limit order traders take the size of trades as an
informative signal of the true value of the asset which they take into ac-
count in their future liquidity supply. They interpret large orders as highly
informative and revise their beliefs particularly strongly. This implies that
for limit order flows in any period we have to distinguish whether they took
place in an information-intensive or low-information environment.
The model implications might only highlight simple mechanics of limit order
book markets, but they are a good starting point to compare the empirical fea-
tures of the limit order book against. Yet before we proceed any further, let us
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cast a brief look at the weaknesses of the model. Firstly, when an order book
is in equilibrium, the model does not allow the submission of new liquidity at
the best prices. New limit orders only replace liquidity at the furthest tick.6 A
second weakness is that market orders are assumed to be exogenous. In practice,
however, the dynamics of the limit order book are far more complex.
2.3 Dynamic Models of the Limit Order Book
In the following section I present a dynamic model of a limit order book market.
The theoretical literature includes models by Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999),
Parlour and Seppi (2003)), Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2004) and Foucault,
Kadan and Kandel (2005). I present a simplified version of Foucault, Kadan
and Kandel (2005) who endogenize the decision between limit and market order
placement.7 While the previous model provided implications why limit order
traders trade and where they submit their limit orders, I present the following
model to obtain hypotheses for the dynamic properties of limit order flow.
6 However, Hasbrouck (2004) points out that this problem is overcome when uncertainty is
introduced, albeit at the cost of simple analytic solutions.
7 In contrast, Parlour (1998) models how the order placement decision depends on the depth
of the limit order book at the best quotes. Foucault (1999) addresses the risk that limit order
strategies lose against agents who have better information. Parlour and Seppi (2003) set up a
dynamic model of different exchanges that compete against each other for order flow. Goettler,
Parlour and Rajan (2004) model limit order trading as a stochastic game that takes place
sequentially. I present the Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) framework because it is based
on the immediacy of market orders versus the delayed execution of limit orders. This framework
is well-suited to derive hypotheses for the time series behavior of liquidity flows as I will be
doing in the following sections.
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2.3.1 Model Assumptions
The market is organized as a limit order book in which market participants trade
one single security. The highest sell price of the security is pmaxA and the lowest
buy price is pminB (with p
max
A > p
min
B > 0). The best ask price is denoted by pA
and the best bid price by pB.
8 The model investigates the dynamics of the bid-
ask spread, s := pA − pB, within the maximum price range, pmaxA − pminB . At the
endpoints of the price interval traders offer to sell and buy an unlimited amount
of shares.
Market participants arrive at the market following a Poisson process with
parameter λ > 0. The model has an infinite horizon and the times between
trade arrivals are exponentially distributed with an expectation of 1
λ
. Market
participants are risk-neutral. Upon their arrival they submit either a market
order, which is executed immediately, or a limit order, which is executed later,
but at a better price. Furthermore, each agent bears waiting costs δ (per unit
of time) for the time until order execution. Traders either belong to the class of
impatient traders or patient traders: impatient traders value fast trade execution
and have high waiting costs of δI , while patient traders have low waiting costs of
δP (with δI > δP ). The proportion of patient traders to impatient traders in the
population is ΘP ; the proportion of impatient traders is ΘI = 1−ΘP .
The trading mechanism of the market is a centralized limit order book in
8 For simplicity I assume a unit tick size. The results are qualitatively identical if a tick size
variable is included, yet they make the model unnecessarily complicated as it is not my aim to
study tick size effects.
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which all limit orders are executed according to price priority. To facilitate the
analysis of the equilibrium outcome, Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) make
the following assumptions:
• Traders arrive only once, submit a market or limit order of size 1 and
exit the market. Orders that have been submitted cannot be cancelled or
revised.
• Limit orders always improve the current best price and reduce the spread
by at least one tick. They cannot queue at the same price.
• A buy order is always followed by a sell order and sell orders are always
followed by buy orders. The probability that the first order is a buy is 0.5.
I denote the execution price of buy and sell orders by p+E and p−E. A buyer
either submits a market order for which he pays the lowest ask price, pA, or
submits a limit order on the bid side. The limit order enters the order book at
a new best bid price, pB. Likewise, a seller either trades at the best bid price or
enters a new best ask price. Hence, execution prices can be written as
p+E = pA − j (2.16)
p−E = pB + j (2.17)
where j denotes the number of ticks from the best price in the limit order book
against which the order could be executed (with j ∈ {0, ..., s− 1}). For a market
order j = 0, the time to execution is zero and therefore the waiting costs are zero,
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too. For a limit order it must hold that j ∈ {1, ..., s−1} depending on the spread
that it creates. Its time to execution is T (j) and its expected waiting costs are
δfT (j) with f ∈ {I, P}. The payoff from the choice of order type – market order
versus j-limit order – can be written as the difference between the bid-ask spread
and waiting costs, pif (j) := j − δfT (j). For a market order it is zero, pif (0) = 0,
while for a limit order it is either positive or negative. A traders order placement
is optimal if it solves
max
j∈{0,...,s−1}
{pif (j) := j − δfT (j)} (2.18)
for buyers and sellers alike.9 In equilibrium, a trader’s strategy solves Equation
2.18 for waiting costs calculated under the same strategy.
2.3.2 Equilibrium Outcome
As the payoff of a market order is zero, a trader will only submit a limit order if
his price improvement j offsets his waiting costs δfT (j). A limit order trader has
to wait at least one period for the execution of the limit order. Since the average
time between orders is 1
λ
the smallest expected waiting costs of a trader of type
f are
δf
λ
. Hence, the smallest spread j∗f that a trader will create – which we call
the reservation spread – must be the next highest integer above
δf
λ
. I assume that
the reservation spread of patient traders is smaller than the reservation spread of
9 Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) assume that a trader who is indifferent between two
orders submits the order that creates the higher spread.
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impatient traders, j∗P < j
∗
I , and that both are smaller than p
max
A − pminB .10 The
following section presents the resulting equilibrium and the dynamics of the limit
order book in equilibrium.11
In equilibrium there exists a cut-off spread sc which, together with patient
traders’ reservation spread, defines three different spread regions of the limit or-
der book. In the region < 1, j∗P > patient and impatient traders submit market
orders. If the spread is in the region < j∗P + 1, sc > only patient traders will
submit a price-improving limit order, while impatient traders will submit a mar-
ket order. In the region < sc + 1, p
max
A − pminB > both patient and impatient
traders submit limit orders which narrow the spread. An important point to
note is that impatient traders sometimes submit market orders even if the spread
is higher than their reservation spread (when sc > s > j
∗
I ). The reason is that
the expected waiting costs of an impatient trader will, in general, exceed his im-
provement in execution price. For ease of presentation I consider the case when
sc = p
max
A − pminB . This assumption has no impact on the results, yet it shortens
the presentation.
The optimal order of a trader depends on the current bid-ask spread in the
limit order book. In equilibrium, there exist exactly g such spreads which I order
from lowest to highest, n1 < n2 < ... < ng. The lowest spread is equal to the
10 The equilibrium state can be derived more easily is we assume that the reservation spread
of a patient and impatient trader are equal. However, it is more realistic that the reservation
spread of the impatient patient trader is higher, because the impatient trader attaches more
importance to fast execution.
11 I only present the equilibrium results, but do not prove them explicitly. My main intention
is to convey their economic intuition. The technical details are in Foucault, Kadan and Kandel
(2005), 1178-1184 and 1209-1215.
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patient traders’ reservation spread (n1 = j
∗
P ) and the highest spread ng equals
pmaxA − pminB . Consequently ng = sc and impatient trader always submit market
orders irrespective of the current spread. In contrast, a patient trader submits
either a market or a limit order depending on the current spread: if the spread
equals the patient trader’s reservation spread (s = j∗P ), the patient trader submits
a market order. If the spread is higher than the patient trader’s reservation spread
(s > j∗P ) he submits a price-improving limit order.
It is important to note that limit orders always reduce the current equilibrium
spread to the next highest equilibrium spread. For example, if the current spread
is ng a patient trader will create a new spread of ng−1. The spread improvement by
this new limit order is therefore ng−ng−1. How large it is in terms of ticks depends
on the values of the bid-ask spreads. Let ∆h denote the spread improvement of a
limit order that narrows the spread from nh to nh−1, ∆h := nh − nh−1. It can be
shown that, in equilibrium, the spread improvement is determined endogenously
by the ratio of patient to impatient traders, ΘP
ΘI
, the current position of the spread,
h, the waiting costs of patient traders, δP , and the expected time between order
arrivals, 1
λ
,
∆h = int+
(
2
(
ΘP
ΘI
)h−1
δP
λ
)
(2.19)
where h ∈ {2, ..., g} and int+ indicates the next highest integer value. The spread
improvement enables us to determine the set of equilibrium spreads as the sum
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of patient traders’ reservation spread and subsequent spread improvements:
n1 = j
∗
P (2.20)
nh = n1 +
h∑
k=2
∆k (2.21)
ng = p
max
A − pminB (2.22)
where h ∈ {2, ..., g − 1} and g − 1 is the last integer for which nh < pmaxA − pminB .
Equations 2.20 to 2.22 define the set of all equilibrium spreads. The trading
process is characterized by constant changes in the spread: at any current spread
h a limit order trader reduces the spread by ∆h to nh−1. As long as only patient
traders submit orders this process continues until their reservation spread n1
is reached. This is the lowest possible equilibrium spread which we call the
competitive spread. At the competitive spread, even patient traders will submit
a market order that widens the spread. When impatient traders arrive they
always submit market orders which widen the spread for all spreads from n1 to
ng−1. At ng it stays unchanged until a patient trader arrives who narrows the
spread again.12
2.3.3 Implications
In equilibrium the spread follows a stochastic process whose values all belong to
the set of equilibrium spreads. The movement along the equilibrium path remains
stochastic because the patience of a trader is a random variable: an incoming
12 The spread stays unchanged at ng because of the assumption that a pool of traders stands
ready to supply an unlimited amount of buy and sell orders at pmaxA and p
min
B .
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order from a patient trader arrives with probability ΘP and an order from an
impatient trader arrives with probability ΘI . A simple way of characterizing the
stochastic process of the limit order book is to measure the probability with which
the spread reverts to its competitive level before the next market order arrives.
If the current bid-ask spread is nh a complete reversal to the competitive spread
requires h − 1 consecutive limit orders. If we denote time with an index t the
conditional probability can be written as follows:
Pr (st+1 = j
∗
P | st = nh) = Θh−1P (2.23)
for h ∈ {2, ..., q}.13 It is important to note that h is a subset of the equilibrium
number of spreads which is determined endogenously in the model. Therefore,
the equilibrium reversal of spreads to their competitive level – the resiliency of
the market – depends on all exogenous parameters.14
More specifically, we can use the equilibrium properties of the model to derive
implications for empirical studies of the limit order book. They involve the rela-
tionship of the exogenous variables (the proportion of patient traders, the waiting
costs, the order arrival rate) with the resiliency of the market. In particular, the
model establishes the following hypotheses:
13 The probability of spread reversal at the competitive level, Pr (st+1 = j∗P | st = j∗P ), is
zero by construction.
14 An important point to note is that in Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) definition of
resiliency, the reversal of liquidity to its pre-shock mean only refers to the bid-ask spread. As
all orders have a unit size in their model, they cannot study the reversal of depth.
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1. Order arrival rate: All other things held equal, a higher order arrival
rate implies a less resilient limit order book.
2. Time between trades: There is positive association between the average
time between trades, conditional on the size of the spread, and market
resiliency.
3. Proportion of patient traders: The higher the proportion of patient
traders in the population, the higher the resiliency of the limit order book.
Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) go on to argue that traders’ impatience
is likely to increase towards the end of the trading day. For this reason they
conjecture that the proportion of patient traders falls at the end of the trading
day. This yields a fourth hypothesis:
4. Time of Day: A limit order book is less resilient at the end of the trading
day than in earlier trading periods.
Although the market structure of a limit order book market is modeled in a
very stylized fashion, the model still yields rich implications for the dynamics of
the limit order book. Future research will no doubt relax some of the assumptions
to widen the scope of the theoretical results. In the next section I conclude how
I build on the theoretical literature in my empirical research.
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2.4 Conclusion
Static models of the limit order book address the equilibrium state of the limit
order book under the assumption that liquidity is not risky. For example, Sand˚as
(2001) shows that it is rational for limit order traders to submit new liquidity as
long as their marginal profit is positive. All things being equal, the updating of
beliefs determines the equilibrium quantities and expected profits for all prices in
the book. The model pinpoints why limit orders are submitted at different ticks
and how the typical shape of the limit order book arises. It has the implications
the market order flow offers profit opportunities for limit order traders to exploit
and that limit order flows can take place anywhere in the limit order book.
Furthermore, it implies that we should measure liquidity beyond best prices and
that limit order supply varies with the information content of trades.
Dynamic models of the limit order book address the evolution and equilibrium
state of the limit order book over time. For example, Foucault, Kadan and Kandel
(2005) develop a dynamic framework in which traders can choose to submit limit
orders which improve the spread or market orders which clear the book and widen
the spread. The order choice determines the evolution of the spread along time
and its reversal to a competitive level. The model derives an equilibrium for the
endogenous order choice and thereby also endogenizes the resiliency of the limit
order book. In terms of liquidity dimensions, Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005)
extend the theoretical literature to the resiliency of liquidity. However, they only
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model the resiliency of the bid-ask spread. They do not model the equilibrium
levels of depth nor do they address the resiliency of depth.
The static and dynamic models in the previous sections show that the the-
oretical literature has already addressed many aspects of liquidity, yet that the
current generation of models provides only partial views of a limit order book
market. So far, the theoretical literature has not yet brought together the spread
dimension, the limit order book’s depth at different ticks and its resiliency mech-
anism. Therefore there is no consistent foundation for the study of more specific
issues – for example the study of liquidity risk in limit order book markets –
to build on. However, as these are very relevant issues and as, in practice, the
missing elements in the theoretical models are important features of the market
structure, it is not surprising that the empirical research has overtaken the the-
oretical literature. Likewise, I depart from the predictions in Sand˚as (2001) and
Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) to empirically extend their scope to a more
rigorous treatment of liquidity risk in limit order book markets.
In particular, I use the concept of resiliency in dynamic equilibrium models to
set up an econometric model that can be tested empirically. I extend the recovery
of the spread to the recovery of depth and examine whether the implications in
Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) hold strong for the reversal of the spread
and of depth. Finally, I explore the relationship between the resiliency of the
spread and the resiliency of depth. The study of systematic liquidity risk across
stocks requires a multi-asset setting. In the absence of multi-asset models for the
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limit order book15 I build on Sand˚as (2001) to measure the liquidity supply of
the price-quantity schedule. I then proceed empirically to estimate the extent
of commonality in liquidity and the time variation of commonality. While the
following chapters contribute to a comprehensive view of liquidity risk in limit
order book markets, they also give insights for future modeling purposes.
15 Domowitz, Hansch and Wang (2005) present empirical evidence that the correlation of
order type seems to be a determinant behind the commonality in liquidity. Coughenour and
Saad (2004) relate commonality to the correlated behavior of market makers and limit order
placement. An incorporation of depth into the Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) model
would endogenize both of these suggested determinants of commonality and make it a good
candidate to extend to a multi-asset context.
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Chapter 3
Market Structure and Data
In the following sections I present the data that I use in the empirical studies in
Chapters 4 to 6. First I give some details of the market model that is used at the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Then I present the reconstruction of the limit order
books from the raw data and finally give some descriptive statistics.
3.1 Market Structure
3.1.1 Xetra Market Model
In my thesis I use data from the electronic limit order book market at the Frank-
furt Stock Exchange (FSE). The electronic system which is used in Frankfurt
is called Xetra. Anyone with a computer that is connected to Xetra can trade
stocks directly without going through further intermediaries. The same trading
platform is also used at the stock exchanges in Vienna and Dublin as well as
at the European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig. Xetra is the dominating
trading venue for stocks that are listed in Frankfurt. There are some regional
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exchanges as well as a floor trading facility, however the Xetra system attracts
more than 98% of all trading activity.
The exchange market model for stock trading defines the way in which agents
can submit orders and how these orders are matched. It includes price deter-
mination, priority of orders as well as the scope of information that is disclosed
and observable to traders. The market model implements legal and regulatory
requirements of the stock exchange as well as the terms and conditions of trading
in Frankfurt. The FSE is an order-driven exchange that allows market orders,
limit orders, market-to-limit orders, stop orders and iceberg orders.16 Let us start
with a brief overview of some fundamental principles of the market model:17
1. A security can be traded continuously or only in auctions.
2. Continuous trading starts with an opening auction, can be interrupted by
intraday auctions and ends with a closing auction at the end of the day.
3. During the auction phase, the order book is partially closed and during
continuous trading, the order book is completely open to all agents.
4. Orders are executed according to price priority and then time priority.
5. Trading is anonymous: before a trade takes place agents do not know whom
the orders in the book belong to and their own identity is not revealed either.
16 Market-to-limit orders, stop orders and iceberg orders will be explained in more detail in
the later parts of this section.
17 For more details on the legal framework and the specific features of the Xetra market
model of stock trading see Deutsche Boerse Group (2004).
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6. All order sizes can be traded, both round and odd lots.
7. There is no tick size requirement (the minimum tick size is 0.01 Euros).
8. Trading is interrupted if the potential price jumps to a price that lies outside
a pre-defined range and an auction is initiated (“volatility interruptions”).
9. A trade confirmation is disseminated automatically after a trade has taken
place with price, quantity and counterparty information.
The stocks listed at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange are segmented into various
different groups. The main criteria for segmentation are market capitalization,
liquidity or industry affiliation. The best-known segment is no doubt the DAX 30
which comprises Germany’s thirty largest blue-chip stocks. Further segments are
the MDAX, TecDAX, Liquid Foreign Equities, Illiquid Small Caps and Illiquid
Foreign Equities. All trading segments have in common that the trading of stocks
in the same segment follows the same rules.
An important feature of a market segment is the organization of its liquidity
supply. In general, equities require at least one Designated Sponsor to be accepted
for trading in the market model of continuous trading. A Designated Sponsor is
an investment bank or securities firm that increases a share’s liquidity by offering
to buy and to sell simultaneously. However, the blue-chip segment is considered
liquid enough without any market-making. Consequently, the liquidity of German
blue-chip stocks in Xetra depends on the competition of limit order traders alone
without any further institutional market makers. In the following sections I will
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be using DAX 30 data, which enables me to study the properties of a purely
order-driven limit order book market.
3.1.2 Order Types and Matching Rules
The core feature of any trading platform is the mechanism how orders get matched
and transactions take place. In Frankfurt, trading is based on a continuous
double auction mechanism where orders are matched automatically by the trading
system. The opening hours are from 9.00 to 17.30 CET. During those hours, the
limit order book openly displays all orders that have been submitted already, but
not executed yet. Market participants who wish to trade will then choose from
several different order types.
The basic order types allowed during continuous trading are conventional
market orders, limit orders as well as market-to-limit orders. A market-to-limit
order is treated as a market order and executed against the best price in the order
book. However, the remaining part that cannot be executed at the best price is
converted to a limit order at the transaction price of the market order part. All
order types can further be restricted to immediate-or cancel (IOC) or fill-or-kill
(FOK). IOC orders are executed immediately and fully or as fully as possible; non-
executed parts are deleted directly. FOK orders are only executed immediately
and fully or not at all. Finally, the validity of orders can be specified further by
means of the restrictions good-for-day, good-till-date and good-till-cancelled. A
good-for-day order is only valid for the current exchange trading day and is then
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automatically cancelled by the exchange. A good-till-date order is valid until a
specified date which can be up to 90 calendar days from the current trading day.
It is not automatically deleted at the end of the trading day, but can be taken
out by the originator at any time if he wishes to do so. A good-till-cancelled
order has no specified date and is valid until it is either executed, deleted by the
originator of the trade or it reaches its maximum validity of 90 days and is then
cancelled automatically.
Beside the basic order types, there are some more sophisticated order types
that are allowed in the Xetra market model, in particular stop orders and iceberg
orders. A stop order is allowed to support trading strategies that depend on the
occurrence of certain price events. In particular, a stop market order is a market
order that is placed in the order book as a market order as soon as the stop
price is reached. A stop limit order is a normal limit order that is placed in the
order book if the pre-specified stop price is reached. In contrast, iceberg orders
do not depend on any price being reached. They enable the entrance of large
orders without the submitting party having to disclose the total order volume
all at once. An iceberg order is a special form of a limit order that has a limit
price, and overall order volume and a peak. The peak enters the order book as a
normal limit order and, once it has been hit and fully executed, is replaced by a
new limit order of the same peak size with a new time stamp. Iceberg orders are
only ever valid for one trading day and get cancelled automatically at the end of
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the day; if they are supposed to run for a second day, the trader has to re-enter
the order the next morning.
Each new incoming order is immediately checked for execution against orders
on the other side of the order book. Matching and price determination take place
on the basis of price and time priority. The time criterion applies if orders share
the same price limit – earlier orders take priority. Incoming market orders are
executed at the highest bid limit or lowest ask limit and, in the case of large
volumes, walk up the book. Therefore, they can be executed against one limit
price or also against several limit prices. It also possible that market orders only
get executed partially if the limit order book does not have enough liquidity, how-
ever this is a very rare event for blue-chip stocks. In such a situation, the market
order then has to be executed immediately against the next incoming order. If it
cannot be executed at the last transaction price, the price is determined by the
next incoming limit order.
The transparency and the sole reliance on anonymous limit order submissions
make Frankfurt Stock Exchange a well-suited trading platform for the study of
the microstructure of markets and market participant behavior. In an interna-
tional context, the Xetra trading platform – at least its blue-chip segment – is
one of very few exchanges that operate as a pure limit order book market with-
out any dealers. For example, London Stock Exchange (LSE) uses the electronic
platform SETS which supports anonymous limit order trading, but it also of-
fers a dealer market off the book, which, effectively, competes with limit order
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traders. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) as well as the technology plat-
form NASDAQ also use hybrid systems of automated order-driven trading and
off-the-book matching which can improve prices. The Paris Stock Exchange, op-
erated by Euronext, uses an electronic system called NSC which, like Xetra, is a
purely order-driven market. However, traders can only see a limited amount of
orders in the book. The great advantage of using Xetra data for my analysis is
that it offers a comprehensive picture of a pure limit order book market in which
the limit order book is displayed openly and fully.
3.2 Data Set
3.2.1 Order Book Reconstruction
The data set which I use ranges from 1 January 2004 and to 31 March 2004. It
comprises the thirty largest stocks listed in Frankfurt which make up the German
blue-chip index DAX 30. Deutsche Boerse provided us with the entire trading
protocol which is recorded automatically for each action that takes place in the
Xetra system. The trading protocol keeps record of all order entries to the system,
order revisions, order cancellations, order expirations and executions. The data
I was provided with is the original output of the Xetra system which is produced
when any order is processed. As such, all events which took place in Xetra have to
be contained in the protocol by construction. The only modification of the data
is that the stock exchange deleted all originator information to keep customer
information confidential.
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Table 3.1 shows an excerpt of the raw data. Each order is recorded with a
unique order number, date and time stamp. The date column is coded in integer
values which count the number of days after the 01 January 1960. The time
also uses integer values to give the number of seconds after midnight. Further
information that is recorded includes the direction of the trade, the order type
and the event that it triggered (column 6 in Table 3.1). For example, the value
1 corresponds to order entries, 5 corresponds to partial fills and 4 corresponds
to final fills. Furthermore, all relevant price and quantity specifications and pro-
cessing information is recorded as well. If an order is revised or if it is partially
executed, the order number stays the same so that all actions that refer to one
and the same order can be traced. However, the matching of orders is not identi-
fied in the system: when a market order is entered and executed, the system only
generates a final fill record. Likewise, a final fill is recorded for the limit order,
however there is no identification that links these two orders. The matching of
limit and market orders was only possible by implementing the complete set of
trading rules of the exchange.
The first step of the data analysis is the reconstruction of each stock’s order
book. At each point in time, the volume of all limit orders which belong to the
same order book side and which carry the same limit order price is aggregated. A
new limit order event initiates an update of the order book: if an order is entered
at a price that is already in the book, the volume at that price is increased by the
volume of the new limit order. If there is no limit order in the book at that price,
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Table 3.1: Example of Allianz’s Trading Protocol
Order Stamp Information Price Size
ID Date Time Dir. Ty. Ev. Limit Match All Proc. Rem.
27746 16073 33485 B L 1 100.25 0 892 892 892
22817 16073 33496 S L 5 100.26 100.26 1700 100 1600
22817 16073 33500 S L 5 100.26 100.26 1700 500 1100
28473 16073 33500 B M 1 0 0 500 500 500
28473 16073 33500 B M 4 0 100.26 500 500 0
22817 16073 33505 S L 4 100.26 100.26 1700 1100 0
28650 16073 33505 B M 1 0 0 1450 1450 1450
28650 16073 33505 B M 5 0 100.26 1450 1100 350
28650 16073 33505 B M 4 0 100.29 1450 350 0
22665 16073 33506 S L 3 100.35 0 1300 1300 0
28708 16073 33506 S L 1 100.42 0 1300 1300 1300
22731 16073 33506 S L 3 100.31 0 376 376 0
28712 16073 33506 S L 1 100.36 0 376 376 376
28712 16073 33507 S L 3 100.36 0 376 376 0
28762 16073 33507 S L 1 100.37 0 376 376 376
Table 3.1 shows an excerpt of the raw data set. Each row corresponds to one event that
was recorded in the Xetra trading system. The columns contain all necessary information to
identify the event. Each event gets a unique order number (ID), date and time stamp (columns
1-3). Some general information is recorded with regard to the direction (Dir) and type of the
trade (Ty) as well as the processing events (Ev) in columns 4-6. Columns 7 and 8 contain
the limit and matching prices (Limit and Match). Columns 9-11 represent the original order
size (All), the processed size (Proc) and the remaining volume (Rem). This example is only
a small excerpt for a specific stock (Allianz). The complete data set has one matrix for each
stock. The number of rows varies between 867,369 and 4,728,368.
a new price limit with corresponding volume is added to the book. Likewise,
limit order cancellations reduce the book’s volume, while revisions reduce the
volume at the old price and increase the volume at the new price. The execution
of market orders also reduces the volume of the limit order book. As Deutsche
Boerse Group recorded the initial order book for each stock, I use a program that,
starting from the initial state, updates the limit order book continuously for each
event in the original data. To do justice to hidden liquidity in the book (which
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results from iceberg orders in the system for which only the peak is displayed in
the book), I first construct construct an order book of all visible limit orders and
secondly a book which contains visible as well as hidden orders.
The second step is to reduce the data to a manageable and regularly spaced
sample. The relevant frequency at which the order book should be sampled
depends on the issue under study. I save snapshots of the order book every 5
minutes, 15 minutes and 60 minutes. This yields time series of the order book
for all stocks at five different frequencies. Furthermore, I cut off the opening
and closing auction because their trading mechanism is different from the normal
continuous trading period. This reduces the data set to 64 trading days with the
number of order book snapshots ranging from 8 (at the 60-minute frequency) to
102 (at the 5 minute frequency). Each time series is sampled for the visible order
book and for the complete order book including hidden liquidity.
The third step is to match the trading activity to the reconstructed order
books. To achieve this aim I first construct time series which count the number
of each order type within the same time interval. Secondly I construct further
time series which aggregate the volumes of all different order types within the
same interval. I obtain two time series for each order type which give the number
of orders and their cumulated volumes. Each element belongs to the order book
of the corresponding interval. For longer intervals these volumes are larger by
construction and smaller for shorter frequencies. Next I turn to some descriptive
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics of the Data Set – Aggregation
Mean Median Max Min
Market capitalization 18.20 10.39 61.29 2.95
Average daily trading volume 114.79 75.22 348.60 14.13
Absolute bid-ask spreads 0.04 0.03 0.09 0.01
Relative bid-ask spreads 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.05
Depth at the best bid and ask 180,487 148,461 979,214 65,773
Table 3.2 summarizes the main characteristics of the stocks and corresponding limit order
books in the data set. Market capitalization is given in billions of Euros as of 01 January 2004.
Trading volume is the average daily trading volume in millions of Euros between 01 January
2004 and 31 March 2004. The average bid-ask spread and depth at the best bid and ask are
computed from the time series of limit order books. Absolute spreads and depth at the best
price are in Euros and relative spreads in %.
statistics of the stocks in the data set, their limit order books and their order
flow which characterize liquidity in the Xetra system.
3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.2 gives some summary statistics of the stocks in the data sample. The
market capitalizations as of 01 January 2004 range from 2.95 billion to 61.29
billion Euros. Together, the market capitalization of all DAX 30 stocks makes
up about 98% of the German market. The average daily trading volume varies
from 14.13 million Euros to 348.60 million Euros. Trading activity is fairly high:
even the least liquid stock is traded about 75 times a day on average. I use the 5-
minute snapshots of the order book to compute a time series of the bid-ask spread
and associated depth of all stocks. On average, the absolute spread between the
best ask price and the best bid price is between 0.01 and 0.09 Euros or, in relative
terms, 0.05% and 0.15%. The volume at the best bid and ask price lies between
54 3 Market Structure and Data
Figure 3.1: Variation in the Liquidity of the Sample Stocks
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Figure 3.1 shows the variation in the liquidity of the sample stocks. Panel A is a time series
graph of the market average of the bid-ask spread and the market trend. Panel B illustrates
spreads and depth in the cross-section.
65,773 and 979,214 Euros. In all, these figures show that the DAX 30 is a very
liquid segment that offers high volumes at fairly low transaction costs.18
Figure 3.1 illustrates the variation in the liquidity of the sample stocks, using
the bid-ask spread as the measure of liquidity. Panel A plots the time series
of the DAX 30 index performance and the time series of the average bid-ask
spread across stocks. The panel makes very clear that there is considerable time
18 Table A.1 in the appendix gives these figures individually for each stock of the data set.
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variation in the spreads. Spreads tend to be low when the market rises and high
when the market falls. However, in relative terms the variation of the market
spread is far stronger than the variation in the index return. Panel B is a plot
of the cross-sectional properties of liquidity. The differences in the spread are
not specially striking across stocks. The difference in depth, however, is fairly
strong: the deepest stock offers about seven times as much volume as the least
liquid stock. Furthermore, Panel B shows that stocks with low spreads also tend
to have high depth. The figure reinforces that liquidity should not be treated as
a constant cost component; rather, it bears considerable risk along time.
Table 3.3 compares the submission behavior for the various order types. On
average, 887,705 orders were submitted for a stock during the three month sample
period. About 97.3 % of all submissions were limit orders, 2.1 % market orders,
0.6 % iceberg orders and only 0.05 % market-to-limit orders. These percentages
show that the vast majority of order flow constitutes liquidity provision. Of the
submitted limit orders, 23 % got executed and 77 % cancelled. Evidently, the
largest proportion of liquidity supply gets cancelled and is not consumed. With
regard to order size, the average market order is 23,959 Euros, while the average
market-to-limit order is 19,522 Euros. If we compare these figures to the depth of
the order book we can conclude that, on average, even the least liquid stock (with
an average depth of 65,733 Euros) is liquid enough to absorb three normal-sized
trades within its best price range. In contrast, iceberg orders exhibit much larger
volumes (an average of 630,000 Euros). In relation to the normal order book
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Table 3.3: Average Order Submissions
Bid Side Ask Side All Orders
(Buys) (Sales) (in sum)
Panel A: Number of Submissions
Market Orders 9,512 9,563 19,075
Limit Orders 433,346 448,878 882,224
Market-to-Limit Orders 204 195 399
Iceberg Orders 2,568 2,514 5,082
Panel B: Average Size
Market Orders 23,888 24,261 23,959
Limit Orders 34,918 34,382 34,639
Market-to-Limit Orders 21,056 17,807 19,522
Iceberg Orders 630,990 629,804 630,655
Panel C: Cancellations and Executions
Limit Order Executions 103,044 100,777 203,821
Limit Order Cancellations 330,303 348,100 678,403
Table 3.3 gives an overview over the average number of order submissions and average
order size (in Euros) in my data sample. The averages are computed over all 30 stocks in
the blue-chip segment of FSE. Additionally, limit orders are split up into executions and
cancellations. Column 1 lists the bid side of the book, column 2 the ask side and the third
column gives figures for all orders.
depth, this volume is so large that anyone who submitted such a large limit order
would run the risk that the order would be interpreted as an informed trade.
This in turn would most probably lead to adverse price movements. An iceberg
order is way to hide large volumes. It must also be said that very often only the
tip of the iceberg gets executed and the rest is cancelled.
While the previous figures address average liquidity consumption, the data
also allows to compute how far individual market orders walk up the book: 84%
of all transactions take place within the best prices, while the remaining 16%
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Figure 3.2: Histogram of Market Order Ticks
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Figure 3.2 shows two histograms of the market order impact for two stocks, Adidas and Allianz.
The x-axis gives the number of ticks that the market order walks up the book beyond the best
price. The y-axis counts the number of events.
consume more liquidity than available at the best price. Figure 3.2 shows a
histogram of the number of ticks that market orders walk up the book if they
are too large to get executed at the best price. In this case, the largest part of
all market orders (in the figure Adidas and Allianz) got settled within the first
few ticks. However, some blocks clear the complete depth up to 25 ticks or more.
These figures vary strongly from stock to stock. However, in all they show that
the market as a whole is very liquid, that it mostly accommodates even large
trades within the best spread and that even if the volume is too large, most
of the matching takes place only very few ticks from the best price. Likewise,
nearly all limit order activity takes place in this region as well: limit orders that
are further from the best price because of price movements get cancelled or are
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Figure 3.3: Time-of-day Effects
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Figure 3.3 shows typical time-of-day effects for spreads and depth. The x-axis gives the time
of day and the y-axis the average relative spread (in %) or the average depth (in 100,000 of
Euros). Spreads exhibit the typical decreasing pattern, depth displays the typical increasing
pattern.
revised to have new and more competitive price limits. Nearly all new liquidity
flows into the book within the first ticks from the best price. Limit orders that
are far away from the best price are mostly stale orders that have been in the
order book for a longer time; new limit orders are only seldom submitted far from
the best price.
Finally, I illustrate time-of-day effects in Figure 3.3. Previous literature such
as Wood, McInish and Ord (1985), Jain and Joh (1988), Foster and Viswanathan
(1990) or McInish and Wood (1992) documents that liquidity shows strong sea-
sonal patterns, in particular on an intraday basis. I therefore plot average spreads
against their specific time of day and likewise for depth. Fig. 3.3 shows that,
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consistent with previous empirical evidence, spreads are higher and depth is lower
at the opening of the trading day. Spreads exhibit a pronounced L-shape over the
time of the day, while depth exhibits the corresponding upside-down L-pattern.
The figures for the market order flow are qualitatively identical. In other words,
the variation of liquidity contains a deterministic time-of-day component.
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Chapter 4
Resiliency of the Limit Order
Book
This chapter investigates the resiliency of an electronic limit order book where
there is centralized aggregation of liquidity and depth. I define resiliency as the
speed with which the temporary erosion of liquidity is corrected through the
inflow of new limit orders. I find strong evidence that the resiliency of each stock
is consistently high. It is strongest around the best price and gets steadily weaker
further from the best price. Furthermore, resiliency depends on microstructural
determinants like order arrival rates, trader patience, trading volume, uncertainty
and informed trading. Cross-sectionally, it has a high association with large
market-capitalized and high-beta stocks. It is not strongly correlated with either
spread or depth which reinforces its importance as an independent dimension of
liquidity.
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4.1 Introduction to Resiliency
It is widely recognized that market liquidity cannot be captured by a single
measure. The seminal literature on liquidity (Garbade (1982), Kyle (1985), and
Harris (1990)) identifies three main dimensions of liquidity: spread, depth and
resiliency. Spread is the price dimension and represents the transaction costs
faced by public traders, and is often measured by the quoted bid-ask spread or
the trade-based effective spread. Depth is the quantity dimension and reflects
the market’s ability to absorb and execute large orders with minimal price im-
pact, and is often measured by the quoted depth or by Kyle’s Lambda. Finally,
resiliency is the time dimension. In the context of a limit-order-book market,
following Garbade (1982), resiliency is the speed with which the temporary ero-
sion of the limit order book that is caused by a large uninformative order-flow
shock is corrected through the flow of new orders into the market. It relates to
a liquidity-induced reduction of the spread and replenishment of depth, not to
information-induced price changes.
This chapter is on resiliency, the time dimension of liquidity. Resiliency ad-
dresses a question that is very important for market participants, stock exchanges
and regulators, particularly in the context of order-matching market systems.
Public traders in such markets potentially face significant price risk and execu-
tion risk when they wait for the price and depth to bounce back to normal levels
after a large trade. For example, this happens to traders of large blocks who
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break up their trades into smaller blocks for a better execution price, and have to
wait for non-trivial time periods before they can execute successive blocks. Ar-
bitrageurs who typically work on large-volume-small-margin strategies also face
similar risks; and the ability of arbitrageurs to arbitrage away small price dis-
crepancies is essential for fair pricing and market integrity. With the market for
supplying liquidity becoming increasingly competitive, and often transcending
national boundaries, stock exchanges should arguably have a strong interest in
understanding the replenishment mechanism of the order book in order to be
able to attract and retain liquidity. Likewise, it is important for regulators to
understand the resiliency dimension of liquidity in-depth, in order to factor an
analysis of resiliency into their monitoring of market quality and stability.19
Spreads have been heavily researched: the literature is far too extensive to
adequately summarise here.20 Depth has also been reasonably well-researched.21
Surprisingly, even though resiliency provides a key insight into the nature of liq-
19 In a static context, Glosten (1994) and Seppi (1997) compare limit order markets and
hybrid systems. In a dynamic context, Huang and Stoll (1996), Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999),
Parlour and Seppi (2003) and Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) study the equilibrium of the
limit order book and order submission strategies, but they direct little attention to the stability
of limit order book markets.
20 One strand of the literature decomposes the spread into three components: one component
reflecting the inventory holding risk of liquidity suppliers, another component reflecting the
adverse-selection losses that liquidity suppliers make to more informed investors, and the last
component reflecting order-processing costs. See, for example, Huang and Stoll (1997), Stoll
(1989), and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). Another strand of the literature focusses on the
individual trade-based effective spread, and its decomposition into the adverse selection spread
and the realised spread. See, for example, Huang and Stoll (1996), Bessembinder (1997) and
Naik and Yadav (2003).
21 In particular, Hasbrouck (1991) and Kempf and Korn (1997) have analysed the effect
of transactions on market prices. Additionally, for example, Glosten and Harris (1988) and
Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) investigated the relationship between stock returns and
measures of depth, similar to Kyle’s Lambda.
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uidity supply in the market, we know relatively little about the empirical proper-
ties of resiliency.22 In particular, we do not know to what extent micro-structural
factors like trading activity, uncertainty and asymmetric information, contrarian
trading and momentum trading affect resiliency, we do not know what stock-
specific factors determine resiliency in the cross-section, and we do not know if
resiliency is related to the other dimensions of liquidity in some way or provides
independent new information. This chapter aims to fill this major gap in the
literature.
In this chapter, I investigate resiliency in an electronic limit order book mar-
ket. There are several reasons for choosing to investigate resiliency in an order
book setting rather than a dealer market setting.
1. With the enormous proliferation and growth in electronic order matching
systems, stock exchanges around the world are increasingly organised as
electronic order-driven markets. Except for the New York Stock Exchange,
the NASDAQ and the London Stock Exchange, major stock markets con-
duct trading almost exclusively through open electronic limit order books.
2. An electronic limit order market is more crucially dependent on the exis-
22 Coppejans, Domowitz, Madhavan (2003) do analyze the time variation of order book depth,
though they do not consider changes in the liquidity flow over time. Gomber, Schweickert and
Theissen (2004) measure the time it takes for a liquidity shock to dissipate to half its size.
A related strand of literature investigates the submission behavior and order aggressiveness of
market participants. Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) empirically analyze market order flows and
order aggressiveness. They document substantial serial correlation of market orders. Ranaldo
(2002), Ahn, Bae and Chan (2001), Bae, Jang and Park (2003) or Grammig, Heinen and
Rengifo (2004) take such analyses further. In contradistinction, the focus in this chapter is on
the continuous refreshment mechanism of the order book.
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tence of adequate resiliency relative to a dealer or a hybrid market structure.
Unlike a dealer market, a limit order book market depends only on limit or-
der submissions for new liquidity. This raises the issue of how a limit order
book market can ensure that enough new liquidity is submitted to the book
as liquidity gets consumed. Understanding the replenishment mechanism
requires a dynamic view of the limit order book.
3. Limit order books potentially allow a cleaner estimate of resiliency. In an
order book context, the resiliency is, quite literally, the rate of mean rever-
sion in the spread and the depth of the order book, with adequate controls
for the information content in trades. This is relatively straightforward to
observe, since the spread and depth of the order book can be measured with
precision. Furthermore, this approach does not require knowledge of the
“true price”. While there exist ways in which such estimations of resiliency
based on pricing errors can be made,23 the associated estimates are consid-
erably more noisy; we do not encounter this problem with limit order book
resiliency.
4. Agents who wish to submit a new limit order can do so at a price/tick of
their choice. This reveals an important facet of order-book based resiliency:
the replenishment of the order book can take place at different points of the
price-quantity schedule. If limit orders are submitted far from the former
best price, implicit transaction costs stay high. However if the book is
23 See Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) and Dong, Kempf and Yadav (2005).
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refilled close to the former best price, transaction costs get reduced again
very quickly. Clearly, the inflow of new liquidity close to the best price is
more valuable to investors than at prices far from the best price. Therefore,
resiliency can only be addressed adequately if the spread and depth at
different ticks are considered. This is a nuance that makes a limit order
book setting mandatory for the analysis of resiliency.
I investigate resiliency using limit order data from the electronic trading sys-
tem Xetra at the German stock exchange in Frankfurt. I choose the German mar-
ket over the markets in the US and the UK because, unlike these other markets,
the German market provides a purely order-driven setting without any dealers
and without significant lateral linkages to external liquidity suppliers or liquidity
supply systems. The behavior of limit order traders is hence not influenced by
resiliency supply from external sources. The trading platform of the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange faces no competition from ECNs and hardly any competition
from regional exchanges, and virtually all available liquidity is aggregated in the
centralized limit order book. Limit order traders in the German market face vir-
tually no competition from an upstairs market as in the UK or the US. Grammig
and Theissen (2005) report for Germany that, in 2002, only 1.5% of trades (con-
stituting only 0.25% of market value) went through the upstairs market. The
limit order book of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange is affected by few external fac-
tors, and offers a clinically uncontaminated view of the behavior of limit order
traders. Hence, it is well-suited for an investigation of resiliency.
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This chapter empirically investigates, for the first time, the main features of
resiliency as a dimension of liquidity in an electronic limit order market. Re-
siliency, to reiterate, addresses the following question: when trades, especially
those resulting from relatively large and uninformative orders, consume liquid-
ity by eroding the limit order book, how fast is liquidity replaced through the
competitive actions of market traders. Resiliency results from the interaction of
liquidity flowing into the market and liquidity being taken out. The inflow comes
from the submission of new limit orders, while the outflow results either from
the cancellation of limit orders or the execution of limit orders against newly
submitted market orders. Together, inflow and outflow determine the evolution
of the price-quantity schedule.
Specifically, I first address how I can formally measure resiliency. I set up
a mean reversion model of liquidity to capture the dynamics of the spread and
depth over time, and examine the relation between current and past liquidity
flows. I examine ask-side and bid-side resiliency separately, and also analyze
a range of different data frequencies. Second, I analyse the micro-structural
time-series factors that affect resiliency, in particular, information asymmetry,
uncertainty and trading activity. Third, I analyse the variation in resiliency
across stocks. And finally, I examine the relationship between resiliency and the
other two liquidity dimensions: spread and depth. My empirical investigation is
based on three-months data on the thirty stocks that consitute the DAX.
I find strong evidence that the liquidity dynamics of the order book follow
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a stable replenishment process: the resiliency for each stock is consistently high
and stable across different horizons. Empty limit order books are refilled quickly,
while full books attract less liquidity. Most clearly I observe resiliency in the
behaviour of liquidity suppliers around the first few ticks of the book, both for
the reduction of the spread as well as for the provision of new depth: resiliency is
strongest around the best price and gets steadily weaker the further I move away
from the best price in the book. Clearly, trades that are executed against the
book take away liquidity at the first few ticks, and traders who actively monitor
the book jump in straight away to exploit these profit opportunities in the book.
I also find that resiliency is dependent in a robust manner on microstructural
determinants. As predicted by Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005), the resiliency
of the spread increases in the proportion of patient traders and decreases with the
order arrival rate and at the end of the trading day. Furthermore, it decreases
with the amount of trading volume, while volatility affects buy and sell side
resiliency asymmetrically. The effects of these determinants on the resiliency
of depth are contrarian. The most probable explanation is that, in the time
series, spread resiliency and depth resiliency are displaced effects. When spread
resiliency is high, price-improving limit orders erode the depth at the best ticks
and therefore reduce depth resiliency. In the cross section, the results show very
consistently that firms with high spread resiliency also have high depth resiliency.
In particular, resiliency has a high association with large market-capitalized and
high-beta stocks. I also find that resiliency is not significantly correlated with
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either spread or depth. This reinforces, ex post, the importance of resiliency as
an independent dimension of liquidity. It cannot be seen or assumed as a replica
of the price or quantity dimension. This time dimension of liquidity provides
significant new information.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 gives a brief outline of the
liquidity proxies that are used in this chapter. Section 4.3 sets up a simple
framework of resiliency which outlines the concept of resiliency and the main hy-
potheses. In Section 4.4 I present the empirical evidence of resiliency. In Section
4.5 I explore the interaction of resiliency with microstructural determinants in
the time series. In Section 4.6 I analyze cross-sectional differences across stocks.
Section 4.7 shows the link between the resiliency dimension of liquidity and other
liquidity measures. Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Construction of Liquidity Measures
In the following section I construct liquidity measures on the basis of each stock’s
limit order book. As discussed above, liquidity is a property of an asset that
ensures that the asset can be traded at any time without high price impacts, yet
it is not obvious what proxies to use. In a limit order book market, the supply
of liquidity results from the submission of limit orders, while the consumption
can result from market orders being executed against the book or limit orders
being cancelled. Models such as Glosten (1994) or Sand˚as (2001) characterize
the limit order book by its price schedule. In line with their approaches, I choose
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two liquidity measures that capture the information of the price impact function:
the depth and spread of the book. The limit order data I use for the measures
are order book snapshots for 5-minute intervals.
I define the depth as the number of shares in the order book. Let nkA and n
k
B
denote the number of shares at tick k. At the best price in the book k = 0, one
tick away from the best price k is 1 and so forth. A or B indicate the ask and
bid sides of the order book. For each stock i I compute the cumulative depth
in the limit order book at any tick from the best price. For example, at tick
3 I obtain DEP kA,i = Σ
3
k=1n
k
A,i and DEP
k
B,i = Σ
3
k=1n
k
B,i. By construction, each
tick comprises the depth of the previous tick. Because traders can choose where
to submit limit orders in the book, the different tick regions reflect regions of
different liquidity supply behavior. To keep the analysis tractable, I consider
depth up to a maximum of ten ticks from the midquote. More than 99% of all
trades are executed within this range of the order book, so it seems reasonable
to restrict ourselves to the active part of the book.24
Beside the depth of the limit order book I also compute the spread that any
trader has to pay in excess of the midquote. Let l be an index of the number
of limit prices in the limit order book. At the best price l = 0, at the next best
price l = 1 and so forth. Furthermore, let us denote any price in the book by
p and the midquote by MQ. For each stock I compute half-spread measures for
24 I do not include the hidden part of iceberg orders in aggregate order book depth. Therefore
I use the exact limit order book that market participants observe and use to condition their
behavior on. Hidden liquidity is, by definition, not visible and does not belong to the decision
set of investors.
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different prices in the limit order book. For example, p0A−MQ is the half-spread
that an investor pays at the best ask price. p3A −MQ is the half-spread that is
incurred for the last unit of trade if the trade walks up three more steps in the
limit order book. The corresponding half-spread on the bid side is MQ − p3B.
While depth measures the volume of liquidity, the half-spread measure captures
the quality of liquidity in terms of its price difference to the perceived fair value
(which is assumed to be the midprice).
4.3 Framework and Hypotheses
Resiliency refers to the dynamic dimension of liquidity which measures how prices
and quantities in the order book evolve over time. In many studies, the time
dimension of liquidity is ignored. While it is straightforward to determine the
costs that one single trade would incur at a single point in time, it is difficult to
determine the costs of a sequence of trades. Firstly, any early transaction will
have an impact on the market price and liquidity which will then affect future
lots of the same trade. Furthermore, the submission of orders transmits a signal
to the market and can change the course of market events in an unpredictable
way. To capture the time dimension, I set up a model of the observed order book
dynamics and then include the interaction with market events.
Departing from the Garbade (1982) definition, I expect that a resilient limit
order book will get refilled as soon as its liquidity has been consumed. In other
words, I investigate the relationship between the past level of liquidity and current
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liquidity flow. Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) derive an equilibrium range
of spreads with a fixed upper and lower boundary. They define resiliency as the
probability that spreads revert back to their competitive level (see Chapter 2).
Consistent with this notion, I set up a mean reversion model of liquidity. Let Lt
denote liquidity a time t and let ∆Lt be the increment of liquidity from t − 1
to t, ∆Lt := Lt − Lt−1. I model liquidity as a stochastic process that consists
of a mean reversion component and a stochastic increment. For the empirical
implementation, let α and ϕ be the coefficients to be estimated. This yields the
specification
∆Lt = α− ϕLt−1 + εt (4.1)
where ϕ is an estimate of κ. It measures the intensity of mean reversion which
depends on the level of liquidity, L. The higher ϕ is, the stronger the pull-back
effect of liquidity to its long-run mean is and thus the higher resiliency is.
One implicit assumption of Equation 4.1 is that ∆t is equally spaced. As I
use order book snapshots at a fixed time interval, this assumption is not critical.
However, validity of the equal spacing for the cross-section of stocks is not that
clear. Comparing the resiliency of small and large stocks against the same time
frame might only measure differences in size instead of resiliency. This is an
argument in favor of choosing the time interval in relation to the trading intensity
of a stock. On the other hand, any trader who needs to liquidate a large position is
bound to the same time horizon for all stocks. From a trader’s point of view, using
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the hourly clock instead of the trading clock is the more appropriate approach. I
follow the latter avenue and use the hourly clock keeping mind that it need not
be the only valid specification.
A second issue to discuss is the choice of the best-suited frequency. In elec-
tronic markets, traders can monitor the limit order book more or less continu-
ously. In times of heavy trading activity, several limit orders are processed within
a second. Market orders take place about every 30 seconds for active stocks and
up to every five or six minutes for less active stocks – for example every 30.60
seconds for Deutsche Telekom and every 6 minutes and 31.80 seconds for Frese-
nius. If I choose a frequency that is too long I will not be measuring the liquidity
adjustment of the book to a trade because very many trades will have taken
place. If we choose a frequency that is too short we will have too many intervals
in which no trades take place and liquidity adjustments are not order-induced.
Since I assume that not all market participants react instantaneously I allow some
time until the discovery of the cleared order book and compute resiliency at a
5-minute, 15-minute and 60-minute frequency.
Market participants who trade assets to do arbitrage or rebalance portfolios
will need to know how resiliency interacts with market events and microstructural
factors to assess favorable and unfavorable moments for trading. I depart from
the limit order book model in Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) which provides
the following hypotheses (see Chapter 2):
• Resiliency increases (ϕ rises) with the patience of traders.
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• Resiliency decreases (ϕ falls) with the order arrival rate.
• Resiliency decreases (ϕ falls) with at the end of the trading day.
In addition, the demand curve literature25 makes predictions about prices in
the presence of trading volume and information. The information hypothesis
states that an adverse impact of informative trades on the price will not be
reversed. This implies that less new limit orders get submitted in information-
intensive periods. The price pressure hypothesis states that trading volume only
has a temporary effect on the price until liquidity suppliers reverse the price
impact. This implies that trade-intensive periods stimulate the submission of
new limit orders and thus increase resiliency. Finally, Foucault (1999) and Handa,
Schwartz and Tiwari (2003) predict an asymmetric effect of bad news on limit
order submissions: buy limit orders are submitted more cautiously and sell limit
orders more aggressively.26 Let us summarize the implications for resiliency:
• Resiliency decreases (ϕ falls) in the presence of informed trading.
• Resiliency increases (ϕ rises) with trading volume.
• Bad news has asymmetric effects on ask and bid side resiliency.
25 The demand curve literature discusses whether the demand curve of stock prices is flat or
sloped. For more details and evidence see Harris and Gurel (1986), Shleifer (1986) Dhillon and
Johnson (1991), Beneish and Whaley (1996) or Kaul, Mehrotra and Morck (2000).
26 Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers (1990) and Saar (2001) make a similar point by arguing
that the ask and bid side of the limit order book behave asymmetrically. Brokers are particularly
unwilling to take short positions to accommodate large block purchases, because they might be
forced to buy the assets at unfavorable conditions later. In the case of a limit order book, the
argument implies that traders on the bid side might be more hesitant to post limit orders.
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In the following sections I estimate the mean reversion model of resiliency and
analyze the impact of microstructural factors along time. As traders will choose
more resilient stocks over less resilient stocks all things equal, I will also assess
cross-sectional differences in ϕ.
4.4 Dynamics of the Limit Order Book
The previous section set up an econometric model for the estimation of resiliency.
In the following section I estimate the resiliency of the depth and spread for each
stock in the data sample. I then vary the tick at which liquidity is measured and
use different frequencies to examine how robust resiliency is across ticks and time
horizons.
4.4.1 Base Estimation of Resiliency
Let us begin the empirical implementation of Equation 4.1 by estimating the
spread and depth reversal. I adopt a cross-sectional SUR estimation in which all
stocks are pooled. The advantage of this approach is that it offers a lot of free-
dom to constrain parameters to be stock-specific or to vary across stocks.27 The
cross-sectional SUR approach yields joint GLS estimates which are corrected for
contemporaneous correlation and heteroscedasticity. I start with a relatively long
lag length and shorten the model by the usual t-statistics of the lag coefficients.
I repeat the procedure until the lag length is significantly different from zero and
27 To test the stability of the results, I also performed all following computations on a stock-
by-stock basis. Qualitatively the results are the same, however the approach has the strong
disadvantage that it is more difficult to assess the significance of coefficients across equations.
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all further autocorrelation of the error term is eliminated. The constant and the
mean reversion parameter are firm-specific while the parameters of the lagged
values are constrained to be equal across stocks. I run the following regression:
∆Li,t = αi − ϕiLi,t−1 + Σnk=1γk∆Li,t−k + εi,t (4.2)
In the equation, L denotes liquidity. Furthermore, let us define ∆L as the
liquidity change in the current period, ∆Lt := Lt − Lt−1. In the estimation,
I substitute L by the spread and depth. The parameter ϕ measures the mean
reversion of liquidity while the γ parameters are lag coefficients. Lags are included
up to a length of 20; beyond that they are not significant anymore and the
usual diagnostic checks show no evidence of serial correlation. ε is a normally
distributed white noise error term. If ϕ in the above model equals zero, the
equation is entirely in first differences and will have a unit root. The t-statistic
will not follow the usual t-distribution anymore; instead I test for the presence
of a unit root by means of the augmented Dickey-Fuller critical t-values. As the
model only contains an intercept and no time trend, the correct value is the so-
called τµ statistic which is 3.43 at the 1% significance level and 2.86 at the 5%
level.
Table 4.1 gives the results for the resiliency of the limit order book at the third
tick for depth (i.e. 0.03 Euros from the best price) and at the third price (i.e.
the third-best price after the best price) for the half-spread. The mean reversion
parameter is significantly positive for every single stock both for the depth and
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Table 4.1: Resiliency of Order Book Liquidity
Depth Spread
Ask Bid Ask Bid
ϕ tϕ ϕ tϕ ϕ tϕ ϕ tϕ
Adidas 0.26 17.40 0.24 15.73 0.29 18.58 0.28 17.78
Allianz 0.42 26.10 0.42 25.50 0.38 27.05 0.37 25.97
Altana 0.28 18.46 0.29 19.25 0.30 18.88 0.27 17.66
BASF 0.37 23.67 0.39 23.99 0.37 24.68 0.37 24.47
Bayer 0.25 17.12 0.33 21.17 0.40 27.74 0.38 26.31
BMW 0.14 10.92 0.30 18.95 0.34 22.96 0.35 22.57
Commerzbank 0.18 12.80 0.21 14.47 0.38 24.20 0.36 22.25
Continental 0.20 13.66 0.23 15.00 0.22 14.49 0.29 18.28
DaimlerChrysler 0.37 24.15 0.24 16.73 0.42 40.58 0.40 38.47
Deutsche Bank 0.39 24.34 0.40 24.19 0.38 26.34 0.36 24.67
Deutsche Boerse 0.23 15.38 0.33 19.19 0.26 16.49 0.27 17.34
Deutsche Post 0.13 10.23 0.27 17.75 0.29 18.20 0.29 18.61
Deutsche Telekom 0.11 9.63 0.13 10.48 0.44 36.24 0.42 30.88
E.ON 0.43 27.17 0.30 19.68 0.40 32.97 0.38 29.01
Fresenius 0.17 12.21 0.15 10.24 0.23 15.19 0.21 14.14
Henkel 0.28 18.34 0.26 17.17 0.28 18.06 0.28 17.97
Infineon Technologies 0.16 13.45 0.16 12.20 0.41 26.98 0.39 25.35
Linde Lufthansa 0.30 19.56 0.23 15.58 0.27 17.00 0.27 17.33
Lufthansa 0.20 13.29 0.25 16.45 0.42 40.11 0.39 36.88
MAN 0.25 16.41 0.24 16.54 0.25 16.17 0.29 18.16
Metro 0.30 19.02 0.25 16.95 0.33 20.99 0.29 18.05
Mu¨nchener Ru¨ck 0.40 25.35 0.39 23.77 0.35 24.03 0.32 22.09
RWE 0.35 22.32 0.33 20.87 0.39 24.82 0.37 23.49
SAP 0.38 23.98 0.43 26.03 0.35 23.08 0.36 23.01
Schering 0.35 22.46 0.27 17.99 0.39 29.09 0.39 26.72
TUI 0.20 13.73 0.24 15.95 0.30 18.62 0.29 18.76
Volkswagen 0.35 22.47 0.33 23.53 0.40 29.14 0.37 26.44
ThyssenKrupp 0.23 15.79 0.27 17.81 0.35 21.48 0.34 21.43
HypoVereinsbank 0.16 13.57 0.14 11.36 0.42 40.51 0.40 38.33
Siemens 0.37 23.87 0.39 24.35 0.40 28.46 0.39 27.02
Aggregate 0.22 41.57 0.24 41.02 0.34 46.91 0.33 46.34
Table 4.1 reports the regression results for the resiliency of the limit order book. The columns
give the resiliency parameter ϕi with its corresponding t-values for the ask side and the bid
side of the order book. The results are reported both for the depth and spread of the limit
order book. The final row gives the resiliency parameter if constrained to be equal across
stocks.
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the spread of the order book. The last row of the table summarizes these results
by repeating the estimation and constraining the mean reversion parameter to
be the same across stocks. For depth, the constrained parameter ϕ is 0.22 with a
t-statistic of 41.57 on the ask side and 0.24 with a t-statistic of 41.02 on the bid
side. For the half-spread, the constrained parameter ϕ is 0.34 with a t-statistic of
46.91 on the ask side and 0.33 with a t-statistic of 46.34 on the bid side. In other
words, deviations from the average level of liquidity are reversed by about 20 to
30% in the next time interval. As discussed above, positive estimates of ϕ imply
that the inflow of new liquidity to the order book is strongest if the past level of
liquidity was low. Liquidity flows to the book faster if the order book has been
cleared, which is evidence of resiliency. Comparing the ask side and the bid side
results I observe that there is little difference between the coefficients on the buy
side and sell side (0.22 vs 0.24 and 0.34 vs 0.33). The R2 values are around 0.35
for depth and 0.41 for the spread. All Durbin-Watson statistics are very close to
2, which implies that there is no autocorrelation in the error term.
4.4.2 Order Book Tick and Time Horizon
Table 4.2 reports the behavior of the mean reversion parameter if I vary the
number of ticks for which I determine the depth and the half-spreads. The
tick in the left column indicates the maximum tick or step in the limit order
book for which I measure liquidity. The table displays estimates constrained
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Table 4.2: Resiliency at Different Ticks
Depth Spread
Ask Bid Ask Bid
Tick/ Step ϕ tϕ ϕ tϕ ϕ tϕ ϕ tϕ
0 0.40 44.43 0.41 45.03 0.47 50.31 0.47 50.31
1 0.29 43.35 0.30 41.50 0.43 49.01 0.42 48.09
2 0.22 41.82 0.24 39.94 0.38 47.31 0.38 47.44
3 0.22 41.57 0.24 41.02 0.34 46.91 0.33 46.34
4 0.15 39.05 0.17 38.81 0.30 45.01 0.30 45.33
5 0.13 38.88 0.15 37.99 0.27 44.89 0.26 45.02
10 0.08 36.57 0.08 33.70 0.16 40.23 0.17 40.99
Table 4.2 reports the regression results of limit order book resiliency for the depth and
half-spread. In the case of depth, the measures are computed for different tick sizes and, in
the case of the half spread, for different steps in the limit order book.
over all stocks.28 The estimates in Table 4.2 highlight that the limit order book
is strongly resilient irrespective of the tick which is considered. However, the
strength of mean reversion gets less with increasing tick size. For the depth of
the limit order book, the coefficient ϕ drops from around 0.40 (on the ask side)
at the best price to 0.08 ten ticks away from the best price. For the spread, ϕ
is about 0.47 (on the ask side) and drops to 0.16 ten steps from the best price.
The bid side behaves in the same way. In all, resiliency at limit prices close to
the prevailing best price is strongest. Most of the action in the limit order book
takes place in a very limited range. When the order book is empty, new limit
orders get submitted to gain price priority and have a high probability of getting
28 Again the computations were also performed with non-constrained coefficients and yielded
qualitatively identical results.
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Table 4.3: Resiliency at Different Frequencies
Depth Spread
Frequency Ask Bid Ask Bid
5 minute intervals 0.223 0.241 0.349 0.338
41.573 41.017 46.910 46.344
15 minute intervals 0.391 0.432 0.538 0.559
41.516 42.175 45.662 46.600
60 minute intervals 0.712 0.777 0.871 0.873
52.489 52.778 53.347 56.803
Table 4.3 reports the regression results of order book resiliency for liquidity at different
frequencies. The table reports the ask and bid side results for both the depth and the
half-spreads in the limit order book. The depth of the limit order book is computed for the
first three ticks and the spread is computed for the third step of the book.
executed. Thus the replenishment mechanism is strongest around the best prices
and we see the strongest evidence of resiliency in that region.
To complete the estimation of the basic model let us focus on the impact of
the trading frequency on the resiliency estimates. Table 4.3 displays the resiliency
estimates obtained at different frequencies. For the sake of brevity, I only report
the constrained estimates across all stocks. Again, the depth in the limit order
book is computed up to the third tick, while the spread refers to half-spreads at
the third step in the limit order book. The table shows that all results remain
strongly significant over the different frequencies. It is evident that for all mea-
sures the resiliency parameters become stronger for longer intervals. While the
level variable stays the same, the difference from t − 1 to t can become much
larger if the trading interval is longer. Thus, the process exhibits stronger mean
reversion. We see that mean reversion is significant at various frequencies as
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documented by the high t-statistics; it is a robust phenomenon in high-frequency
data as well as longer intervals. From an economic perspective, it seems plausible
that the amount of new liquidity which is submittted after an eroded order book
increases with the time horizon.
4.5 Interaction of Resiliency andMicrostructural
Factors
In this section I investigate how resiliency interacts with microstructural factors
such as information asymmetry, trading activity and uncertainty. The first sub-
section explains the construction of the microstructural proxies, while the second
subsection gives details on the estimation procedure and presents the results.
4.5.1 Construction of Microstructure Proxies
In section 4.3 I discussed that resiliency should be associated with the order arrival
rate, the patience of traders, the information intensity of trading, the trading
volume and bad news. Furthermore, I expect a different level of resiliency at the
end of the trading day. Let us now turn to the construction of these determinants.
I measure the information intensity of the trading period by proxying the
probability with which trades were submitted by informed traders. A prominent
summary measure of informed trading is the PIN measure whose empirical imple-
mentation is developed in Easely, Kiefer, O’Hara and Paperman (1996), Easely,
Kiefer and O’Hara (1997) and Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002). PIN departs
from the order imbalance in a stock to derive a probability measure. Since it has
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to be computed over various days and I need a measure for each period, I proxy
PIN by the imbalance between buy and sell market orders. This proxy assumes
that the order imbalance reflects information directly which is the closest I can
get to PIN for high-frequency levels. To compute the measure, I determine the
number of market orders from t − 1 to t on the ask side and the bid side of the
order book, nMOA,t and nMOB,t. I can then calculate the surplus of market
orders for each order book side which corresponds to a simple measure of order
imbalance OI:
OIA,t = nMOA,t − nMOB,t (4.3)
OIB,t = nMOB,t − nMOA,t (4.4)
OIA,t and OIB,t are identical by construction except for their sign. The reason for
this convention is that suppliers of sell limit orders should react to a sell surplus
in the same way as suppliers of buy limit orders do to a buy surplus. As the
absolute value of the surplus has no real economic meaning, I finally transform
order imbalance into a 0-1-variable where the highest 10% of imbalances receive
a 1 and all other values are set to zero. This dummy variable isolates the effect
of periods in which trading is information-intensive.
The next determinant that I turn to is trading activity. I proxy trading
activity by the market order volume submitted in a given interval. Let MOA,t
denote the volume of all market orders on the ask side between t − 1 and t.
Likewise, let MOB,t denote market order volume on the bid side of the order
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book between t − 1 and t. I then obtain trading volume as the sum of all buy
and sell market orders:
TRVt =MOA,t +MOB,t (4.5)
As trading volume is clustered very strongly in some periods I take the log values
of volume as the proxy for trading volume.
I proxy bad news by the unexpected component of volatility. To determine
unexpected volatility I employ the Bollerslev (1986) GARCH approach. I choose a
GARCH(1,1) specification and model the variance of stock returns conditional on
past squared residuals. At this point however I have the problem that conditional
volatility will no doubt be strongly correlated with trading volume. As I want to
include both variables in the following estimations, I include trading volume in
the estimation of conditional volatility as in Lamoureux and Lastrapes (1990). I
thus succeed in disentangling volume and volatility. The equations of the model
are:
rt = µt−1 + εt (4.6)
εt | (TRVt, εt−1, εt−2, ...) ∼ N(0, ht) (4.7)
ht = α0 + α1εt−1 + α2ht−1 + α3TRVt (4.8)
where rt is the rate of return, µt−1 is the mean of rt conditional on past informa-
tion and trading volume, α0 to α3 are the coefficients of the conditional volatility
equation and ht is the conditional volatility. The residuals from this model, εt.,
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yield the unexpected component of volatility, UNXV , which, by construction,
will be orthogonal to TRV.
Furthermore, I construct the variables which are associated with resiliency in
the Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) model. Firstly, I compute the proportion
of patient traders in the population in each interval as the number of limit orders
(nLO), corrected for the number of cancellations (nCA) in relation to the overall
number of orders in the interval:
PATA,t = (nLOA,t − nCAA,t)/(nLOA,t + nMOA,t − nCAA,t) (4.9)
PATB,t = (nLOB,t − nCAB,t)/(nLOB,t + nMOB,t − nCAB,t) (4.10)
The arrival rate is simply the sum of market and limit orders in an interval, again
corrected for the number of cancellations:29
ARA,t = nLOA,t + nMOA,t − nCAA,t (4.11)
ARB,t = nLOB,t + nMOB,t − nCAB,t (4.12)
As with trading volume, the arrival rate has very strong peaks at times. Therefore
I use logs again. Finally, I construct a 0-1-variable ENDt which gets assigned
a value of 1 if the observation is from the last 45 minutes of the day and zero
otherwise. In all, I now have six variables (OI, TRV , UNXV , PAT , AT and
END) which I use to condition resiliency in a time series framework.
29 I follow Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) in their definition of order arrivals. Strictly
speaking the term arrival rate is misleading, because order arrivals are defined in terms of their
absolute numbers (and not as a rate).
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4.5.2 Impact of Microstructure Proxies on Resiliency
In the assessment of the interaction effects of microstructural factors and re-
siliency, I re-estimate the basic resiliency model, yet I include the microstructural
determinants as conditioning variables. In particular, the resiliency parameters
ϕ are now functions of the conditioning variables. The regression model is the
following:
∆Li,t = αi − ϕiLi,t−1 + Σnk=1γk∆Li,t−k + εi,t (4.13)
ϕi = β0,i + β1OIi,t + β2ENDi,t + β3PATi,t + β4ARi,t (4.14)
+β5TRVi,t + β6UNXVi,t
In the above equations, ϕi in the top line is substituted by the functional
relationship specified in the bottom two lines. OI is the dummy variable of
information-intensive periods, AR is the order arrival rate, PAT is the proportion
of patient traders, END is a dummy variable for the end of the trading day, TRV
corresponds to trading volume and UNXV is the proxy of bad news. The indices
in the equations show that the conditioning variables are time-varying and stock-
specific. In the SUR estimation, I let the base level of resiliency be stock-specific
(β0,i), however I constrain the impact of the conditioning variables to be the same
for all stocks, therefore β1 to β6 carry no firm indices. This notion is appealing
because if there is an economically meaningful link between resiliency and the
microstructural determinants, it should be present for all stocks.
Table 4.4 shows the results for the resiliency of the limit order book. The
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Table 4.4: Time Series Impact on Depth Resiliency
Depth Spread
Ask Bid Ask Bid
Variables: β tβ β tβ β tβ β tβ
Constant -0.83 -39.83 -0.82 -37.91 -0.02 -43.57 -0.02 -44.01
OI -0.01 -3.02 -0.01 -1.26 -0.00 -1.01 -0.01 -4.12
AR 0.03 12.70 0.02 8.99 -0.00 -3.86 -0.00 -0.04
PAT -0.02 -1.36 0.03 2.26 0.02 3.19 0.01 1.89
END 0.01 1.24 0.02 3.79 -0.01 -2.05 -0.01 -4.35
TRV 0.01 4.90 0.01 6.42 -0.01 -13.83 -0.01 -10.26
UNXV -1.88 -8.09 1.09 6.03 3.68 26.10 -3.83 -22.83
Table 4.4 reports the results of the SUR estimation for resiliency coefficients that have been
conditioned on time series factors. The mean reversion parameter ϕ is a function of six time
series factors (as specified in Equation 4.14): information intensity (OI), order arrival rate
(AR), proportion of patient traders (PAT ), time of the trading day (END), trading intensity
(TRV ) and bad news (UNXV ).
table gives resiliency both for the depth as well as the half-spreads. A positive
β coefficient means that resiliency is positively associated with the conditioning
variable and a negative coefficient implies negative association. I can draw the
following conclusions:
• With regard to order imbalance, OI, all coefficients are negative. For the
resiliency of depth, the ask side coefficient of order imbalance is significant
and for the resiliency of the half-spread, the bid side coefficient is significant.
Negative coefficients imply that resiliency is lower in information-intensive
periods and higher in the presence of non-informative trades. These results
are evidence of the fact that resiliency is lower when the informativeness of
trades is high. Economically this implies that limit order traders are not
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prepared to replace liquidity in the presence of informed trading; if they
did they would lose money against better informed investors.
• We observe that the effects of the order arrival rate (AR), the proportion
of patient traders (PAT ) and the end of the trading day (END) on the
resiliency of the spread are as predicted in Foucault, Kadan and Kandel
(2005). The resiliency of the spread is significantly higher if the proportion
of patient traders is high (both on the ask and bid side). In economic
terms this means that, to a large extent, patient traders are responsible
for the supply of new liquidity and therefore the replenishment of the limit
order book. In contrary, resiliency is negatively associated with the order
arrival rate (ask side coefficient is significant) and the end of the trading
day (bid and ask coefficients are significant). This implies that a high
number of new orders leads to less resiliency because new orders consume
the supplied liquidity and therefore impede that the book gets refilled. The
most plausible explanation for weak resiliency at the end of the trading day
is that there is no incentive for limit order traders to submit new liquidity
as it is less likely to get consumed before the close; therefore the book does
not refresh as fast anymore.
• Furthermore, the effects of the arrival rate and the end of the day on the
resiliency of the depth are the opposite to the effects on spread resiliency:
depth resiliency is positively associated with the order arrival rate and the
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end of the trading day. The results for trader patience are mixed. This
indicates that spread resiliency and depth resiliency are not synchronous.
Rather, spread improvement and depth replenishment do not seem to take
place in the same time periods. This result is plausible because high spread
resiliency erodes depth by definition: a new best quote improves the spread,
but it reduces depth as depth now only comprises one single order. There-
fore, depth recovers later than the spread.
• Similar to the order arrival rate, trading volume also has a negative effect
on the resiliency of the spread. Both the coefficients on the ask side and
on the bid side are highly significant. Subsequently, the improvement of
the spread is lower in environments with a high amount of trading. Again,
the impact on the resiliency of the depth is opposite: when trading is high,
limit order traders are less likely to improve the spread and more likely to
increase depth. This is additional evidence that there is lagged relationship
between spread and depth improvement.
• The effect of unexpected volatility on resiliency is asymmetric. For the
resiliency of depth, the ask side estimate is significantly negative and the
bid side is significantly positive. This implies that, in the presence of high
unexpected volatility, resiliency is weaker on the ask side and stronger on
the bid side. The evidence suggests an unwillingness of limit order traders
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to buy when volatility is high and a stronger willingness to sell. Again, the
resiliency of the half-spread is the other way round.
All together, informed trading has a negative effect on resiliency as we ex-
pected in section 4.3. Likewise, the results for the resiliency of the spread confirm
the hypotheses in Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005). Another striking point
are the opposite effects of the time series variables on the resiliency of the depth.
The most plausible explanation is that, in the time series, the resiliency of the
depth and of the spread are not synchronous: fast spread improvements reduce
the depth at the best tick and, likewise, large depth improvements require stable
spreads. Therefore the effects are opposite.30
4.6 Resiliency in the Cross-Section
If resiliency varies over time and across stocks, the choice of resilient stocks will
ceteris paribus lead to more successful trade execution. It will be more important,
the smaller the per-unit profits and the higher the turnover volume of trading
strategies. In this section I focus on the cross-sectional perspective of resiliency
and examine what characteristics stocks with high resiliency share.
An important property of a stock is its risk. I measure the overall risk of a
stock i by the volatility of its return, V OLi. Furthermore, I use the beta factor
of stock, BFi, for its exposure to systematic market risk. It is computed over
30 With the help of the conditioning variables I construct time series of resiliency and conduct
Granger causality tests. I observe Granger causality both from spread resiliency to depth
resiliency and vice versa. The study of the asynchronous effects of spread and depth resiliency
would probably require an examination of spread improvements and depth reactions on a much
finer frequency to see which effect leads the other. I leave this to future research.
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a time series of stock returns that takes the DAX30 as the market portfolio.
This data is provided publicly by the German Stock Exchange. Because the
previous section showed that resiliency is negatively associated with informed
trading, I also include a factor that measures such information asymmetries. In
the cross section it seems plausible that informed trading has an impact on the
liquidity supply if the losses of liquidity suppliers to informed traders are high.
Therefore I take the stock return in each interval, sign it by the direction of order
imbalance and take the sum of all signed returns. Under the assumption that
order imbalance reflects information, this measure computes the overall profits
of an informed traders, IPi. Finally, I follow Banz (1981) and Fama and French
(1992) in adding the firm size as a cross-sectional stock characteristic. Like in
the literature, I use the log of market capitalization, MCi, to measure size.
In a first step, Panel A of Table 4.5 shows the correlation of the factors
among each other. Overall risk (volatility) and systematic risk (beta factor)
are associated fairly strongly (0.465) which is not surprising. Otherwise, the
correlations are low as we would expect, since their is not obvious relationship
between these factors. Panel B shows the correlations of the depth and spread
resiliency with these factors. The results are averages of the ask side and the
bid side. Market capitalization and the beta factor are both positively correlated
with resiliency. In economic terms this implies that investors are prepared to
provide new liquidity fast if the stock is very large (and therefore usually well-
known and heavily traded). Likewise, investors provide new liquidity quickly if
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Table 4.5: Correlation of Cross-Sectional Factors and Resiliency
Panel A: Correlation Matrix of Cross-Sectional Factors
BF IMB MC VOL
Beta Factor BF 1.000 0.086 0.250 0.465
Informed Trader Profits IMB 1.000 0.194 -0.126
Market Capitalization MC 1.000 -0.161
Return Volatility VOL 1.000
Panel B: Correlation Matrix of Resiliency and Cross-Sectional Factors
BF IMB MC VOL
Resiliency of Depth ϕD 0.085 -0.161 0.268 -0.198
Resiliency of the Spread ϕS 0.356 -0.221 0.210 -0.223
Table 4.5 reports correlation of cross-sectional factors and resiliency measures. Panel A shows
the top half of the correlation matrix of the cross-sectional factors amongst each other. Panel
B shows the correlation of the resiliency measures with these cross-sectional factors. The
critical value at the 5%-quantile is ∓ 0.153.
they know that the stock is a high-beta stock. In contrast, volatility and informed
trader profits are negatively correlated with resiliency. Economically speaking,
volatility and informed trader profits are viewed as risky properties of a stock
which impede investors from readily supplying more liquidity; hence resiliency
is lower and the correlation between these factors and resiliency negative. The
correlation structure is consistent for spread and depth resiliency.
Let us now turn to the cross-sectional estimation. I re-estimate Equation 6.1
with informed trader profits, market capitalization, beta and return volatility as
conditioning variables. The estimation procedure is the same as in the time series
section: again I model the resiliency parameter ϕ as function of the conditioning
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Table 4.6: Cross-Sectional Impact on Mean Reversion
Depth Spread
Conditioning variables Ask Bid Ask Bid
Base Level of Resiliency δ0 0.34 0.27 0.27 0.29
17.30 13.87 15.43 15.60
Informed Trader Profits δ1 -1.84 -1.36 -1.20 -1.07
-8.98 -6.53 -8.17 -6.88
Beta Factor δ2 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06
2.72 4.02 7.54 8.68
Market Capitalization (logs) δ3 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
0.48 3.90 1.36 1.07
Return Volatility δ4 -9.48 -6.59 0.63 -1.39
-7.57 -5.16 0.58 -1.23
Table 4.6 shows the results for the estimation of Equation 4.16. I examine the cross-section
impact of informed trader profits, the beta factor, market capitalization and return volatility
on resiliency. The results are displayed for the ask and bid side of spread and depth
resiliency. The first row is the estimate of the coefficient and the second row always gives the
corresponding t-statistic.
variables. The model is:
∆Li,t = αi − ϕiLi,t−1 + Σnk=1γk∆Li,t−k + εi,t (4.15)
ϕi = δ0 + δ1IPi + δ2BFi + δ3MCi + δ4V OLi (4.16)
In the above equations, ϕi in the top line is substituted by the functional
relationship specified in the bottom two lines. Therefore, the mean reversion
parameter becomes a function of certain variables. The subscripts in the equa-
tions show that the conditioning variables are not time-varying yet stock-specific.
The parameters of these conditioning variables are assumed to be the same over
all stocks, therefore δ0 to δ5 carry no firm indices. I allow the intercept of the
resiliency model to be stock-specific, αi.
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Table 4.6 shows the results for the estimation of Equation 4.16. Firstly, δ0
reflects the base level of resiliency if all conditioning variables are zero (which I
call the “base level” of resiliency). Clearly, the base level of resiliency remains
strongly significant for depth and spread resiliency. The coefficients are slightly
lower than without conditioning variables. The coefficients of the cross-sectional
factors confirm the relationships that we observed in the correlation structure.
Informed trader profits and resiliency are negatively associated (with highly sig-
nificant coefficients for both spread and depth resiliency): stocks for which in-
formed traders make higher profits have a less resilient liquidity supply. This is
plausible as liquidity suppliers fear providing liquidity to better informed traders
who will then make a profit from the transaction. If they therefore anticipate
insiders making profits they reduce their liquidity supply. In contrast, the beta
factor has strongly positive relationship with resiliency. Stocks that have a high
beta factor also have a high resiliency. This reflects that investors care about
beta and see potential profits in providing liquidity to high-beta stocks. The re-
sults for market capitalization are not quite as strong: all coefficients are positive,
however only one estimate is significant. This is evidence that large stocks tend
to be more resilient, however the evidence is fairly weak. Finally, return volatil-
ity and resiliency have a negative relationship: more volatile stocks also have a
less resilient liquidity supply. A plausible explanation is that volatility reflects
risk and uncertainty; in risky and uncertain environments liquidity suppliers fear
making losses as they cannot be sure about the true asset value. Therefore they
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reduce their liquidity supply which leads to lower resiliency. This result is very
strong for depth resiliency (on the bid and ask side). However, volatility has no
significant impact on spread resiliency.
An interesting point to note is how consistent the cross-sectional effects are
for spread and depth resiliency. The relationship with informed trader profits,
beta and market capitalization is exactly the same. Volatility only has an effect
on depth resiliency, while it does not affect spread resiliency. If I compare these
results to the time series results, I see that, on a more microstructural scale,
spread and depth resiliency are not synchronous. This suggests a lead-lag rela-
tionship on a very high frequency. In the cross section however, stocks that have
a high depth resiliency also tend to have a high spread resiliency; spread and
depth resiliency are linked to the same firm characteristics in the cross section.
4.7 Relationship with other Liquidity Measures
Evidently, the limit order book of stocks shows a strong tendency to refill once
it has been cleared. The mechanism is particularly strong for larger stocks with
a high exposure to risk and for stocks with low informational asymmetries. A
final question that I pose is whether this difference in liquidity is already taken
into account for by other dimensions. To do this, I examine the correlation of
the resiliency measures with the bid-ask spread and depth at the spread.
At first I re-estimate the resiliency model in Equation 6.1 on a daily basis and
collect a time series of resiliency estimates for the spread and depth. Then I collect
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Table 4.7: Correlation of Resiliency Measures
SPR DEP RESD RESS
Bid-ask spread (SPR) 1.000 -0.370 -0.224 -0.167
Depth (DEP ) 1.000 0.030 0.124
Resiliency of the depth (ϕD) 1.000 0.463
Resiliency of the spread (ϕS) 1.000
Table 4.7 reports the correlation of the different dimensions of liquidity with each other. In
particular I correlate the bid-ask spread and depth at the spread with resiliency. The table
shows the results for the resiliency of the spread and depth. The diagonal consists of ones
and only the top half of the table is reported for the sake of brevity. The critical value at the
5%-quantile is ∓ 0.153.
time series of the average daily bid-ask spread and the average daily depth at the
spread.31 Table 4.7 shows the correlation structure of spread and depth resiliency
with the bid-ask spread and depth. We see that the bid-ask spread and depth are
negatively correlated (-0.370). This implies that spreads are low when depth is
high and vice versa. This result is as we would have expected. The bid-ask spread
is negatively associated with resiliency (-0.224 for depth resiliency and -0.167 for
spread resiliency). Depth has a positive relationship both with depth resiliency
(0.030) and spread resiliency (0.124). Again, these results are not surprising:
high resiliency reflects the fact that a stock is liquid with regard to the time
dimension of liquidity. Therefore, high liquidity in the time dimension coincides
high liquidity in the spread dimension (a negative correlation with the spread)
and high liquidity in the volume dimension (a positive correlation with depth).
Finally, spread and depth resiliency are positively correlated (0.463). Taking the
31 I collect these time series for all 30 stocks and for each variable stack the time series into
one single vector. Correlations are computed on the basis of these stacked vectors.
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results of the cross-sectional estimation into account, a positive correlation for
daily estimates is not surprising.
In all, the correlation of the bid-ask spread, depth and resiliency are as ex-
pected. The association of resiliency with the bid-ask spread is slightly higher and
the association with depth is slightly lower. All coefficients are not particularly
high which indicates that resiliency does not simply duplicate the other liquid-
ity dimensions. It contributes to the understanding of liquidity as a separate
dimension, the time dimension of liquidity.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter empirically investigates, for the first time, the main features of re-
siliency as a dimension of liquidity in an electronic limit order market. Resiliency
addresses the following question: when trades, especially those resulting from
relatively large and uninformative orders, consume liquidity by eroding the limit
order book, how fast is the spread reduced again and how fast is the depth of the
limit order book replenished through the competitive actions of market traders.
Resiliency results from the interaction of liquidity flowing into the market and
liquidity being taken out. The inflow comes from the submission of new limit
orders, while the outflow results either from the cancellation of limit orders or
the execution of limit orders against newly submitted market orders. Together,
inflow and outflow determine the evolution of the price-quantity schedule.
Specifically, I first address how we can formally define and measure resiliency.
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I accordingly set up a mean reversion model of liquidity to capture the dynamics
of the price and quantity schedule over time, and examine the relation between
current and past liquidity flows. I examine ask-side and bid-side resiliency sepa-
rately, and also analyze a range of different data frequencies. Secondly, I analyze
the microstructural time-series factors that affect resiliency. In particular, these
factors include informed trading, the order arrival rate, the patience of traders,
the time of the day, trading activity and unexpected volatility. Thirdly, I analyze
the variation in resiliency across the cross section of stocks. And finally, I exam-
ine the relationship between resiliency and the other two liquidity dimensions,
the spread and depth.
I find strong evidence that the liquidity dynamics of the order book follows
a stable replenishment process: the resiliency for each stock over a five-minute
horizon is consistently high and stable across different frequencies. Empty order
books are refilled quickly, while full books attract less new liquidity. The overall
order flow reflects this resiliency, but, far more strongly, the resiliency can be
seen in the behaviour of liquidity suppliers around the first few ticks of the book.
Both for the depth and for the spread, resiliency is very strong around the best
price and gets steadily weaker the further we move away from the best price in
the book. Clearly, trades that are executed against the book take away liquidity
at the first few ticks, and traders who actively monitor the book jump in straight
away to exploit these profit opportunities in the book.
I also find that, in its time series behavior, resiliency is dependent in a stable
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and robust manner on microstructural determinants. In information-intense pe-
riods, resiliency is lower than in liquidity-intense periods. This seems plausible as
liquidity suppliers fear that they will lose to their better-informed counterparties
when trades are particularly informative. As predicted by Foucault, Kadan and
Kandel (2005), the resiliency of the spread is associated positively with the pro-
portion of patient traders in the population and negatively with the order arrival
rate and the time of the day. Like the arrival rate, trading volume also has a
negative impact on resiliency. The effect of unexpected volatility is asymmetric:
resiliency on the bid side increases, while it falls on the ask side. Interestingly,
these effects on the resiliency of the spread are the opposite for depth resiliency.
The most probable explanation is that, in the time series, spread and depth
resiliency are asynchronous. When spread resiliency is high, the spread gets im-
proved rapidly which, in turn, erodes depth. I would therefore expect spread
resiliency to come before depth resiliency and, hence, an opposite effects of time
series factors on these two dimensions.
My results also show that, ceteris paribus, investors will choose more resilient
stocks over less resilient stocks. Resiliency has a high association with large
market-capitalized and high-beta stocks. On the other hand, stocks which offer
high profits to informed traders tend to be less liquid. I also find that resiliency is
not significantly correlated with either spread or depth. This reinforces, ex post,
the importance of resiliency as an independent dimension of liquidity. It cannot
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be seen or assumed as a replica of the price or quantity dimension. This time
dimension of liquidity provides significant new information.
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Chapter 5
Commonality Across Limit Order
Books
This chapter investigates the commonality of liquidity in the limit order book for
an electronic limit order book market. I use order book data from the electronic
trading facility Xetra of the German Stock Exchange. I construct liquidity mea-
sures of a stock’s limit order book and estimate the common movement of these
liquidity measures. I find strong evidence that there is commonality in liquidity.
It is much stronger for liquidity measures of the limit order book than for sim-
ple proxies like spreads. Secondly, it shows time variation both on an intradaily
basis and over longer horizons. The common movement of liquidity implies that
trading in limit order book markets is subject to systematic liquidity risk.
5.1 Introduction
Liquidity risk is a major concern to investors, because it implies that they might
have to trade when markets are especially illiquid, and trading in illiquid markets
is very costly. If the liquidity of different stocks also moves together, liquidity
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risk will be an even greater concern to investors:32 common liquidity movements
imply that liquidity risk is market-wide and, apart from idiosyncratic shocks,
cannot be diversified. Investors will have to bear the systematic component of
liquidity risk and will therefore ask for compensation.
Empirical asset pricing papers such as Amihud (2002), Pa´stor and Stambaugh
(2003) or Gibson and Mougeot (2004) show that investors receive a notable com-
pensation for bearing liquidity risk. In contrast, empirical microstructure pa-
pers such as Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi
(2001), Halka and Huberman (2001) and Brockman and Chung (2002) suggest
that liquidity risk is almost entirely firm- specific. It implies that liquidity risk is
diversifiable and should not be priced.
One possible explanation for the weak evidence of commonality in the mi-
crostructure literature is that earlier studies used poor proxies for liquidity. For
example, Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001),
Halka and Huberman (2001) and Brockman and Chung (2002) all measure liq-
uidity by looking at quotes and quantities at best prices. However, if investors
want to trade large positions, their orders will walk up the book and therefore
they will not only care about liquidity at best prices, but also about liquidity
beyond best prices.
32 The theoretical literature develops several kinds of mechanisms through which the liquidity
supply of different stocks is linked. In these models, the correlation of liquidity preferences,
intermediary behavior or informational shocks create contagion effects in the liquidity of dif-
ferent stocks. See Allen and Gale (2000), Kyle and Xiong (2001), Gromb and Vayanos (2002),
Fernando (2003), Watanabe (2003) and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005).
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A second explanation is that best quotes are particularly noisy and therefore
not well-suited for the study of commonality. Since liquidity suppliers compete
fiercely for new price priority, the bid-ask spread and depth at best prices are
subject to strong idiosyncratic variation. This hypothesis is consistent with Do-
mowitz, Hansch and Wang (2005) who show that order type correlation has far
more explanatory power for liquidity commonality inside the limit order book
than at the best prices.
A third explanation is time variation. Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam
(2001) show that liquidity is time-varying and that it is particularly low in falling
markets. If commonality exhibits a similar time variation, it might be low on
average but higher in falling markets. The empirical evidence on this issue is
ambiguous. For the US market, Coughenour and Saad (2004) find that in falling
markets specialist behavior tends to be more strongly correlated across the stocks
that they manage than in rising markets, while Domowitz, Hansch and Wang
(2005) observe no systematic differences for the Australian market.
In this chapter I focus on (i) the level of commonality in liquidity beyond
best prices and (ii) the time variation of commonality in a pure limit order mar-
ket. The basic methodology follows the market model used in Chordia, Roll and
Subrahmanyam (2000) and extends it to liquidity measures beyond the bid-ask
spread and depth. Furthermore, I examine the link between commonality in the
limit order book and movements of the market return.
This study is most closely related to the work of Bauer (2004) and Domowitz,
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Hansch and Wang (2005). Bauer (2004) performs a Principal Component Analy-
sis (PCA) for liquidity measures of the limit order book and relates commonality
to underlying financial variables. Domowitz, Hansch and Wang (2005) investi-
gate the impact of order-type and order-flow correlations on return and liquidity
commonality. I differ from these papers in three ways: firstly, I focus on how
commonality in liquidity depends on how deep we look into the limit order book
(as opposed to its relation with underlying financial variables or order-type and
order-flow commonality). Secondly, from a methodological point of view, I apply
the Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) market model instead of using a
correlation or common factor approach. This approach has the advantage that it
allows me to control for external factors and that the common factor can directly
be interpreted as market liquidity. Thirdly, I use data from the German stock
market, one of the world’s largest and most important markets, instead of the
Swiss and Australian market.33
Based on the Xetra limit order book, I measure liquidity both at best prices
(using the bid-ask spread and its depth) and beyond best prices (using depth
deeper in the limit order book and the slope of the price-quantity schedule). My
study yields the following main results: (i) I find evidence of significant com-
mon variation in liquidity throughout the order book. The more the liquidity
33 The growing availability of limit order book data has produced many further studies on
such markets. With regard to commonality, Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) study
common liquidity movements across asset classes. Benston, Irvine and Kandel (2000) and Cao,
Hansch and Wang (2004) study the information content of the limit order book. Coppejans,
Domowitz, Madhavan (2003) focus on dynamic issues of the limit order book. Beltran, Giot
and Grammig (2005) relate commonalities across price-volume pairs of the limit order book to
underlying microstructural factors.
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measures are extended beyond best prices, the stronger commonality is: at best
prices, common variation in depth only accounts for roughly 2% of all liquidity
variation, while it increases to a maximum level of about 20% deeper in the book.
(ii) Commonality exhibits strong time variation associated both with the time
of the day and the movement of the market. Most notably, liquidity commonal-
ity increases strongly with the absolute value of negative returns. This implies
that diversifying liquidity risk becomes more difficult in falling markets when
diversification is particularly important.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 investigates
the commonality of liquidity at the best prices in the book. In Section 5.3 I
construct liquidity measures that incorporate the liquidity in the order book. I
use a market model and principal component analysis to explore the commonality
in order book liquidity. Section 5.4 investigates the influence of stock industry,
time of day and market momentum. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Commonality at Best Prices
Previous studies have implicitly assumed that best limit prices alone are sufficient
to capture the liquidity of an asset. To relate my results to the literature, I analyze
the commonality of liquidity for the bid-ask spread and for the depth of the order
book at the best bid and ask prices.
In Chapter 3 I showed that, consistent with the literature, liquidity exhibits
strong time-of-day effects. Like Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) I therefore stan-
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dardize liquidity by time-specific means and standard deviations. Thus I fo-
cus on the unexpected component of liquidity variation which corresponds to
the liquidity risk that investors bear. I illustrate the standardization procedure
for the bid-ask spread: let pA denote the best ask price, pB the best bid price
and MQ the midquote. I compute bid-ask spreads relative to the midquote,
RS = (pA − pB)/MQ. Then let h denote the time of the day and d a specific
trading day (with d = 1, ..., 64). For every stock i, I take subsamples that include
observations at one time of the day but over all days. From these subsamples
I calculate the time-specific mean of the spread, µi,h = Σ
n
d=1RSi,h,d/64, and its
standard deviation, σi,h =
√
Σ64d=1(RSi,h,d − µi,h)2/64. For all stocks I then de-
mean and standardize each observation of the spread according to its time of the
day. Let RS∗ denote spreads adjusted for trends:
RS∗i,h,d =
RSi,h,d − µi,h
σi,h
(5.1)
The same procedure is applied to depth at the best prices. Let nA be the number
of shares quoted at the best ask and nB at the best bid. I compute depth as
DEPA,B = nA · pA + nB · pB and then correct it for time-of-day trends to obtain
DEP ∗A,B. The detrended time series of the spread and depth are the input for
the following analysis of commonality at best prices.
The standard econometric approach to commonality is the market model in
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) which is estimated by time series re-
gressions. The market model relates the liquidity of a single stock to the liquidity
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Table 5.1: Market Model for Spreads and Depth – Individual Stocks
Spreads Depth
Stock β tβ R
2 β tβ R
2
Adidas-Salomon 0.6990 6.7864 0.0584 0.0753 1.1615 0.0109
Allianz 0.3734 6.0024 0.0579 0.2386 1.7794 0.0071
Altana 0.9078 6.5176 0.0512 0.0953 1.8156 0.0125
BASF 0.4568 6.8301 0.0720 0.4295 3.5770 0.0227
BMW 0.7256 7.8778 0.0822 0.4742 4.8448 0.0290
Bayer 0.5154 6.0242 0.0569 0.2042 2.0234 0.0275
Commerzbank 1.0406 9.9498 0.1098 0.2087 1.9895 0.0141
Continental 0.8969 6.2345 0.0497 0.1703 3.0950 0.0282
DaimlerChrysler 0.6308 8.6423 0.0885 0.3181 2.3183 0.0120
Deutsche Bank 0.3601 6.3999 0.0487 0.3441 1.9998 0.0299
Deutsche Boerse 0.6747 5.7529 0.0455 0.1925 2.7269 0.0201
Deutsche Post 0.7599 6.1584 0.0610 0.1286 1.3530 0.0104
Deutsche Telekom 0.3184 6.8685 0.0500 0.7755 1.1039 0.0420
E.ON 0.9983 8.7036 0.1132 0.2041 4.1170 0.0344
Fresenius 0.7957 5.2823 0.0357 0.2129 4.2120 0.0318
Henkel 0.4142 6.3119 0.0731 0.6281 5.1925 0.0409
HypoVereinsbank 0.1291 2.0315 0.0123 0.0179 0.1488 0.0087
Infineon Technologies 0.5589 6.5592 0.0468 1.0661 4.2320 0.0456
Linde 0.7843 6.4774 0.0574 0.2169 3.6965 0.0206
Lufthansa 0.9678 8.0727 0.0739 0.2359 2.6843 0.0195
MAN 1.1994 7.9897 0.0786 0.0931 1.5158 0.0197
Metro 0.8874 6.4716 0.0535 0.1176 1.6893 0.0193
Muenchener Rueck 0.5454 7.8595 0.0955 0.1777 1.0794 0.0055
RWE 0.5170 5.8814 0.0510 0.2081 1.9924 0.0066
SAP 0.3906 5.4891 0.0373 0.3358 3.0865 0.0239
Schering 0.5941 6.0253 0.0462 0.4035 5.4434 0.0552
Siemens 0.4222 6.5354 0.0715 0.1327 1.1256 0.0168
ThyssenKrupp 0.2495 3.8854 0.0273 0.0532 0.4538 0.0056
TUI 1.0952 6.4770 0.0465 0.2431 3.6895 0.0250
Volkswagen 0.5061 6.4617 0.0590 0.1066 1.2058 0.0148
Averages 0.6472 6.5520 0.0604 0.2703 2.5118 0.0220
Table 5.1 reports the parameter estimates of the liquidity market model for spreads and depths
for each stock (Equation 5.2). It gives the coefficients of market liquidity, their corresponding
t-values and the R2 values of the regression. The last row gives the averages across stocks.
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of the market in the same way as the CAPM does for returns. It employs a re-
gression framework to measure the sensitivity of stock i’s liquidity, Li, to market
liquidity, LM .
34 Market liquidity is computed as the average liquidity across all
stocks, Σ29i=1Li,t/29, where t is a time subscript.
35 The estimation includes lead
and lag market liquidity (LM,t+1 and LM,t−1), contemporaneous, lead and lag
market returns (rM,t, rM,t+1 and rM,t−1) as well as individual stock return volatil-
ity V OLi,t (proxied by the squared return) as additional regressors. With ε as
an error term, I obtain the following specification:
Li,t = α + β
1
i LM,t + β
2
i LM,t+1 + β
3
i LM,t−1 + δ
1
i rM,t + δ
2
i rM,t+1
+δ3i rM,t−1 + ηiV OLi,t + εi,t (5.2)
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarize the estimation results of Equation (5.2) for
liquidity at best limit prices. Table 5.1 gives a detailed picture of all 30 β1
coefficients. β1 measures how strongly individual stock liquidity is determined
by the market level of liquidity. For the relative spread the level of the coefficients
varies between 0.1291 and 1.1994 with an average of 0.6472, while the t-statistic
reflects significance for all 30 stocks. The R2 values vary between 1% and 11%
with an average of 6.04%. For depth at the best bid and ask, β1 varies between
0.02 and 1.06 with an average of 0.27 across stocks. The parameter estimates are
significant in 70% of all regressions, while the average R2 value is about 2%. The
34 The Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) model is in first differences. I follow Has-
brouck and Seppi (2001) and use standardized variables instead.
35 For each stock i’s regression, stock i is dropped in the calculation of market liquidity,
because it would lead to additional correlation otherwise. Further robustness checks show that
the results are unchanged for value-weighted market liquidity instead of the arithmetic average.
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Table 5.2: Market Model for Spreads and Depth at the Best Limit Prices
Spreads: Averages Depth: Averages
Parameters t-statistics Parameters t-statistics
Intercept α 0.1309 0.2765 0.1186 3.6111
Market Liquidity β1 0.6472 6.5520 0.2703 2.5118
β2 0.0383 0.5094 0.1412 0.6699
β3 0.0508 0.6317 0.1268 1.0269
Market Return δ1 -0.0132 -0.2541 0.0053 0.0508
δ2 0.0064 0.0176 0.0797 0.4039
δ3 -0.0144 -0.0105 -0.1220 -0.2933
Return volatility η 0.1115 0.6725 0.0049 0.0899
Adjusted R2 0.0604 0.0220
Table 5.2 reports the parameter estimates of the liquidity market model (Equation 5.2) for
spreads and depths. It gives the mean parameter estimates across all 30 stocks and the corre-
sponding average t-values for spreads and depth. The last row reports the average adjusted R2
values of the regressions.
results show that the spread market model of liquidity is stronger than for depth.
Furthermore, the adjusted R2 measure of the regressions can be interpreted as a
measure of commonality, since it explains the percentage of individual liquidity
variation that is explained by market liquidity.36 Thus, commonality in spreads
is about 6% while it is lower at 2% for depth. Table 5.2 shows the average
parameter estimates and t-values for the additional regressors. We see that their
averages are clearly insignificant; unlike market liquidity they do not explain any
movement in individual stock liquidity.37
36 R2 captures the effects of all explanatory variables rather than market liquidity alone. How-
ever, leaving out the insignificant regressors does not lower the adjusted R2 values very much.
Therefore its magnitude is nearly completely driven by the market liquidity coefficient. This
procedure allows direct comparison with the R2 values in Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam
(2000).
37 I average the estimated parameters and their corresponding t-values across all stocks as in
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The market model results that I obtain are very much along the lines of Chor-
dia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) and Brockman and Chung (2002). In these
studies, only the market liquidity parameter is significant, while the additional
regressors are not. They report adjusted R2 values of anywhere between 1.70%
and 2.78% for spreads and 1.00% and 2.08% for depth. I obtain a value of 2%
for the depth and 6% for spreads while all control variables are insignificant. Ev-
idently, the spread market model is slightly stronger for my data, yet 6% is not
that convincingly high, either.
5.3 Commonality Beyond Best Prices
In this section I extend commonality to the order book. First, I construct mea-
sures of order book liquidity and secondly compute the extent of commonality
they show. Finally, I employ principal components analysis (PCA) to check that
the results are stable with respect to the methodology. I compare the level of
common liquidity movement to the levels evidenced by the bid-ask spread and
the depth at the best bid and ask price.
5.3.1 Construction of Liquidity Measures
In limit order book markets, all orders are executed against the limit orders in
the order book. If an order is very large, this implies that it will hit unexecuted
limit orders which have different price limits. The larger the order, the more
price limits will be hit and the further a market order walks up the limit order
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) and Brockman and Chung (2002). A cross-sectional
t-statistic implicitly assumes that the estimation errors in βi are independent across stocks.
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book. Furthermore, if many transactions take place before any limit order trader
has time to submit new limit orders, limit orders that were deep in the order
book suddenly become relevant. Evidently, the spread alone is not sufficient to
characterize the liquidity of a limit order book market; I need a measure of the
order book to assess a stock’s liquidity.
The bid-ask spread gives the price discrepancy between the best prices in the
book, while depth at the spread is the corresponding volume in the order book.
A natural extension is to move away from the best prices and to consider prices
p and volume x deeper in the order book. Because of asymmetries of the bid
and ask side I construct separate measures for each order book side. In a first
step I compute the price difference between all limit order prices in the book
and the midquote at that point in time. In a second step I transform these
price differences into price impacts relative to the midquote and link them to
the cumulative volume in the order book, PIAi (x) = (pi(x) −MQi)/MQi and
PIBi (x) = (MQi − pi(x))/MQi. Finally, I compute the volumes that correspond
to price impacts of 0.5%, 1%, 1.5% and 2%. I choose 2% as the cut-off value
for this extended depth measure because in my data set market orders that are
executed against the limit order book seldom incur higher price impacts.38
An advantage of this extended depth measure is that it is non-parametric and
is not based on any restrictive assumptions. A disadvantage, however, is that it
38 The measure is similar to the cost of round trip in Benston, Irvine and Kandel (2000), the
XLM measure in Gomber, Schweickert and Theissen (2004) or hypothetical price impacts as in
Kumar (2003). Unlike cost-of-round-trip measures, my measure captures asymmetries of the
bid side and the ask side.
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only characterizes one point on the price-quantity schedule at a time. I there-
fore introduce the slope of the price-quantity schedule as a second measure that
summarizes all price-volume combinations in the limit order book simultaneously.
Knowledge of the slope of the price-quantity schedule enables a trader to compute
price impacts for any order size. With regard to the specification, the empirical
literature comes to very mixed conclusions: Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995) doc-
ument linearity, while Coppejans, Domowitz, Madhavan (2003) or Cao, Hansch
and Wang (2004) find evidence of some non-linearities.
Let l denote the pairs of price-volume combinations of an order book, let t
denote the individual points in time for which I have order book snapshots and
let x denote the volume in the order book. If ε is the error term, I obtain the
following equation for a linear model price-quantity schedule:
PIi,t,l = λi,t · xi,t,l + εi,t,l (5.3)
As with the extended depth measures, I cut off the price-quantity schedule for
price impacts higher than 2%. The indices indicate that I estimate the model in
each point in time and for each stock. Furthermore, I do the estimation separately
for the ask side and bid side. I also estimate Equation 5.3 with an additional
quadratic term, ρi,tx
2
i,t,l. Negative estimates of ρi,t imply a concave order book
function and positive estimates imply a convex relationship. I find neither a
significantly high number of positive nor negative estimates and therefore I choose
the linear model. I obtain a time series of λAi,t and λ
B
i,t for each stock. The model
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does not include a constant to ensure that the estimated graph starts at the origin.
Subsequently, the state of the order book is summarized by one parameter. Since
the price impact function is upward-sloping by construction, it is not surprising
that the fits turn out to be very good and that the parameters estimates are
highly significant.
Table A.2 in the appendix gives some descriptive statistics of my proxies. The
average volume associated with 2% price impacts is 4,219,230 Euros on the ask
side and 4,032,470 Euros on the bid side, yet there is considerable variation in
these figures. The average slope estimate is 0.8992 on the ask side and 0.9557 on
the bid side. Again there is considerable cross-sectional variation across stocks:
As the model of the order book slope has no constant, the slope is a direct measure
of the level of liquidity: for example, in the case of Fresenius an investor who
wishes to buy a position of 500,000 Euros will incur a price impact of 1.1258%.
In comparison, the half-spread is 0.0655%. Evidently, spread measures are bad
proxies for large volumes.
5.3.2 Market Model Results
In this section I investigate market-wide liquidity movements of the entire limit
order book. I use the same methodology as before, yet this time I substitute Li,t
and LM,t in Equation 5.2 by my new measures of order book liquidity. Again
I follow the standardization procedure of Equation 5.1 to eliminate trends from
the data.
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Table 5.3: Market Model for the Extended Depth Measure – Individual Stocks
Ask Side Bid Side
Stock β tβ R
2 β tβ R
2
Adidas-Salomon 0.7766 3.6945 0.0579 0.9571 5.0424 0.1020
Allianz 1.0389 4.9800 0.1042 0.8625 5.0533 0.2375
Altana 0.6372 3.0701 0.0918 0.8732 4.4712 0.0410
BASF 0.8268 4.1595 0.1397 1.0128 5.5817 0.1301
BMW 0.5456 2.7432 0.1508 0.6165 3.2135 0.0588
Bayer 0.8077 5.2372 0.3513 0.5407 2.7524 0.0205
Commerzbank 0.7146 3.8567 0.1980 0.6950 3.8881 0.1745
Continental 0.9604 4.7992 0.1835 0.5895 3.0350 0.0426
DaimlerChrysler 0.8281 5.1474 0.2641 1.0605 5.9898 0.2049
Deutsche Bank 0.7954 4.0889 0.1865 0.5277 2.8419 0.0753
Deutsche Boerse 0.6987 3.2872 0.0702 0.7246 3.7491 0.0341
Deutsche Post 0.8217 4.7963 0.3750 0.6051 3.3161 0.0704
Deutsche Telekom 0.5922 2.9398 0.1522 0.5497 3.0045 0.1287
E.ON 0.2957 1.4514 0.0636 0.3482 1.8335 0.0388
Fresenius 0.9057 5.0962 0.1631 0.9372 4.8645 0.0396
Henkel 0.8850 4.1493 0.0705 0.8781 4.6440 0.0517
HypoVereinsbank 0.0117 0.0557 0.0190 0.1885 0.9859 0.0017
Infineon Technologies 0.3439 1.6709 0.0830 0.1019 0.5343 0.0159
Linde 1.0261 4.9520 0.1348 0.7600 3.8896 0.0393
Lufthansa 0.5429 2.7324 0.1600 0.5930 3.2281 0.0770
MAN 0.7349 3.4949 0.0731 0.9213 4.7641 0.0706
Metro 0.9738 4.9160 0.1847 0.6173 3.1637 0.0164
Muenchener Rueck 0.8404 4.6200 0.3087 0.8559 4.5013 0.0777
RWE 0.6269 2.9312 0.0564 0.6129 3.1520 0.0496
SAP 0.9122 4.6560 0.2048 0.7529 3.9907 0.0819
Schering 0.5815 2.8550 0.1180 0.4207 2.1680 0.0328
Siemens 0.8535 4.3360 0.2043 1.0537 5.8729 0.1852
ThyssenKrupp 0.6324 3.5943 0.3301 0.4752 2.3938 0.0097
TUI 0.6339 3.1542 0.0716 0.6700 3.7105 0.1365
Volkswagen 0.8125 4.0291 0.1541 0.9084 5.3488 0.2565
Average 0.7200 3.7172 0.1609 0.6811 3.6532 0.0827
Table 5.3 reports the parameter estimates of the liquidity market model for the depth of the
order book at 2% price impact for each stock. It gives the coefficients of market liquidity, their
corresponding t-values and the R2 values of the regression for the ask and bid side. The last
row gives the averages across stocks.
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Table 5.4: Market Model for Depth at 2.0 % Price Impact
Ask Side: Averages Bid Side: Averages
Parameters t-statistics Parameters t-statistics
Intercept α -0.0084 -0.3581 -0.0034 -0.1151
Market Liquidity β1 0.7219 3.7165 0.6903 3.6995
β2 0.0634 0.4276 -0.0048 0.0121
β3 0.0725 0.4719 0.0009 0.0515
Market Return δ1 0.0794 0.5497 -0.0230 -0.1714
δ2 0.0323 0.2202 -0.0729 -0.5156
δ3 -0.0240 -0.1726 -0.0177 -0.1301
Return volatility η 0.0492 1.1742 0.0760 1.5074
Adjusted R2 0.1609 0.0827
Table 5.4 reports the parameter estimates of the liquidity market model (Equation 5.2) for the
extended depth measure at a price impact of 2.0%. It gives the mean parameter estimates
across all 30 stocks, the average t-values and the percentage of significant coefficients at the
individual stock level (in %) for the ask side and the bid side of the order book. The last row
reports the average R2 values of the regressions.
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 give the results for order book depth at 2% price impact. In
Table 5.3 I list all individual β1 coefficients with their corresponding t-statistics.
Both on the ask side and on the bid side, β1 is significant for 28 out 30 stocks
(93.33%). Table 5.4 shows the average values. The beta coefficient for contem-
poraneous market liquidity is the only coefficient with a significant t-value; as
before, the t-values of all other regressors indicate that they are not significant.
Compared to the results of liquidity at the best limit price alone, however, the
adjusted R2 values are much higher. They climb to an average of 16.09% on the
ask side and 8.27% on the bid side. In comparison, the corresponding R2 value of
depth at best prices was between 1.0% and 2.1%. In other words, commonality
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increases strongly if I consider the aggregate liquidity supplied to the limit order
book at price impacts of 2%.
Next I proceed to the slope of the price-quantity schedule of the limit order
book which is also estimated for price impacts up to 2%. Tables 5.5 and 5.6
present the results. Table 5.5 shows that the β1 coefficient varies between 0.1139
and 1.0966 on the ask side of the limit order book and 0.2043 and 0.9949 on the
bid side. 29 out of 30 stocks have significant coefficients on the ask side and 28
out of 30 on the bid side. On average, the market liquidity coefficients are 0.7302
on the ask side and 0.6645 on the bid side; both are highly significant. All other
coefficients are close to zero in a range between -0.1063 and 0.0704 with small
and insignificant t-values. Commonality on the ask side is 17.19% and on the
bid side 10.90%. Evidently, the results for slope parameters of the price-quantity
schedule are very similar to those for aggregate depth. The explanatory power
of the slope model as opposed to the extended depth measure is minimally more
powerful (17.19% versus 16.09% on the ask side and 10.90% versus 8.27% on the
bid side). Compared to commonality at best prices, the extent of systematic
liquidity risk is once again considerably higher. These results underline that the
high extent of commonality for liquidity in the limit order book remains a robust
result irrespective of the measure.
Obviously systematic movements in liquidity are quite different for the liquid-
ity flow at best prices and the liquidity flow up until ticks further beyond best
prices. As I have only focused on liquidity at 2% price impacts so far, I now
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Table 5.5: Market Model for the Slope of the Price-Quantity Schedule – Individ-
ual Stocks
Ask Side Bid Side
Stock β tβ R
2 β tβ R
2
Adidas-Salomon 0.6706 4.2422 0.0812 0.8405 5.2077 0.1162
Allianz 1.0966 7.1134 0.1493 0.6913 4.8021 0.2748
Altana 0.8954 5.6654 0.0926 0.8583 5.1036 0.0495
BASF 0.8401 5.4983 0.1448 0.9949 6.4469 0.1969
BMW 0.4935 3.3006 0.1516 0.7096 4.3513 0.0897
Bayer 0.8649 6.1124 0.2614 0.6234 3.8197 0.0813
Commerzbank 0.9036 6.3157 0.2441 0.6266 4.4515 0.2953
Continental 0.8532 5.5842 0.1459 0.6429 3.7752 0.0211
DaimlerChrysler 0.6369 4.4276 0.2296 0.6894 4.4588 0.1678
Deutsche Bank 0.5673 3.7430 0.1380 0.5583 3.4095 0.0675
Deutsche Boerse 0.7413 4.7605 0.1053 0.7071 4.1456 0.0201
Deutsche Post 0.7483 5.7654 0.3705 0.5078 3.1506 0.0956
Deutsche Telekom 0.5207 3.6392 0.2253 0.4125 2.5542 0.0775
E.ON 0.2965 1.8984 0.0758 0.2043 1.2425 0.0384
Fresenius 0.7951 5.4021 0.1983 0.6289 3.7117 0.0283
Henkel 0.8211 5.1907 0.0945 0.7626 4.5393 0.0468
HypoVereinsbank 0.1139 0.7140 0.0173 0.3489 2.0703 0.0092
Infineon Technologies 0.3975 2.7986 0.2269 0.2417 1.4622 0.0308
Linde 0.7843 4.9910 0.0978 0.8434 4.9817 0.0434
Lufthansa 0.6055 3.9815 0.1325 0.5983 3.6188 0.0557
MAN 0.8529 5.4123 0.1103 0.8673 5.4119 0.1434
Metro 0.9083 6.0797 0.1832 0.6825 4.0259 0.0237
Muenchener Rueck 0.9139 6.8574 0.3416 0.9219 6.1417 0.2288
RWE 0.5247 3.3518 0.0853 0.4731 2.8092 0.0171
SAP 0.7750 5.1553 0.1674 0.7169 4.4542 0.1158
Schering 0.8488 5.7700 0.2030 0.7115 4.3647 0.0874
Siemens 0.8625 5.9839 0.2408 0.9600 6.6583 0.2860
ThyssenKrupp 0.8374 6.1046 0.3025 0.6241 3.6965 0.0342
TUI 0.8308 5.4249 0.1379 0.5796 3.7072 0.1507
Volkswagen 0.9060 6.1559 0.2029 0.9083 6.7677 0.3775
Average 0.7302 4.9147 0.1719 0.6645 4.1780 0.1090
Table 5.5 reports the parameter estimates of the liquidity market model for the slope of
the price-quantity schedule for each stock. It gives the coefficients of market liquidity, their
corresponding t-values and the R2 values of the regression for the ask and bid side. The last
row gives the averages across stocks.
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Table 5.6: Market Model for the Slope of the Price Impact Function
Ask Side: Averages Bid Side: Averages
Parameters t-statistics Parameters t-statistics
Intercept α 0.0017 0.0600 0.0010 0.0335
Market Liquidity β1 0.7302 4.9147 0.6645 4.1780
β2 0.0600 0.4901 0.0568 0.4831
β3 0.0854 0.6713 0.0704 0.5787
Market Return δ1 -0.1063 -0.7185 0.0592 0.4333
δ2 -0.0359 -0.2520 0.0558 0.4003
δ3 0.0332 0.2250 -0.0109 -0.0677
Return volatility η -0.0041 -0.2888 -0.0003 -0.1862
Adjusted R2 0.1719 0.1090
Table 5.6 reports the parameter estimates of the liquidity market model (Equation 5.2) for the
slope parameter of the price impact function. It gives the mean parameter estimates across all
30 stocks and the average t-values for both the bid side and the ask side of the order book.
The last row reports the average adjusted R2 values of the regressions.
turn my attention to the region between the best ask and ask prices that are 2%
above the midquote and 2% below the best bid, respectively. Table 5.7 shows how
commonality changes for different cut-off points of aggregate order book depth.
On the ask side, β1 starts out at 0.53 for 0.5% impacts and increases continually
to 0.72 for order book depth at a 2% price impact. The corresponding average
t-values are very clearly above the critical value of 1.65. Turning to the level of
commonality, I observe that the adjusted R2 value on the ask side is 9% for a
price impact of 0.5%. It increases continually up to 16%. The pattern holds for
the bid side of the order book as well where commonality increases to a value of
8%. In Figure 5.1 I illustrate the results graphically. In contrast to the previous
liquidity measures, I have not cut liquidity off at 2% to show how commonality
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increases even further in the order book. It approaches levels beyond 20% on the
ask side and beyond 10% on the bid side. While this kind of depth might not
be required by traders in large-cap stocks, it might well get consumed in smaller
and less liquid stocks (see Keim and Madhavan (1997)). The results clearly in-
dicate that mismeasurement of liquidity is one reason for the underestimation of
commonality.
5.3.3 Principal Components Results
In the following section I approach commonality from a different angle. While
Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) directly assume that the market average
of liquidity explains individual stock liquidity, other studies such as Hasbrouck
and Seppi (2001) or Hansch (2001) use principal component analysis (PCA), a
more statistical approach. Instead of imposing any pre-specified restrictions on
the common liquidity factor, they use PCA to extract the factor with the highest
explanatory power for individual liquidity variation. I compare the results of
these two methodologies for my data and conclude to what extent they influence
the findings.39
The main input of the PCA is the correlation matrix of my liquidity measures.
Again I standardise all measures first as in Equation 5.1. PCA then extracts the
39 Beltran, Giot and Grammig (2005) have also used principal components analysis in the
context of limit order books. They apply PCA to price-quantity pairs to examine whether
variation in such pairs can be attributed to one or more underlying factors. While they link
variation within the order book of single stocks to microstructural factors, I focus on the
variation of liquidity across stocks. Furthermore, I am less interested in the identification of
such factors. Rather, I use PCA as a means to estimate the extent of covariation across a range
of assets.
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Table 5.7: Market Model for Increasing Depth of the Limit Order Book
Ask Side Bid Side
Price impact β1 t-value R
2 β1 t-value R
2
0.5% 0.53 3.19 0.09 0.46 2.74 0.06
1.0% 0.53 2.50 0.12 0.49 2.42 0.07
1.5% 0.67 3.33 0.14 0.62 3.22 0.08
2.0% 0.72 3.72 0.16 0.69 3.70 0.08
Table 5.7 reports parameter estimates of the liquidity market model (Equation 5.2) for
increasing depth. The first column lists the price impact up to which depth is aggregated.
The further columns give average parameter estimates, corresponding t-values and average R2
values for the ask side and the bid side of the order book.
linear combination of individual liquidity measures with the highest explanatory
power for the variability in the data. This linear combination – called the first
principal component – is effectively a weighting vector of individual liquidity and
is given by the first eigenvector of the correlation matrix. Its explanatory power
is given by the corresponding eigenvalue. From the weighting vector I compute
the value of the principal component for each point in time. I then regress this
time series onto the time series of individual stock liquidity measures for each
stock:
Li,t = ξi + ψi PCi,t + εi,t, (5.4)
In the equation above, PCi,t denotes the realization of the first principal
component in t. ξi and ψi are parameters and εi,t is an error term. To generate a
test statistic, I bootstrap new time series from the regression residuals εi,t of all
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Figure 5.1: Commonality for Increasing Depth of the Limit Order Book
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Figure 5.1 shows how the extent of commonality increases as more liquidity in the order book
is considered. The x-axis gives the price impact up to which depth is aggregated and the y-axis
gives the amount of market-wide movement. Commonality is measured as the R2 value of the
market model of liquidity.
stocks, compute the correlation matrix and perform PCA. I repeat this procedure
10,000 times until I obtain a smooth empirical distribution of the first eigenvalue
and sample the 95%-quantile as our critical value.
Table 5.8 summarizes the PCA results for aggregate depth. On the ask side,
the first principal component of aggregate depth at 0.5% price impact is 4.0.
With a critical value of 2.1 it is clearly significant and accounts for 13.3% of
overall variation in depth. If I successively increase aggregate depth up to 2%,
the amount of common variation rises continually from 13.3% to 20.1%. All
first principal components remain strongly significant.40 On the bid side of the
40 Although all additional regressors turned out to be insignificant in the previous market
average approach, I eliminate their impact on our liquidity measures to doublecheck the signif-
icance of our results. In a first step, I regress the liquidity measures onto the same explanatory
variables, then compute the correlation matrix of all 30 stocks from their residuals and finally
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book, the pattern is identical. All first principal components for aggregate depth
are significant. In level, commonality starts out at 10.8% and rises to 12.7%
if I consider depth up to 2% price impacts. If I compare these results to the
regression approach in the previous section, I see that they are very similar indeed.
Firstly, commonality increases with order book depth. Secondly, commonality is
stronger on the ask side of the book. In level, the PCA results are about 4%
above the market index approach for ask side depth and 2% for the bid side.
Somewhat higher PCA results are not surprising, since PCA is not restricted to
a predetermined measure of market liquidity.
For the sake of completeness I report the PCA results for the spread and slope
of the price-quantity schedule in Table A.3 in the appendix. Qualitatively they
provide the same evidence: commonality around the spread is lower (7.74% for
the bid-ask spread and 7.22% for depth at best prices), while commonality of
order book liquidity is higher (24.36% for the ask side slope and 14.69% for the
bid side slope). As with depth, PCA obviously reinforces the conclusion drawn
from the Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000) model.
5.4 Time Variation of Commonality
The previous section showed that the mismeasurement of the liquidity in the
limit order book is one reason why the impact of commonality in liquidity has
been underestimated in the past. A second reason is that commonality might be
repeat the PCA procedure. This leads to minimally lower levels of commonality, yet qualita-
tively identical results.
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Table 5.8: PCA Results for the Extended Depth Measures
Price Impacts of Depth
PCA Output 0.5% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0%
Ask Side
First eigenvalue 4.00 4.85 5.69 6.04
Critical value 2.13 2.53 2.84 2.92
Proportion of variation 13.32 16.17 18.97 20.13
Bid Side
First eigenvalue 3.24 3.57 3.66 3.80
Critical value 2.01 2.19 2.48 2.54
Proportion of variation 10.80 11.92 12.20 12.66
Table 5.8 gives the results of PCA for the extended depth measure at different price impacts.
In the first section, the table lists the first eigenvalue, its critical values at the 95% confidence
level and the proportion of total variability explained by the first principal component (in %)
for the ask side of the order book. The second section gives the same information for the bid
side.
time-varying. In the following section I explore the time variation with regard to
intradaily patterns and with regard to the momentum of the market.
5.4.1 Time of Day
It is widely recognized that liquidity exhibits strong time-of-day effects. In par-
ticular, liquidity is low in the morning at the opening of the market. This is
illustrated very clearly in the L-shape over the bid-ask spread and the upside-
down L-shape of depth. Furthermore, trading activity also declines at the end of
the day. I now turn to the question whether commonality in liquidity exhibits
similar time-of-day effects. The following analysis uses liquidity measures which
are already free of trends, so remaining time-of-day effects only reflect trends in
commonality, not in the level of liquidity.
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Table 5.9: Impact of the Time of Day
Ask Bid
Open Day End Open Day End
Impact β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2
0.5% 0.57 13 0.46 09 0.52 11 0.52 10 0.42 07 0.39 08
1.0% 0.51 15 0.41 12 0.54 14 0.46 13 0.37 08 0.54 09
1.5% 0.57 17 0.46 15 0.75 18 0.55 14 0.46 07 0.73 11
2.0% 0.56 19 0.47 16 0.82 19 0.60 15 0.51 07 0.81 12
Table 5.9 reports the average coefficients of market liquidity and the corresponding R2 values
of the regressions (in %) for the opening of the trading day (“open”), the midday trading
period (“day”) and the end of the trading day (“end”). The results are reported for the bid
side and the ask side of the book.
To examine these effects I investigate commonality on an intradaily basis. In
particular, I split our data into three subsamples: a morning sample (order book
liquidity until 11 a.m.), a midday sample (from 11.30 a.m. until 3.30 p.m.) and
an evening sample (from 4 p.m. to 5.30 p.m.). I then reestimate Equation 5.2
separately for all three subsamples.
Table 5.9 summarizes the results for the extended depth measure. Although
time-of-day effects have been eliminated from individual liquidity levels, the sys-
tematic movement of liquidity across stocks shows clear intraday patterns. For
example, the adjusted R2 value for ask side depth at a price impact of 2% is 19%
in the morning, drops to 16% in the course of the day and goes back up to 19% in
the late trading period. On the bid side, the R2 value is 15% in the morning, 7%
during the trading day and 12% at the close of the day. There is a clear U-shape
in the commonality of liquidity: commonality is higher in the morning, falls to
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lower levels during the day and rises again in the evening before the exchange
closes. This pattern is visible for every depth measure from 0.5% to 2% price
impacts. It is also robust with regard to the ask and bid side of the limit order
book.41
5.4.2 Market Momentum
While time-of-day effects are an explanation of variation in commonality over
a short time horizon, market momentum is a possible explanation for variation
over a longer horizon. Numerous studies provide evidence that the correlation
of stock returns is strongest in falling markets (see Conrad, Gultekin and Kaul
(1991), Kroner and Ng (1998), Bekaert and Wu (2000), Longin and Solnik (2001)
or Ang and Chen (2002)). In such environments, a flight to quality reduces the
liquidity of equity markets in favor of safer investments. Therefore, in falling
markets liquidity tends to get withdrawn from many stocks at the same time and
that, in turn, induces a higher commonality.
Let w with w = 1, 2, 3, ..., 53 denote rolling ten-day intervals. For each such
interval I calculate the portfolio return of our sample stocks, Rw, and estimate
Equation 5.2. I take the R2 of each interval as measure of commonality, Cw. The
highest ten-day return is 1.48% and the lowest is -4.60%. In a first step, I present
the results for these two subsamples in Table 5.10. If I compare the R2 values
for the upwards and downwards trending markets I see that there is very strong
41 We obtain the same qualitative results if I use the slope of the price-quantity schedule as
our measure of the liquidity in the limit order book. See Table A.4 in the appendix for the
estimation results.
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Table 5.10: Impact of Market Momemtum
Ask Bid
Up Down Up Down
Price impact β1 R2 β1 R2 β1 R2 β1 R2
0.5% 0.51 0.10 0.63 0.15 0.31 0.06 0.53 0.15
1.0% 0.49 0.14 0.62 0.18 0.40 0.07 0.56 0.20
1.5% 0.61 0.14 0.74 0.21 0.55 0.09 0.72 0.18
2.0% 0.72 0.15 0.78 0.22 0.63 0.10 0.73 0.14
Table 5.10 reports the average parameter estimates of the market liquidity parameter and R2
values for rising markets (“up”) and falling markets (“down”). It lists the results for the ask
side and the bid side of the order book and also differentiates with regard to the price impact
up to which order book depth is aggregated.
evidence of a momentum effect: liquidity comoves far more strongly in falling
markets than in rising markets. On the ask side, commonality is about one third
higher in falling markets. At a price impact of 2% commonality is about 15% in
the rising market and 22% in the falling market. On the bid side commonality
in the rising market is 10% and in the falling market 14%.42
In a second step I relate the degree of commonality to the portfolio return
in the same time window. For the depth measures from 0.5% price impact to
2% price impact all ask side and bid side correlation coefficients are below -0.4.
Evidently, market momentum and commonality are negatively related. I add an
error term ε and estimate the following regression:
Cw = α+ β Rw + εw (5.5)
42 The results for the slope of the price-quantity schedule are reported in Table A.5 in the
appendix.
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In the above equation, β measures the relation between commonality and market
momentum. For the extended depth measure at 2% price impacts β is -1.125 with
a Newey-West adjusted t-statistic of -2.110. On the bid side, β is -0.602 with
a Newey-West corrected t-statistic of -3.853. Clearly, the coefficients on both
sides of the book are significantly negative. The significance is just as strong for
all other depth measures as well. This implies that commonality is stronger if
momentum is negative and weaker if it is positive.43
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I depart from the observation that market-wide liquidity ap-
parently gets priced, yet there is only very weak evidence that stock liquidity
movement does actually exhibit a market-wide component. One reason for this
weak evidence might be the mismeasurement of order book liquidity. A further
explanation is that commonality might be time-varying. I examine these hy-
potheses with the help of an extensive order book data set from the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange (FSE). It enables us to measure common movements of the en-
tire liquidity in the order book. I construct measures of order book liquidity and
then estimate the sensitivity of firm liquidity to market liquidity. I alternatively
use principal components analysis to doublecheck that our results are robust with
respect to the methodology.
In all, I observe strong evidence of commonality in liquidity. In a reference
43 The results are qualitatively virtually identical if I measure liquidity by means of the price-
quantity schedule of the limit order book. See Table A.6 in the appendix for a summary of the
results for both depth and the slope of the price-quantity schedule.
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scenario, I analyze commonality for liquidity at the best price. Although I docu-
ment significant commonality, it is fairly weak as in the literature (2% for depth
and 6% for spreads). However, once I take the liquidity supply in the order book
into account, commonality increases strongly. If depth measures at 2% price im-
pacts are used, commonality rises up to 16%. A closer examination of the results
also reveals that ask side commonality is stronger than on the bid side. Mea-
sures of the price-quantity schedule lead to similar results. Obviously, in a limit
order market with a limit order book, the commonality of liquidity provision is
drastically higher than the spread suggests.
In addition to the mismeasurement of order book liquidity I also examine
the time variation of commonality. Firstly, commonality is far stronger at the
opening of the trading day when liquidity is low and at the end of the day when the
liquidity supply falls again. During the day when liquidity is high commonality
is lower. Obviously there are intraday patterns of commonality which seem to be
associated with the overall level of liquidity in the market. Likewise commonality
is much stronger in falling markets than in rising markets. These results imply
that commonality is also associated with the general momentum of the market.
In all, this is strong evidence of time variation of commonality in liquidity.
One implication of commonality is that an asset’s liquidity will affect the
investor’s risk of holding the asset. An investor who holds a portfolio of stocks
will not be able to eliminate liquidity risk. Furthermore, commonality implies
that assets will tend to be illiquid at the same time. This can potentially affect
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asset prices and lead to the instability of the market. Market-wide liquidity swings
will tend to be stronger if a market is already trending downwards. Events such
as the 1987 stock market crash show that market-wide liquidity outflows can be
substantial and can have a destabilizing impact. Whether commonality really
is responsible for market crises or whether effects remain confined to the asset
class alone is an open question. Previous research presents first evidence that
commonality also exists across asset classes.
In the light of our empirical findings, it is a natural question to ask where
commonality comes from. One hypothesis is that commonalities arise from the
correlated trading behaviour of market participants. The most plausible determi-
nants seem to be correlated liquidity demands, informed trading or discretionary
trading. The theoretical literature leaves a lot of room for models to be developed
in this area. Even in the absence of theory, some of these hypotheses should still
be accessible to closer empirical examination. The principal components in the
PCA are a further source of information as to the identity of the economic factors
at work behind the commonality of liquidity.
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Chapter 6
Pricing Effects of Liquidity
This chapter investigates the impact of liquidity on asset returns in an electronic
limit order book market. I decompose liquidity into three components: the level
of liquidity, systematic liquidity risk and the resiliency of liquidity. These three
factors are then incorporated into conventional asset pricing tests to examine
their impact on stock returns. I find evidence that liquidity gets priced: the
return of a stock is decreasing in the level of liquidity, increasing in the systematic
component of liquidity risk and decreasing in the resiliency of its limit order book.
This implies that liquidity is valued by investors and that it enters the pricing
process of a stock.
6.1 Introduction
In general, liquidity is viewed as an important property of an asset that is traded
in financial markets. It is widely established that it varies both across assets and
also over time. This implies that the purchase price as well as the risk of holding
two otherwise identical stocks can differ substantially due to differences in liquid-
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ity. Conventional wisdom holds that, ceteris paribus, an investor should require
a higher expected return for a stock which is less liquid or whose liquidity supply
is more risky. Traditionally, however, asset pricing has focused more strongly on
fundamental factors. It has only very recently turned to microstructure issues.
In this chapter I take a closer look at such features by decomposing liquidity into
different dimensions and examining their impact on stock returns.
From a theoretical point of view the central question is whether the liquidity of
a stock should have an effect on the required return at all. Amihud and Mendelson
(1986) argue that traders will demand higher returns for holding stocks with
larger spreads and, thus, in equilibrium liquidity should be priced. Some further
approaches model the impact of different levels of trading costs on returns. These
models include Constantinides (1986), Heaton and Lucas (1996), Vayanos (1998)
or Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2004). They argue that while liquidity should have an
impact on prices, the level of the liquidity premium should be very low. Harris
(2003) goes as far as saying that the resulting premium should be inconsequential.
At the same time, the empirical literature documents that illiquid assets earn
significantly higher returns than liquid assets. The first empirical studies examine
the relation between the level of liquidity and expected stock returns (see Amihud
and Mendelson (1986), Amihud and Mendelson (1989), Eleswarapu (1997), Bren-
nan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998)
or Amihud (2002)). The next generation of studies focuses on the pricing of
liquidity risk as opposed to the level alone. It includes Pa´stor and Stambaugh
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(2003), Gibson and Mougeot (2004) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005). Together
these studies provide positive evidence that both the level and risk of liquidity
get priced.44 However, they differ in the construction of liquidity factors and
the strength of the pricing effects. Beyond that, they use low-frequency trade
data instead of limit order book data. This leaves some doubt as to whether the
observed pricing effects are really due to differences in liquidity in the microstruc-
tural sense.
In this chapter I investigate the pricing effects of liquidity risk in an electronic
limit order book environment. Firstly, stock exchanges around the world conduct
trading almost exclusively through open limit order books nowadays. Therefore
limit order book liquidity is the kind of liquidity which is of interest to investors.
This implies that pricing studies of liquidity should take place on the basis of limit
order book data. Secondly, the limit order book is a very clean and immediate
measure of liquidity which measures the costs of any potential trade. This data is
necessary to estimate the resiliency of the liquidity supply of any stock. Resiliency
is important to investors because it is a measure of trade execution risk: it ensures
that trades can be placed rapidly and at reasonable prices. Finally, purely trade-
based liquidity measures are biased because trades take place when liquidity is
high. In contrast, the limit order book does not have this bias.
The chapter examines empirically, for the first time, the pricing effects that the
44 There are in fact some studies that present contrasting evidence: for example, Eleswarapu
and Reinganum (1993), Chen and Kan (1996) and Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) find that
liquidity does not get priced.
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liquidity has in electronic limit order book markets. I do not limit my approach
to one all-embracing factor of liquidity such as the bid-ask spread or depth alone.
Instead I split liquidity into a level component and two risk components. The level
component reflects that investors have to make an up-front payment when they
buy a stock and incur a further discount when they sell the stock again. The
first risk component is resiliency. It measures the execution risk of individual
trades. The second risk component of liquidity is commonality which takes into
account that liquidity co-moves across stocks. Intuitively speaking, it should be
valuable to possess stocks which are liquid when the market is illiquid. I expect
a pricing impact of these components because, all other things held equal, a high
level of liquidity, a low systematic exposure and a resilient limit order book are
favorable for good trade execution. Surprisingly, asset pricing studies have not
distinguished these components of liquidity. This chapter aims to fill this gap in
the literature.45
While the measurement of liquidity levels is fairly straightforward, the correct
specification of liquidity risk is more difficult. I use the same methodology as
in the previous chapters: I set up a mean reversion model of the limit order
book to estimate resiliency (see Chapter 4). This procedure yields measures of
the riskiness of trade execution. Then I estimate the exposure of each stock’s
45 From this perspective, this chapter is most closely related to Acharya and Pedersen (2005).
They set up a framework in which liquidity, stock returns and market returns are correlated
and then distinguish between a level effect and a risk effect of liquidity. However, they do not
consider resiliency as a dimension which is valuable to investors. Furthermore, their results
rise and fall with the assumption that they have modeled the actual channels through which
liquidity enters returns correctly. Thirdly, the estimation is done without order data.
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liquidity to market movements of liquidity (see Chapter 5). This yields measures
of each stock’s systematic liquidity risk. With the help of the Fama and French
(1992) asset pricing framework I examine the impact of these liquidity factors
on stock returns. More specifically, I determine time-varying beta factors, book
equity to market equity as well as firm size and then add liquidity into the pricing
equations. Finally, I estimate the simultaneous impact on stock returns in this
asset pricing scenario.
I find strong evidence that liquidity plays an important role for the pricing
process of assets: both the level of liquidity and liquidity risk get incorporated into
stock returns. The higher the level of stock liquidity is, the lower the return that
an investor receives from buying that stock. Likewise, the lower the liquidity risk
of the stock is, the higher the return paid on the investment. The main implication
of these results is that, evidently, investors pay attention to the tradability of
stocks. While fundamental factors have an impact on the value that an investor
perceives as the fair price of the stock, the quality of the actual trading process
itself also enters asset prices. I derive this conclusion on the basis of liquidity
measures which are constructed directly from limit order book data. Therefore
they are founded strongly in the fine microstructure of the market and unlikely
to be proxying other factors.
The fact that the level of liquidity is priced reflects the initial investment
and the expected final liquidation costs. Furthermore, liquidity is stochastic
and varies along time. Therefore investors run the risk of having to liquidate
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positions at times when their stocks are particularly illiquid. I split liquidity
risk into a systematic component and into resiliency. I find evidence that both
components get priced as expected. In terms of magnitude, the pricing effects for
the level of liquidity and systematic liquidity risk are very similar. A difference
of one standard deviation across stocks will lead, all other things held equal,
to an increase of about 10% return per annum (or 0.9% per month). This is
roughly the same magnitude as for the remaining fundamental factors in the
pricing framework. The liquidity premium for resiliency is about half the size.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 presents the liquidity mea-
sures, briefly summarizes the microstructure models that are used for the estima-
tion and examines the linkage between the various components of liquidity. In
Section 6.3 I present the methodology of the asset pricing tests. Section 6.4 re-
ports the empirical evidence of the pricing effects. First I give simple correlations
and then report the test results. Section 6.5 analyses the impact of the liquidity
measures to check the robustness of the results. Section 6.6 concludes.
6.2 Liquidity Measures and Pricing Factors
A frequent definition of liquidity is that it measures the speed and ease with which
an investor can trade into or out of positions in a financial market. An asset is
generally considered liquid if transactions take place at a reasonable price and
without having to wait too long. The previous sections have already discussed
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the looseness of this concept. I now discuss how I measure the level and risk of
liquidity for the asset pricing tests.
The most frequent proxies of liquidity are the bid-ask spread and the corre-
sponding depth at the best bid and ask price. Therefore I use them as measures
of the level of liquidity.46 While the level of liquidity is a fairly easy input to the
asset pricing tests, the risk dimension cannot be proxied that directly. Let us take
a closer look at the microstructure models that I use to assess a stock’s systematic
component of liquidity risk and the resiliency of its limit order book. The esti-
mation of resiliency is based on the model in Chapter 4 and the estimation of the
systematic liquidity risk is based on the Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000)
model that was presented in Chapter 5. I briefly summarize these approaches:
1. Resiliency: The first component of liquidity risk that I model is the re-
siliency of the limit order book. We would expect resiliency to enter returns
because higher resiliency ensures that liquidity shocks are overcome rapidly
and that large trades can be executed at good prices. I set up a mean
reversion model of the liquidity supply and then adopt a cross-sectional
SUR for the empirical specification. The cross-sectional SUR approach
yields joint GLS estimates which are corrected for contemporaneous corre-
lation and heteroscedasticity. Let Lt−1 denote the level of liquidity in the
past period and let ∆L be the change in liquidity in the current period,
46 To make sure that these measures are not too noisy, I will extend the spread and depth
to ticks that are deeper in the book to ensure the robustness of the results.
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∆Lt := Lt − Lt−1. I run the following regression:
∆Li,t = αi − ϕiLi,t−1 + Σnk=1γk∆Li,t−k + εi,t (6.1)
In the equation, the parameter ϕ measures the mean reversion of liquidity
while the γ parameters are lag coefficients. ε is a normally distributed white
noise error term. As in Chapter 4 the estimation of resiliency is based upon
the bid-ask spread and depth around the spread. To reduce the noise in
the data I also use depth up to the first three ticks in the book as well as
bid and ask half-spreads for the third step of the limit order book.
2. Commonality: The second component of liquidity risk that I model is sys-
tematic component of liquidity risk. We would expect that the systematic
component of liquidity enters returns because, ceteris paribus, stocks with
higher systematic liquidity risk are riskier and should provide compensa-
tion for the additional risk that investors bear. The standard econometric
approach is the market model in Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000)
which relates the liquidity of a single stock to the liquidity of the market.
It employs a regression framework to measure the sensitivity of stock i’s
liquidity, Li, to market liquidity, LM :
Li,t = α+ β
1
i LM,t + β
2
i LM,t+1 + β
3
i LM,t−1 + δ
1
i rM,t + δ
2
i rM,t+1
+δ3i rM,t−1 + ξiV OLi,t + εi,t (6.2)
In the equation, the market return, rM,t, and stock volatility, V OLi,t, are
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used as control variables. ε is a normally distributed white noise error
term. As in Chapter 5 the estimation of commonality is based on the bid-
ask spread, depth at the spread as well as the depth at 2% price impact in
the limit order book and the slope of the price-quantity schedule. These
measures are standardised to correct for predictable trends in the data. The
cut-off point of the limit order book is 2%.
In the context of the following pricing sections, the parameters of interest
are ϕi in Equation 6.1 and β
1
i in Equation 6.2, the coefficients of resiliency and
systematic liquidity risk. These two measures characterize the liquidity risk of
an investor when he trades a stock in a limit order book market. The resiliency
measure is negative in its exposure to liquidity risk (the higher the coefficient, the
lower the risk), while the commonality coefficient is positive in its exposure (the
higher the coefficient, the higher the risk). Since investors should get compensated
for holding risky and illiquid assets, let us depart with the hypothesis that in the
asset pricing tests the sign of the resiliency measure should be negative and the
sign of the commonality measure should be positive.
6.3 Methodology
In the following section I determine the Fama-French factor inputs for the asset
pricing tests. I then present the conventional Fama and MacBeth (1973) test
methodology and extend the approach to a joint GLS estimation to obtain higher
statistical power. Finally I discuss potential errors and biases in the results.
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6.3.1 Fama-French Factors
The limit order book data used for the previous studies of liquidity was presented
in Chapter 3. For the asset pricing tests I need additional data on stock returns
and firm characteristics. The data is available in Datastream. I collect return
information and firm characteristics for all stocks in the DAX 100 index which
were listed at the German stock exchange for the period from 1993 to 2004.
Although the asset pricing tests will only use DAX 30 stocks, I use the DAX
100 stocks to construct the beta factors.47 Return data is collected on a monthly
basis which yields 144 monthly returns for each stock. Firm characteristics are
sampled on a yearly basis.
The methodology that I will be using follows the Fama and French (1992)
approach to allow for the comparability of my results to previous studies. Fama
and French (1992) explored the determination of the cross-sectional variation in
returns and found that the beta factor, firm size and the ratio of book equity
to market equity all influenced stock returns. Therefore, I also include these
factors in the asset pricing tests. A problematic feature to note is that the period
that I use is fairly short (10 years), while asset pricing studies typically use very
long time series. However, the longer the period that I choose, the less likely
47 The reason for using more than 30 stocks will become apparent in the following discussion
of the methodology. The central idea is that we use more stocks to be able to construct
beta portfolios. If I only used thirty stocks I would only be able to construct either very
few portfolios (for example only 3 ten-stock portfolios) or otherwise very small portfolios (for
example 10 three-stock portfolios). However, I need a sufficient number of portfolios to be able
to construct a sufficient time variation in beta and I need sufficiently large portfolios to reduce
the estimation error in beta. The estimation procedure is explained in the following section.
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liquidity features are to be valid for whole time horizon. I go back ten years
because that spans the time for which trading has been organized in limit order
book markets. I do not consider any longer time horizons because the market
structure has changed too much in the last few years for the pricing of liquidity
to yield meaningful results over such long periods.
Methodologically the most challenging task in the Fama and French (1992)
framework is to determine the beta factor. Beta is considered to be time-varying,
yet unfortunately it cannot be observed directly and has to be estimated. This
poses a number of challenges which have been discussed extensively in the lit-
erature (see Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), Fama and MacBeth (1973), Roll
(1977), Fama and French (1992), Black (1993) or Kothari, Shanken and Sloan
(1995)). I follow the Fama and French (1992) of using portfolio betas to proxy the
time variation in beta. First, I estimate so-called pre-ranking portfolio betas for
each stock by using two years of monthly returns, Ri,t. Let t be a time index in
months, let T be the index for each test year and let i be an index for each stock.
To obtain pre-ranking betas for each year, I estimate the following equation:
Ri,t = αi + βˆi(rM,t − rf,t) + εit (6.3)
In the equation, ε is an i.i.d. error term. Ri,t is the excess return of stock i in
t over the risk-free rate, Ri,t := ri,t − rf,t. I use the German 1-month interbank
rate, Fibor and Euribor,48 as the return of the risk-free asset and the performance
48 The sample period covers the introduction of the Euro in Germany which is why the Fibor
rates (denominated in Deutschmark) were renamed into Euribor (denominated in Euros).
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index DAX 30 as the proxy for the market return rM,t. Equation 6.3 is estimated
for each year T with the past 24 monthly returns so that I obtain one pre-ranking
beta for each stock and for each year, βˆi,T . By construction, there is some overlap
in the return data for the pre-ranking betas.
In the next step, the pre-ranking betas are sorted into deciles according to
their beta factor each year. An important point to notice is that the composition
of each beta decile changes from year to year. Monthly portfolio returns are
calculated for each portfolio as the equally-weighted averages of individual stock
returns, rp,t, where p is an index for the portfolios. The monthly portfolio returns
are then aggregated to yearly returns, rp,T , and are regressed onto the yearly
market returns, rM,T :
Rp,T = αp + βˆp(rM,T − rf,T ) + εp,T (6.4)
This procedure yields one beta estimate over the whole period for each portfo-
lio, βˆp. An advantage of this procedure is that the use of portfolios rather than
individual securities diversifies most of the firm-specific return component and
therefore enhances the precision of the estimates of beta (see Black, Jensen and
Scholes (1972)). As I will be using individual stocks in the cross-sectional re-
gressions, I take the portfolio beta factor of the portfolio to which stock belongs
as its individual beta factor each year as in Fama and French (1992). Because
stocks belong to different portfolios each year, their individual stock betas vary
over time, βˆi,T .
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The remaining factors in the Fama and French (1992) framework can be ob-
served directly. The size factor is the market value of stock i at the end of
year T . The book-to-market factor takes the ratio of a firm’s book equity to
its market capitalization. I take yearly time series from Datastream for each
value at the end of year T . Like the literature, I set values of BE/ME below
0.005 to 0.005 and values above 0.995 to 0.995 and then take the log of the ratio,
BMT := ln(BET/MET ). With the beta estimates we obtain all inputs of the
original Fama and French (1992): a market factor, a size factor and a book-to-
market factor. We only use DAX30 stocks as these are the only stocks for which
we can determine the liquidity factors. Finally, we follow Fama and French (1992)
in deleting all financial companies because book equity to market equity has a
different meaning for banks and financial corporations.49
6.3.2 Estimation Procedure
I now bring together the liquidity factors from section 6.2 and the Fama-French
factors from section 6.3. The aim is to analyze the individual pricing effects of
these risk components in a simultaneous model. The original model of Fama and
French (1992) regresses the cross section of stock returns onto the stocks’ firm
characteristics:
Ri = γ0 + γ1βˆi + γ2SIZEi + γ3BMi + εi (6.5)
49 In my sample the financial firms are Allianz, Commerzbank, HypoVereinsbank, Mu¨nchener
Ru¨ck and Deutsche Bank.
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I now add the level, resiliency and commonality of liquidity (LLEV , LRES and
LSY S) to the model. As stated before, asset pricing tests require long time
series. Typically, Equation 6.5 will be estimated for each year of the sample
period, while we only have single observations of the liquidity factors. Therefore
I assume that the liquidity factors remained constant over the estimation period
and thus generate the same return contribution every year. In principle, there is
no harm in this assumption, yet it will bias my study against finding significant
results.50 With the estimates of the liquidity level and liquidity risk, I obtain the
following new pricing equation:
Ri,T = γ0,T + γ1,T βˆi,T + γ2,TSIZEi,T−1 + γ3,TBMi,T−1 + γ4,TLLEVi
+γ5,TLSY Si + γ6,TLRESi + εi,T (6.6)
In Equation 6.6, Ri,T is the yearly excess return of stock i in year T . The equation
is estimated for each year of the data sample from 1995 to 2004 over the cross-
section of all stocks i. γj,T with j = 0, ..., 6 are the estimated coefficients that
I obtain each year. εi,T is the serially uncorrelated error term with a mean of
zero. Finally I obtain a time series of 10 parameter estimates for each factor in
Equation 6.6.
The standard procedure in Fama and MacBeth (1973) is to test whether the
50 An alternative approach is to identify observable variables which determine liquidity. With
the help of such variables, liquidity factors could be reconstructed under the assumption that the
relationship of the observable variables and liquidity stays unchanged. This has the advantage
that liquidity factors become time-varying. The previous chapters suggest possible factors.
Also see Beltran, Giot and Grammig (2005) for an investigation of factors that help predict the
liquidity of the limit order book.
6.3 Methodology 145
average of the parameter estimates, γ¯j =
1
T
Σ10T=1γˆj,T , are significantly above or
below zero. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) derive a correction technique
for time-varying volatility in which each coefficient is weighted by its precision
(as measured by the standard error) when computing cross-sectional averages.
In effect, this corresponds to a cross-sectional GLS estimation.51 I use the Fama
and MacBeth (1973) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) as the starting
point to obtain estimates that are comparable to the previous studies. However,
as both the cross section of stocks as well as time horizon are relatively small,
these standard tests will tend to have low statistical power. In a second step I
therefore follow Amihud, Christensen and Mendelson (1992) who combine time
series and cross-sectional observations in their estimation. This yields one single
estimation equation:
Rs = γ0 + γ1βˆ
s + γ2SIZE
s + γ3BM
s + γ4LLEV
s + γ5LSY S
s
+γ6LRES
s + εs (6.7)
In Equation 6.7, the superscript s indicates that all variables which carry the
index have been stacked: Rs is an i × T vector which consists of i subvectors
of length T . Each subvector is the return time series of one stock which is
then followed by the time series of the next stock and so forth. Likewise, βs,
SIZEs and BM s are also i × T vectors which stack the time series of the asset
pricing factors. LLEV s, LSY Ss and LRESs are similar i× T vectors, yet each
51 For further details see Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979).
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subvector i consists of constants because we assume that liquidity is constant
over the sample period. In this pooled approach, I use a standard t-test to test
whether the estimates of γ are unequal to zero.52 The main difference between
Equations 6.6 and 6.7 is that Equation 6.6 is estimated each year, while the joint
approach is estimated only once over the whole time horizon.
Let us briefly discuss the correct estimation technique for the pooled approach.
GLS is the correct estimation method53 where I proceed as follows: With the help
of the original OLS residuals I estimate the variance-covariance matrix of stock
returns for cross-sectional heteroscedasticity, Cˆ. The next step is to determine the
weighting matrixW such that C−1 = W ′W . All variables are then pre-multiplied
by the weighting matrix and Equation 6.7 is re-estimated for the transformed
variables:
R∗ = γ0 + γ1βˆ∗ + γ2SIZE∗ + γ3BM∗ + γ4LLEV ∗ + γ5LSY S∗
+γ6LRES
∗ + ε∗ (6.8)
In Equation 6.8, the superscript ∗ indicates that the stacked variables have been
replaced by their transformed counterparts. I can now use the standard OLS
statistical inference to test for the significance of γj. Additionally, I use the
52 This is the approach used in Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Amihud and Mendelson
(1989) and Amihud, Christensen and Mendelson (1992).
53 See, in the context of the CAPM, Brown and Weinstein (1983), Amihud and Mendelson
(1986), Amihud and Mendelson (1989) and Shanken (1992).
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Newey and West (1987) correction for possible remaining autocorrelation in the
data.54
6.3.3 Potential Errors and Biases
Asset pricing tests in the tradition of Fama and French (1992) face the problem
that their factors do not have a solid theoretical foundation. Therefore, the
tests always run the danger that they are in fact using variables which have
no causal relationship with returns. Instead, they might simply be capturing
the measurement error in other factors such as beta. Likewise, the proposed
factors could simply be proxies of more fundamental factors like uncertainty or
information asymmetry which are not directly observable. For example, Miller
and Scholes (1982) and Berk (1995) point out that many factors in asset pricing
tests depend on the stock price. In turn, the stock price’s inverse value is a good
proxy of conditional beta. A similar point can be made for liquidity: Novy-Marx
(2003) argues that a stock’s exposure to risk leads to high return premia and low
liquidity. Subsequently, it is not surprising that liquidity risk is associated with
high returns, however that does not mean that high liquidity risk is the reason
for high stock returns. Let us therefore take the time to check how reliable the
factors in the following asset pricing tests are.
As the estimates of liquidity risk are not related to the stock price, they
should definitely not be a proxy of beta. With regard to the second point it
54 The estimation of the variance-covariance matrix, the GLS weighting method and the
Newey and West (1987) correction are all implemented in EVIEWS.
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is always difficult to rule out completely that a variable is just a proxy of a
different unobservable pricing factor. However, I try to keep this danger as low
as possible by controlling for the standard Fama-French factors. Secondly, the
liquidity measures are connected very directly to each stock’s limit order book,
so that they should be reliable liquidity estimates. We can conclude that it is
unlikely that we are confounding liquidity with any other factors. Therfore let us
return to Equations 6.6 and 6.7. The main coefficients of interest are γ4, γ5 and
γ6 which we will now examine in more detail.
6.4 Asset Pricing Test Results
In the following section I present some basic properties of the pricing factors as
well as their correlation structure. I then examine the impact that liquidity risk
has in the Fama and French (1992) model and in the joint GLS framework.55
6.4.1 Correlation Structure of Pricing Factors
Let us first have a look at some summary statistics of the variables which are used
in the asset pricing tests. Table 6.1 shows that over the whole period the mean
excess return over the risk-free asset is 4.93%. There is a wide range between the
lowest and highest annual return over the time period (-70.69% and 211.07%).
The range of beta factors obtained from the portfolio approach reaches from 0.33
55 The liquidity measures used are the bid-ask spread (for the level of liquidity), depth at 2%
price impact in the limit order book (to estimate commonality) and depth up to the third tick
(to estimate the resiliency of the limit order book). The results for all further measures are
presented in the robustness section to underline that the following conclusions are irrespective
of the liquidity proxies.
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Table 6.1: Asset Pricing Inputs
Mean Median S.D. Min Max
Excess Returns 0.049 0.045 0.240 -0.707 2.110
Beta Factor 0.871 0.920 0.278 0.330 1.277
Market Capitalization 2.745 2.208 0.962 0.190 4.883
Book Equity to Market Equity -0.636 -0.501 0.498 -2.813 0.598
Level of Liquidity 0.084 0.084 0.024 0.045 0.136
Resiliency of Limit Order Book 0.536 0.545 0.179 0.225 0.861
Systematic Liquidity Risk 1.489 1.593 0.364 0.230 2.104
Table 6.1 gives the inputs of the asset pricing tests. Returns are the excess returns over the
German interbank rate. The beta factors are the portfolio betas that are obtained from the
Fama and French (1992) estimation procedure and assigned to individual stocks. Market
capitalization of equity is the size factor at the end of the previous year (logarithmic values of
equity in billions of Euros). Book equity to market equity is also given in log values. The level
of liquidity is the average relative bid-ask spread (in %). The two components of liquidity risk
are the estimates of resiliency and of commonality. All statistics are calculated over the last
five years where there are no missing values.
to 1.28. Market capitalization and book equity to market equity are taken as logs,
so that these values are more important in terms of their relative size compared to
other stocks as opposed to their absolute levels. On average, the relative bid-ask
spread is 0.084%. Liquidity risk in terms of execution risk (i.e. resiliency) is taken
as the sum of the ask side and bid side coefficients. It ranges from 0.225 to 0.861.
Low values imply strong resiliency and thus lower risk. Systematic liquidity risk,
also computed as the sum of ask side and bid side coefficients, varies between
0.23 and 2.10. For systematic risk, high values imply strong systematic liquidity
risk.
The first step that I take in investigating the return impact of the pricing
factors is a canonical correlation analysis. Table 6.2 shows the correlation struc-
ture of all variables that enter the asset pricing regressions. The critical value
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Table 6.2: Correlation Structure
RET BET SIZE BEME LLEV LRES LSYS
Excess Returns 1.000 0.032 -0.165 -0.086 0.228 -0.110 0.104
Beta Factor 1.000 0.143 0.300 0.059 0.443 -0.041
Size Factor 1.000 -0.296 -0.510 -0.241 0.012
BE-ME Factor 1.000 0.146 -0.170 -0.024
Level of Liquidity 1.000 -0.049 0.020
Resiliency 1.000 -0.043
Commonality 1.000
Table 6.2 gives the correlation matrix of the asset pricing input factors. Returns are the excess
returns over the risk-free rate. Beta factors are obtained from the Fama and French (1992)
estimation procedure. Market capitalization of equity is the size factor (logarithmic values
of equity in billions of Euros). Book equity to market equity is also given in log values. The
liquidity level is measured by the bid-ask spread. The two components of liquidity risk are the
estimates of resiliency and of commonality. All statistics are calculated over the cross section
of sample stocks.
at the 5% level is 0.19 for my data sample. The strongest and clearly significant
correlation is between the size factor and the bid-ask spread (-0.51): as we would
expect large stocks tend to have low bid-ask spreads. Another high correlation is
between the beta factor and the resiliency of the limit order book (0.44): stocks
with high beta factors tend to have very resilient limit order books. All other
correlation coefficients are in the range of -0.30 to 0.30. Next let us look at the
correlations of the factors with the stock return. The correlation coefficient for
the bid-ask spread and the return is 0.23 which is significant, while for resiliency
and the return the correlation is -0.11 and for commonality and the return 0.10.
The coefficients are not particularly large in value, yet they all have the expected
signs. The correlation of the returns with the Fama-French factors is not much
higher, either. Return and beta are positively correlated (0.03), while the co-
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efficient for the size factor is negative (-0.16). These coefficients have the same
sign as often reported in previous studies: high beta stocks and small-cap firms
earn higher returns. The association between returns and book equity to market
equity is negative (-0.09). This is opposed to the original positive relationship
found in Fama and French (1992). However, Loughran (1997) reports that the
BE/ME factor is an effect predominant in the technology section (for example
NASDAQ stocks). Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002) also find an opposite
sign of BE/ME for NYSE stocks.
A variable that has received no attention so far is trading volume (or turnover).
Datar, Naik and Radcliffe (1998) find evidence of a negative relationship between
turnover and returns. Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001) also argue
that both turnover as well as turnover volatility should affect stock prices. They
present evidence that there is a negative relationship between these variables and
returns. As turnover and firm size tend to be heavily correlated, I check their
association and observe a correlation of 92.3%. Subsequently, firm size seems to
be a very strong proxy for trading volume (or vice versa). Because of the high
association, I do not include volume as a separate variable. I stick with firm size
instead to maintain comparability with Fama and French (1992).
6.4.2 Pricing of Liquidity and Liquidity Risk
In this section I present the results of the asset pricing tests. Primarily I will be
focusing on the liquidity factors in the pricing framework – the level of liquidity,
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Table 6.3: Fama-MacBeth Asset Pricing Test
Fama-MacBeth LR-Correction
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.
Constant -0.172 -1.366 -0.028 -0.105
Beta Factor -0.076 -0.661 -0.078 -0.728
Market Capitalization 0.050 1.358 0.034 0.880
Book Equity to Market Equity -0.111 -2.071 -0.116 -1.710
Level of Liquidity 0.169 0.174 0.871 0.702
Resiliency of Limit Order Book -0.042 -0.329 -0.020 -0.139
Systematic Liquidity Risk 0.100 1.488 0.069 1.195
Table 6.3 shows the results of the Fama-MacBeth asset pricing test. The coefficients are yearly
averages and the t-statistics test whether the averages are equal to zero. The dependent variable
is the yearly excess stock return over the German Interbank rate. The exogenous variables are
the beta factor, market capitalization (logs of equity in billions of Euros) and book equity to
market equity (logs). The level of liquidity is measured by the relative bid-ask spread while
liquidity risk is captured by resiliency and commonality.
resiliency and systematic liquidity risk.56 We start with the Fama and MacBeth
(1973) framework and then compare the results to the pooled approach. After
we have examined the pricing effects of liquidity, we will also have a look at the
conventional Fama-French factors at the end of the section.
Table 6.3 displays the time series averages of the estimated coefficients in
the cross-sectional Fama-MacBeth approach. Both the conventional Fama and
MacBeth (1973) test as well as the Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) correc-
tion yield very similar results. The coefficients of all three liquidity factors have
the expected signs: firstly, the standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) coefficient
of the bid-ask spread is 0.169 (with a t-statistic of 0.174) and the Litzenberger
and Ramaswamy (1979) coefficient is 0.871 (with a t-statistic of 0.702). For re-
56 For the sake of brevity I report the results for the bid-ask spread. The results for depth at
the best spread are presented in the robustness check. However, the results remain unchanged.
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Table 6.4: Pooled Asset Pricing Test
Coefficient Coefficient Impact on
Estimates t-statistics Returns %
Constant -0.464 -2.533
Beta Factor 0.001 0.010 0.273
Market Capitalization 0.055 1.656 5.240
Book Equity to Market Equity -0.296 -5.126 -14.767
Level of Liquidity 0.013 2.246 9.412
Resiliency of Limit Order Book -0.240 -1.429 -4.310
Systematic Liquidity Risk 0.301 3.607 10.973
Table 6.4 shows the results of the pooled asset pricing test. In the pooled approach the
cross-section and time series are jointly estimated and tested against zero with standard
t-tests. The dependent variable is the yearly excess stock return over the risk-free rate. The
exogenous variables are the beta factor, market capitalization (logs of equity in billions of
Euros) and book equity to market equity (logs). The level of liquidity is measured by the
relative bid-ask spread while liquidity risk is captured by resiliency and commonality. The
impact on returns gives the return impact (in %) for an increase of the exogenous variables by
one standard deviation.
siliency, the standard coefficient is -0.042 and the corrected coefficient is -0.020
(with t-statistics of -0.329 and -0.139, respectively). Finally, the Fama and Mac-
Beth (1973) estimate for commonality is 0.100 (with a t-statistic of 1.488) and
the Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) coefficient is 0.069 (with a t-statistic
of 1.195). All together, high spreads, low resiliency and high commonality imply
higher returns. However, the coefficients are not significant. As the yearly regres-
sions have only 25 observations, this is not very surprising. We therefore turn
to the joint estimation of the time series and cross section to examine whether
lack of statistical power or lack of causality are responsible for the insignificant
results.
The results for the pooled asset pricing tests are provided in Table 6.4. Again
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we focus on the parameter estimates of the liquidity factors. In the pooled ap-
proach we find that all estimates have the same sign as they had in the Fama and
MacBeth (1973) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) approaches. How-
ever, the pooling of the time series and cross-sectional observations has clearly
increased the statistical power of the test: in the joint approach, the liquidity
factors have a very pronounced effect on stock returns. Firstly, the coefficient
of the bid-ask spread is 0.013 with a t-statistic of 2.246. As we would expect,
stocks with higher bid-ask spreads (less liquid stocks) earn higher returns, all
other things equal. Thus, investors get compensated for holding illiquid stocks.
Secondly, systematic liquidity risk has a significantly positive impact on returns.
The estimated coefficient is 0.301 and the corresponding t-statistic is 3.607: the
higher the systematic component of liquidity risk is, the higher the return that is
paid to the investor. Finally, the coefficient of resiliency is -0.240 with a t-statistic
of -1.429. Subsequently, less resilient stocks earn higher returns. This result is
significant at the 10% level, while the other liquidity coefficients are significant
at the 5% level. In all, the coefficients of all liquidity factors have an important
impact on stock returns. The Adjusted R2 value of the model is 24.05% and the
hypothesis that all parameters are significant is rejected even at the 1% level.
I now assess the economic importance of the pricing factors. The final column
of Table 6.4 displays the magnitude of return differentials which are due to cross-
sectional differences in the liquidity factors. An increase of one standard deviation
of the bid-ask spread across stocks leads, all other things held equal, to an increase
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of the annual stock return of 9.41 percentage points. Likewise, the same increase
of systematic liquidity risk leads to an increase of the return by 10.97 percentage
points. With regard to resiliency, an increase of the resiliency factor by one
standard deviation leads to a decrease of the return of 4.31 percentage points.
Comparing these figures we see that the impact of the bid-ask spread and of
systematic liquidity risk on returns are about twice as strong as the impact of
resiliency. One reason why resiliency has a weaker impact might be that its
risk is diversifiable across assets. In contrast, systematic liquidity risk cannot be
diversified. Likewise, the bid-ask spread cannot be avoided, either.
Let us turn to the Fama-French factors in the asset pricing regressions. Their
impact on returns varies greatly from factor to factor. The coefficient of the
size factor is 0.055 with a t-statistic of 1.656. This result implies that larger
firms earn higher returns. It is contrary to the well-known size effect (see Banz
(1981)), however it is consistent with Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002). They
also observe that the impact of market capitalization on returns is positive if
the pricing equation includes a separate liquidity factor or a factor of informed
trading. The most plausible reason is that with a separate liquidity factor in the
equation, market capitalization does not proxy liquidity anymore and therefore
need not have a negative coefficient. The coefficient of the beta factor is 0.001
and with a t-statistic of 0.010. Obviously, beta has little power to explain stock
returns. This evidence is in line with prior research as in Fama and French (1992),
Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) or Datar, Naik and Radcliffe (1998). The book-to-
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market factor also has a coefficient of -0.296 and a t-statistic of -5.128. The
coefficient has a different sign compared to Fama and French (1992). However,
as discussed before, a positive relationship of book equity to market equity with
returns is primarily observed for NASDAQ stocks. As our sample does not include
high-tech stocks, the opposite sign is therefore not so surprising (see Easley,
Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002)). If we compare the magnitude of the Fama-French
factors with the liquidity factors we see that beta has virtually no impact on
returns. The impact of market capitalization is about as high as the impact of
resiliency (5.24 percentage points). In contrast, the ratio of book equity to market
equity has a stronger impact on returns than liquidity risk (14.76 percentage
points).
In all, we observe that all dimensions of liquidity and liquidity risk get priced.
The bid-ask spread and systematic liquidity risk have the strongest effects on
stock returns. This is not surprising as systematic liquidity risk is non-diversifiable
and the spread is a payment that is always incurred for any stock investment.
6.5 Robustness Checks
In this section I examine the robustness of the previous results. Firstly, I take a
closer look at the influence which the choice of liquidity measures has on the es-
timation results. The measure of liquidity enters the estimation directly through
the level of liquidity and indirectly through its impact on the estimates of re-
siliency and commonality.
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Table 6.5: Asset Pricing Tests with Different Liquidity Measures
Pricing Factor Measure Coefficient t-statistic Impact
Level of Liquidity SPRi 0.013 2.246 9.412
DEPi -0.931 -0.824 -4.516
λi 0.204 1.712 7.008
Resiliency of Limit Order Book DEP ik=3 -0.240 -1.429 -4.310
HSil=3 -1.024 -1.265 -5.126
Systematic Liquidity Risk SPRi 0.188 1.743 5.024
DEP tiA,B 0.301 3.607 10.973
λi 0.084 0.948 3.599
Table 6.5 shows the results of the pooled asset pricing test for different liquidity measures.
The table displays the parameter estimates and t-statistics of the liquidity factors. The level
of liquidity and systematic liquidity risk are estimated for the spread (SPR), depth (DEP )
and the slope of the price-quantity schedule (λ). Resiliency is estimated for the depth of the
limit order book at the third tick (DEP ii=3) and the area under the price-quantity schedule
(HSil=3) .
To assess the impact of the liquidity proxy I re-estimate Equation 6.8 for
different measures of liquidity and for different estimates of resiliency and com-
monality. I use three different proxies for the level of liquidity: the bid-ask spread
(SPRi), the corresponding depth of the limit order book (DEP
i
A,B) and the slope
of the price-quantity schedule (λi). With regard to resiliency, I estimate the mean
reversion model in Equation 6.1 for depth at the third tick (DEP ik=3) and for the
half-spread (HSil=3) on the bid and ask side (see Chapter 4). Likewise, I estimate
the systematic component of liquidity risk in Equation 6.2 on the basis of the
spread, the depth of the limit order book (at 2% price impact) and the slope of
the price-quantity schedule (see Chapter 5). I vary the liquidity measures for one
factor at a time so that all other factors are always equal to the specification in
the previous section. The results are provided in Table 6.5.
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Table 6.5 shows that the only sign that changes is when I proxy the level
of liquidity by depth instead of the bid-ask spread. However, this is consistent
with the previous results, as a high bid-ask spread reflects low liquidity, while
high depth reflects high liquidity. Therefore, in this case opposite signs actually
underline that the effect of the level of liquidity on returns is the same for both
liquidity measures. For all other proxies, the signs and directions of the impact
on returns also remain the same. While the directions of the impact remain
unchanged, the statistical power of most alternative liquidity measures is lower:
all estimates were significant in the previous section, yet after the robustness
checks only about two thirds of the coefficients remain significant. Likewise, the
magnitude of the effects is smaller for the level of liquidity and for the systematic
component of liquidity risk. The results for resiliency are unchanged.
In all, the results are qualitatively similar with regard to the signs of the
coefficients, however the magnitude of the return effects differs for the various
liquidity measures. The strongest effects can be observed if we measure liquidity
by the bid-ask spread and by the depth of the limit order book. Maybe it is not
surprising that the pricing effects of the slope are not very high because investors
do not observe the slope of the price-quantity schedule directly. Furthermore,
it is reasonable to assume that the slope measure is a particularly noisy pricing
factor: the slope is an estimated variable which is used to obtain an estimate of
commonality. This double estimation makes it particularly likely to be subject
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to an error-in-variables bias. The bias will tend to underestimate the coefficient
in the pricing equation and thus biases against finding significant results.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the impact of liquidity on stock returns. In the past, as-
set pricing has focused very strongly on more fundamental factors of asset prices
and has only very recently turned to the characteristics of the actual trading
process. In particular, aspects of liquidity have not been examined very compre-
hensively. I split liquidity into three factors: the level of liquidity, the systematic
component of liquidity risk and the resiliency of the limit order book. We would
expect that, ceteris paribus, an investor will demand higher returns for stocks
which are less liquid, which have higher systematic liquidity risk or which have
a less resilient liquidity supply. The chapter examines empirically, for the first
time, the simultaneous pricing effects of these liquidity factors on the basis of
tick data from a limit order book market.
We find strong evidence that liquidity plays an important role for the pricing
process of assets: both the level of liquidity and liquidity risk are incorporated
into stock returns in a significant way. The lower the level of liquidity is, the
higher the return that investors receive from buying that stock. This effect is
the strongest if we measure liquidity by the bid-ask spread or by the depth of
the limit order book. Likewise, the higher the liquidity risk of a stock is, the
higher is the return that an investor receives. This result can be observed both
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for the systematic component of liquidity risk as well as for the resiliency of the
limit order book. This chapter presents evidence that investors pay attention to
the tradability of stocks and that they require higher premia if they hold stocks
which cannot be traded as easily or whose liquidity supply is more risky.
The results provided in this chapter are consistent with several studies in
the literature that have provided evidence that the level of liquidity gets priced
(see Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Amihud and Mendelson (1989) or Amihud
(2002)). Likewise, the evidence is also consistent with the studies by Pa´stor and
Stambaugh (2003) and Gibson and Mougeot (2004) who first put forward that
liquidity risk gets priced. The only other study that examines the level and a risk
component of liquidity simultaneously is Acharya and Pedersen (2005). In their
framework, the impact of the level is more than twice as strong as the impact
of liquidity risk. The results in this chapter confirm that both the riskiness and
level of liquidity are priced. However, in my study the level of liquidity and its
systematic risk have an equally strong impact on returns, while the impact of
resiliency is much lower. One reason why liquidity risk has a stronger impact in
my study is probably that the use of limit order book data allows a more precise
estimate of liquidity risk.
In all, I provide positive evidence that liquidity is a stock characteristic that is
valued by investors and thus enters stock returns. In this chapter, liquidity is split
up into three components to determine the magnitude of the individual aspects
of liquidity. The pricing effects for the level of liquidity and for the systematic
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component of liquidity risk are very similar: a difference of one standard deviation
across stocks will lead, all other things held equal, to a return increase of about
10% return per annum. For resiliency, an increase of one standard deviation leads
to a return increase of about 5%. These results are valid under the assumption
that the liquidity factors are constant over time. When longer time series of the
limit order book are available, future studies will be able to examine these effects
for time-varying liquidity factors.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In the previous chapters I examined the riskiness of liquidity in a limit order
book market. Liquidity risk typically constitutes the danger that the liquidation
of an asset can be very costly because trades incur high market impacts in illiquid
markets. Two important aspects of such liquidity-induced price movements are,
firstly, the replenishment process of the limit order book and, secondly, the spill-
over process of liquidity from one stock to another. For investors, liquidity risk
matters when they want to time their trades or when they split large volumes
over time. In addition, liquidity spill-overs become relevant as soon as investors
trade multiple securities. Against this background my thesis investigated the
properties and magnitude of liquidity risk. Furthermore, it examined the pricing
effects of liquidity risk on stock returns. Let us conclude by reviewing the most
important results and implications for future research.
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7.1 Main Results
Market structures have been changing and limit order book markets growing so
fast that the theoretical literature has not kept pace with this rapid development.
Therefore, all theoretical models of the limit order book are only partial views
of limit order markets. Most notably, static models such as Glosten (1994) or
Sand˚as (2001) derive the equilibrium state of the price-quantity schedule. Dy-
namic models such as Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005) characterize the dy-
namic equilibrium of very simple limit order book markets. The challenge of the
empirical literature is to keep the theoretical models of liquidity in mind and, at
the same time, to do justice to the complex nature of real-world markets. My
research provides important insights for investors in limit order book markets
and has implications for the further theoretical and empirical research.
I address liquidity risk empirically with the help of three months of limit order
book data from a the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. On the basis of Foucault, Kadan
and Kandel (2005) I set up an econometric model of resiliency which I estimate
for the dynamics of the spread and depth. Then I build on Sand˚as (2001) to
implement the price-quantity schedule of the limit order book empirically and
estimate systematic liquidity movements across stocks. Finally, I use the Fama
and French (1992) asset pricing framework to assess the impact of liquidity factors
on stock returns.
With regard to resiliency (Chapter 4), I find strong evidence that the limit
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order book follows a stable replenishment process. If an order book is empty
it attracts a lot of new liquidity which increases the book’s depth. Likewise, if
the current bid-ask spread is high, new limit orders get submitted that improve
the price. These results reflect that the limit order book is resilient, because
once liquidity has been consumed, it gets replaced by new liquidity. Along time,
spread resiliency is negatively associated with the order arrival rate and positively
associated with the proportion of patient traders in the trading population. This
suggests that liquidity-consuming factors reduce resiliency and liquidity-providing
factors increase resiliency. In general, spread resiliency and depth resiliency react
contrarily because spread resiliency erodes depth at the best tick, so that the two
effects are asynchronous. In the cross section, spread and depth resiliency are
both positively associated with market capitalization and beta, yet negatively
correlated with insider profits. Resiliency is not significantly correlated with
either the bid-ask spread or depth. This reinforces, ex post, the importance of
resiliency as an independent dimension of liquidity which provides significant new
information.
With regard to commonality (Chapter 5), I find strong evidence of market-
wide liquidity movements. At first, I analyze commonality for liquidity at the
best prices which turns out to be fairly weak (2% for depth and 6% for spreads).
However, once I take the liquidity supply in the order book into account, com-
monality increases strongly: for depth at 2% price impacts commonality rises to
16%. Measures of the price-quantity schedule lead to similar results. Obviously,
166 7 Conclusion
in a limit order market with a limit order book, the commonality of liquidity
provision is drastically higher than the spread suggests. In addition to the mis-
measurement of order book liquidity I also examine the time variation of liquidity
co-movement: commonality is far stronger at the opening of the trading day when
liquidity is low and at the end of the day when the liquidity supply falls again.
During the day when liquidity is high commonality is low. Furthermore, com-
monality is much stronger in falling markets than in rising markets. In all, this is
strong evidence that in the past the mismeasurement of liquidity and the neglect
of time variation has led to a serious underestimation of liquidity commonalities.
With regard to pricing effects (Chapter 6), I find strong evidence that liquidity
plays an important role for the pricing process of assets: both the level of liquidity
and liquidity risk are incorporated into stock returns in a significant way. The
lower the level of liquidity is, the higher the return that investors receive from
buying the stock. Likewise, the higher the liquidity risk of a stock is, the higher
is the return that an investor receives. This result can be observed both for the
systematic component of liquidity risk as well as for the resiliency of the limit
order book. The pricing effects for the level of liquidity and for the systematic
component of liquidity risk are very similar: a difference of one standard deviation
across stocks will lead, all other things held equal, to a return increase of about
10% return per annum. An increase in resiliency leads to a return increase of
about 5%. Evidently, investors require higher premia if they hold stocks which
cannot be traded as easily or whose liquidity is more risky.
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7.2 Further Research
The previous results show that there are considerable differences in liquidity both
in the time series as well as in the cross section of stocks. The most important
implication for investors is that liquidity risk can have a substantial impact on
their trading performance. Therefore it is not surprising that liquidity risk is
reflected in stock prices and returns. From an academic point of view, the results
bring up further interesting issues which I leave to future research:
1. Theoretical models of resiliency have only addressed the dynamics of the
spread so far, most notably Foucault, Kadan and Kandel (2005). However,
the empirical results show that the replenishment mechanism of the order
book is strong both for the bid-ask spread and for depth. These results
imply the necessity to extend the theory to a more realistic limit order
book setting. In particular, theoretical models should allow the queuing of
limit orders at the same tick and should give up the assumption that limit
orders are always price-improving. Although these elements will make the
models more complex, they should at the same time offer richer and more
realistic predictions about the behavior of limit order book markets.
2. While theory is in search of an adequate framework for resiliency, some
open questions remain for further empirical study. In particular, the previ-
ous results show that depth and price resiliency are both strong, yet their
relationship is not totally clear. In the current set-up, the fixed time hori-
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zon aggregates limit and market orders within the interval and therefore
makes it difficult to identify clear lead and lag structures of the spread and
depth. A promising approach is to use the complete history of limit order
books updated for each single order. This would allow to study how the
spread and depth adapt to liquidity shocks (market orders that clear one
tick, two ticks and so forth) and how spread and depth changes interact.
3. In the context of a limit order book structure, liquidity commonality has not
been modeled formally in the literature. However, the most striking result
in my empirical study is how strongly systematic movements of liquidity
increase with the tick distance of liquidity from the best price. Domowitz,
Hansch and Wang (2005) provide further empirical evidence that in limit
order book markets such commonality arises from the correlation of order
types instead of order flow. Therfore, it appears very promising to extend
the current models of the limit order book (such as Sand˚as (2001)) to a
multi-asset setting. The great challenge is to endogenize the choice of order
type which, in turn, should produce correlation in the liquidity supply.
4. A further intriguing aspect of commonality is the link between systematic
liquidity movements and the state of the macroeconomy. As financial crises
are mostly accompanied by vast liquidity outflows, a plausible hypothesis is
that macroeconomic variables such as the movement of the exchange rate
have predictive power for systematic liquidity risk. From the opposite per-
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spective, the effect of liquidity commonality on the stability of the market
is unclear. Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam (2005) give first evidence
that spill-overs between bond and stock markets are large. It remains to be
examined whether high commonality in liquidity is evidence of an efficient
and well-functioning liquidity supply or a signal of an approaching crisis.
5. The pricing results demonstrate that both the level of liquidity as well as
its riskiness are factors which have a pronounced impact on stock returns.
A central problem of such asset pricing tests is the length of the times
series. A promising extension to my approach would be to make liquidity a
function of observable economic variables. For example, Beltran, Giot and
Grammig (2005) identify such factors that predict the liquidity in the limit
order book. In a first step their coefficients would have to be estimated for
the limit order book data. In a second step, liquidity factors could then
be constructed going back in time. The advantages of such an approach
are that constant coefficients are a less restrictive assumption than constant
liquidity factors and that the longer time series increase the statistical power
of the asset pricing test.
In all, the results in the previous chapters contribute to the understanding of
liquidity risk in limit order book markets. The thesis underlines the importance
of liquidity risk for investors’ trading decisions. The main challenge of future
research is to bring theory in line with the empirical results and to extend the
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empirical literature in order to obtain further insights into the role of liquidity
risk in limit order book markets.
Appendix A
Additional Tables
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics of Spread and Depth Measures at the Best Limit
Prices in the Limit Order Book
Market Trading Absolute Relative Aggregate
Stock Capital. Volume Spread Spread Depth
Adidas 4.17 34.76 0.086 0.093 94,230
Allianz 38.50 295.99 0.056 0.057 194,850
Altana 6.73 33.47 0.052 0.106 79,820
Basf 25.39 135.67 0.027 0.063 182,560
Bmw 23.08 97.23 0.021 0.091 156,100
Bayer 17.05 94.15 0.026 0.075 152,060
Commerzbank 9.36 56.29 0.017 0.108 157,800
Continental 4.09 27.82 0.038 0.119 88,490
Daimler 37.36 201.79 0.025 0.068 221,550
Deutsche Bank 38.34 324.95 0.036 0.053 252,420
Deutsche Boerse 4.87 36.55 0.046 0.098 109,200
Deutsche Post 18.23 45.42 0.020 0.111 144,860
Deutsche Telekom 61.29 348.60 0.012 0.074 979,210
Eon 36.15 178.47 0.069 0.104 76,630
Fresenius 3.94 14.13 0.071 0.131 65,770
Henkel 3.70 19.61 0.033 0.063 218,860
Infineon 8.01 153.05 0.012 0.106 361,810
Linde 5.15 24.03 0.047 0.107 82,390
Lufthansa 4.96 45.19 0.017 0.121 135,730
Man 3.42 28.34 0.035 0.128 89,570
Metro 11.42 42.63 0.043 0.123 96,300
Muenchener Rueck 22.13 221.43 0.058 0.062 201,930
RWE 16.49 106.93 0.028 0.083 165,730
SAP 42.49 201.83 0.080 0.061 171,560
Schering 7.91 53.69 0.037 0.092 106,230
Tui 2.95 26.53 0.028 0.149 89,860
Volkswagen 14.19 114.85 0.028 0.073 142,820
HypoVereinsbank 9.19 101.00 0.020 0.111 198,140
Thyssen Krupp 8.19 40.37 0.020 0.110 134,610
Siemens 57.16 339.02 0.030 0.050 263,520
Averages 18.20 114.793 0.037 0.093 180,487
Table A.1 reports descriptive statistics for different liquidity measures of our data set. The
second column is market capitalization of each stock (as of 01 January 2004), the third colum
is average daily trading volume (in 1,000 Euros), the fourth column is the absolute spread in
Euros, the fifth column is the relative spread in % and the final column is depth at the best
limit prices in Euros.
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Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Depth of the Order Book at 2% Price
Impact and for the Slope of the Order Book
Depth Slopes
Stock Ask Side Bid Side Ask Side Bid Side
Adidas 2,437.00 2,044.00 0.8522 0.9701
Allianz 8,833.00 8,657.00 0.2263 0.2332
Altana 1,776.00 1,602.00 1.2289 1.2673
BASF 3,924.00 4,360.00 0.4721 0.4463
Bayer 3,273.00 2,922.00 0.6139 0.6919
BMW 3,075.00 3,186.00 0.6809 0.6602
Commerzbank 2,885.00 2,295.00 0.7663 0.9186
Continental 1,239.00 1,036.00 1.6666 1.9632
Daimler 5,789.00 5,547.00 0.3326 0.3441
Deutsche Boerse 11,145.00 10,916.00 0.1836 0.1866
Deutsche Bank 1,830.00 1,861.00 1.1555 1.1305
Deutsche Post 2,411.00 2,060.00 0.8619 1.0021
Deutsche Telekom 17,655.00 16,668.00 0.1084 0.1133
Eon 1,173.00 997.00 1.6551 1.7904
Fresenius 823.00 831.00 2.2516 2.2441
Henkel 5,459.00 5,303.00 0.3422 0.3631
Infineon 7,150.00 5,614.00 0.3391 0.395
Linde 1,079.00 1,123.00 1.8555 1.8497
Lufthansa 1,734.00 1,621.00 1.1827 1.3244
MAN 1,046.00 945.00 2.0172 2.1075
Metro 1,485.00 1,429.00 1.4324 1.4314
Muenchener Rueck 7,815.00 7,048.00 0.2832 0.3002
RWE 2,770.00 2,705.00 0.7139 0.7267
SAP 6,423.00 6,915.00 0.2982 0.284
Schwering 2,200.00 2,467.00 1.0523 0.9295
TUI 1,223.00 1,102.00 1.7401 2.0498
VW 3,213.00 3,887.00 0.6709 0.5903
ThyssenKrupp 1,762.00 1,318.00 1.2102 1.4617
HypoVereinsbank 3,943.00 3,408.00 0.6082 0.7217
Siemens 11,007.00 11,107.00 0.1747 0.1752
Average 4,219.23 4,032.47 0.8992 0.9557
Table A.2 gives descriptive statistics of the liquidity of the order book. The second and third
column give the aggregate depth (in 1,000.00 Euros) of the order book up to a price impact of
2%. The fourth and fifth column give parameter estimates of a linear model of the order book
function.
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Table A.3: PCA Results for the Spread and the Slope Measures
Best Prices Slope Measure
PCA Output Spread Depth Ask Bid
First eigenvalue 2.23 2.17 6.85 5.42
Critical value 1.54 1.39 4.25 3.50
Proportion of variation 7.74 7.22 24.36 14.69
Table A.3 gives the results of PCA for liquidity at best prices (bid-ask spread and depth at
the best bid and ask price) as well as the slope of the price-quantity schedule. The table lists
the first eigenvalue, its critical values at the 95% confidence level and the proportion of total
variability explained by the first principal component (in %).
Table A.4: Impact of the Time of Day: Slope of the Price-Quantity Schedule
Open Day End
Slope Coefficient β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2
Ask Side 0.60 15.64 0.40 8.45 0.48 12.90
Bid Side 0.49 17.89 0.43 11.74 0.50 15.63
Table A.4 reports the average coefficients of market liquidity and the corresponding R2 values
of the regressions (in %) for the opening of the trading day (“open”), the midday trading
period (“day”) and the end of the trading day (“end”). The results are reported for the bid
side and the ask side of the book. The liquidity measure used is the price-quantity schedule of
the order book.
Table A.5: Impact of Market Momemtum: Slope of the Price-Quantity Schedule
Up Down
Slope Coefficient β1 R2 β1 R2
Ask Side 0.541 0.110 0.694 0.185
Bid Side 0.506 0.141 0.728 0.178
Table A.5 reports the average parameter estimates of the market liquidity parameter and R2
values for rising markets (“up”) and falling markets (“down”). It lists the results for the ask
side and the bid side. The liquidity measure used is the price-quantity schedule of the book.
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Table A.6: Relationship between Commonality and Market Return
Liquidity Measures α t(α) β t(β) R2
Depth (Ask Side) 0.303 1.129 -1.125 -2.110 0.087
Depth (Bid Side) 0.227 0.794 -0.602 -3.853 0.010
Slope (Ask Side) 0.187 0.669 -1.004 -2.365 0.085
Slope (Bid Side) 0.194 0.890 -0.708 -3.112 0.099
Table A.6 reports the parameter estimates for the regression of commonality onto the market
return (in Equation 5.5). It lists the results for the ask side and the bid side of the order
book. The liquidity measures used are the depth in the limit order book and the slope of the
price-quantity schedule.
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Appendix B
Principal Component Analysis
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a technique that goes back to Pearson
(1901) and Hotelling (1933). It is used to analyze variation of multivariate data
structures. PCA decomposes the total variability within a data structure into
components which account for the total variation. A textbook application of
PCA to finance is given in Watsham and Parramore (1997).
The starting point of PCA is the covariance matrix. PCA requires stationary
and standardized data because it will otherwise give too much weight to variables
with large variances. Therefore if the data are of different orders of magnitude
it is usual to standardize the variables first. Let X denote the data matrix and
let xi denote column i of this matrix. Each observation of each column is then
standardized by subtracting the column mean xiand dividing by its standard
deviation σxi . Let zi denote the columns of the standardized data and let Z be
the corresponding data matrix:
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zi,t =
xi,t − xi
σxi
(B.1)
The next step is then to compute the variance-covariance matrix of the stan-
dardized data matrix which I call C:
C = cov(Z) (B.2)
The variance-covariance matrix enables us to extract from this matrix the eigen-
vectors and their associated eigenvalues. The eigenvectors are linearly indepen-
dent combinations of the variables of the variance-covariance matrix which ac-
count for the total variance of the multivariate data structure. The eigenvalues
give the proportion of risk that each eigenvector accounts for.
Mathematically, each eigenvector j is a vector γj which has an associated
scalar λj known as the corresponding eigenvalue. The relationship between eigen-
vectors and eigenvalues is such that when the variance-covariance matrix is mul-
tiplied against the eigenvector, it simply scales the eigenvector by the eigenvalue:
C γj = λj γj (B.3)
Now let matrix Λ be a diagonal matrix which contains all eigenvalues of C
sorted from highest to lowest. Let Γ be the corresponding matrix of eigenvectors
in which the eigenvectors are sorted as columns from highest to lowest. The
symmetry and non-singularity of the variance-covariance matrix C then ensures
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that the inverse of Γ exists and equals Γ. Finally, PCA has decomposed the
complete covariance matrix into eigenvectors and eigenvalues that account for
the total variation in the original multivariate data:
C = ΓΛΓ (B.4)
The eigenvectors in Γ are the principal components that contribute to the
total variance. The eigenvalues in Λ give the risk accounted for by each of these
principal components. Dividing the first eigenvalue by the dimension of the
variance-covariance matrix yields the proportion of risk explained by the first
principal component. I perform PCA for our various liquidity measures and
devote special attention to the proportion of total variation that the obtained
principal components explain. I perform this analysis for standardized liquidity
measures for which we compute the variance-covariance matrix and then follow
the procedure above.
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Appendix C
Order Book Reconstruction
The following source code reconstructs the Xetra order book at any desired fre-
quency. It was programmed in Gauss 6.0 and consists of one main text file as well
as several additional functions. The main file structures the computation proce-
dure and the functions apply the Xetra matching rules in detail. The included
file globvariables.src contains global variable definitions, the helpprocs.src
file contains auxiliary functions and the additional file mainprocs.src contains a
list of functions used in the main body of the program. Text that is enclosed by
a slash and an asterisk – /* ... */ – is a comment and not executed. For the sake
of brevity, the loop is shortened to three stocks that are sufficient to illustrate
the program structure.
/* GENERAL PATH AND FORMAT SETTINGS */
chdir /orderbooks/input;
format /m1 /rd 5,2;
/* FILES AND SOURCE CODED TO BE INCLUDED */
#include /book/iput/globvariables.src;
#include /book/iput/mainprocs.src;
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#include /book/iput/helpprocs.src;
/* LOOP FOR ALL 30 DAX EQUITIES (SHORTENED TO 3 STOCKS HERE):
DATA IS LOADED; ENTRIES IS PRE-SPECIFICATION OF MAXIMUM NUMBER
OF DIFFERENT LIMIT PRICES (REDUCES COMPUTATION; ERROR RETURNED
IF SPECIFICATION TOO LOW; DATA UP TO 3-MIO-BY-50 MATRICES */
stock=1;
do while stock <=30;
/* ADIDAS */
if stock == 1;
let data_all="allADS";
let data_init="initADS";
entries=300;
endif;
/* ALLIANZ */
if stock == 2;
let data_all="allALV";
let data_init="initALV";
entries=700;
endif;
/* here come all other stocks */
/* SIEMENS */
if stock == 30;
let data_all="allSIE";
let data_init="initSIE";
entries=400;
endif;
/* SAMPLING FREQUENCY IN SECONDS; UP TO 15 MINUTES SUPPORTED BY 1
GB PROCESSOR, HIGHER FREQUENCIES REQUIRE MORE POWERFUL SERVER */
sample_time=60*5;
/* COLUMN DEFINITIONS FOR FOLLOWING MATRIX MANIPULATION */
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ordertype=1;
orderprice=2;
ordervolume=3;
direction=4;
ordertime=5;
orderdate=6;
weekday=7;
rem_ordervolume=8;
tradingperiod=9;
hid_ori_ordervolume = 10;
hid_rem_ordervolume = 11;
htb_ordervolume =12;
chge_rem_ordervolume = 13;
/* DAILY OPENING AND CLOSING HOURS (IN SEC) AND CURRENT PERIOD */
begin_sample=8.50*3600;
end_sample=17.5*3600;
number_period=(end_sample-begin_sample)/sample_time+1;
/* GENERATION OF VARIABLE NAMES */
vnames=seqa(1,1,250);
datanams=seqa(1,1,8);
vnames=0$+"v"$+ftocv(vnames,3,0);
datanams=0$+"v"$+ftocv(datanams,3,0);
/* DATA IMPORT FROM RAW DATA (FUNCTION "data_in_matrix");
"data_init" IS DATA FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF INITIAL ORDER
BOOK, "data_all" IS DATA FOR CONTINUOUS UPDATING */
temp_data_all=data_in_matrix(data_all);
temp_data_all=temp_data_all[.,1:14];
data=data_in_matrix(data_init);
data=data[.,1:14];
/* CALCULATION OF START DAY, END DAY AND NUMBER OF ORDER BOOKS */
dayvar=minc(temp_data_all[.,orderdate]);
endday=maxc(temp_data_all[.,orderdate]);
number_dates=rows(unique(temp_data_all[.,orderdate],1));
n_total=number_dates*number_period;
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/* INITIALIZATION OF PRICE AND QUANTITY MATRICES THAT CONTAIN
ORDER BOOK INFORMATION (FOR VISIBLE AND HIDDEN BOOKS) AND
INFORMATION REGARDING TIME, TRADING PERIOD ETC. */
pask_total=zeros(n_total,entries);
pbid_total=zeros(n_total,entries);
vask_total=zeros(n_total,entries);
vbid_total=zeros(n_total,entries);
hid_vask_total=zeros(n_total,entries);
hid_vbid_total=zeros(n_total,entries);
stime_total=zeros(n_total,1);
info_total=zeros(n_total,3);
period_total=zeros(n_total,1);
/* POINTER FOR PLACE OF ORDER BOOK TO BE UPDATED; TEMPORARY PRICE
AND QUANTITY VARIABLES THAT ARE OVERWRITTEN EACH DAY */
indic=1;
mnanz_initial=1; /* INITIAL ASK POINTER POSITION IS 1 */
mnbnz_initial=1; /* INITIAL BID POINTER POSITION IS 1 */
mpask_initial=zeros(1,entries);
mpbid_initial=zeros(1,entries);
mvask_initial=zeros(1,entries);
mvbid_initial=zeros(1,entries);
hid_mvask_initial=zeros(1,entries);
hid_mvbid_initial=zeros(1,entries);
/* CONSTRUCTION OF INITIAL ORDER BOOK BY THE PROCEDURE
"construct_one_day1" */
construct_one_day1(mnbnz_initial,mnanz_initial,mpask_initial,
mpbid_initial,mvask_initial,mvbid_initial,entries,ordertype,
orderprice,ordervolume,direction,ordertime,rem_ordervolume,
hid_mvbid_initial,hid_mvask_initial,hid_ori_ordervolume,
hid_rem_ordervolume,htb_ordervolume,chge_rem_ordervolume,
tradingperiod);
/* SAVE PROCEDURE OUTPUT FOR FURTHER USE */
mpask_initial=mpask[rows(mpask),.];
mvask_initial=mvask[rows(mvask),.];
hid_mvask_initial=hid_mvask[rows(mvask),.];
185
mnanz_initial=mnanz[rows(mnanz),.];
mpbid_initial=mpbid[rows(mpbid),2:entries]~0;
mvbid_initial=mvbid[rows(mvbid),2:entries]~0;
hid_mvbid_initial=hid_mvbid[rows(mvbid),2:entries]~0;
mnbnz_initial=mnbnz[rows(mnbnz),.]-1;
/* CLEAR MEMORY TO REDUCE COMPUTATION TIME */
clear temp_data_init,mpbid,mvbid,mpask,mvask,mnbnz,mnanz,mtime,
merror_in_record;
/* LOOP FOR MAIN COMPUTATION: RECONSTRUCTION OF ORDER BOOKS DONE
DAILY AND RESULTS ARE SAVED TO FINAL OUTPUT MATRICES */
do while dayvar le endday;
data = selif(temp_data_all,temp_data_all[.,orderdate].==dayvar);
if not ismiss(data);
weekday = minc(data[.,weekday]);
/* CONSTRUCTION OF DAILY BOOK BY PROCEDURE "construct_one_day2" */
construct_one_day2(mnbnz_initial,mnanz_initial,mpask_initial,
mpbid_initial,mvask_initial,mvbid_initial,entries,ordertype,
orderprice,ordervolume,direction,ordertime,rem_ordervolume,
hid_mvbid_initial, hid_mvask_initial, hid_ori_ordervolume,
hid_rem_ordervolume,htb_ordervolume,chge_rem_ordervolume,
tradingperiod);
/* SAVE PROCEDURE OUTPUT FOR FURTHER USE */
lastobs=rows(mvask);
mvask_initial=mvask[lastobs,.];
mpask_initial=mpask[lastobs,.];
mvbid_initial=mvbid[lastobs,.];
mpbid_initial=mpbid[lastobs,.];
mnbnz_initial=mnbnz[lastobs,.];
mnanz_initial=mnanz[lastobs,.];
hid_mvask_initial=hid_mvask[lastobs,.];
hid_mvbid_initial=hid_mvbid[lastobs,.];
sampling(sample_time,begin_sample,9*3600-1);
topic=rows(pask);
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/* SAVE PARTIAL ORDER BOOKS TO FINAL OUTPUT MATRICES */
pask_total[indic:indic+topic-1,.]=pask;
pbid_total[indic:indic+topic-1,.]=pbid;
vask_total[indic:indic+topic-1,.]=vask;
vbid_total[indic:indic+topic-1,.]=vbid;
hid_vask_total[indic:indic+topic-1,.]=hid_vask;
hid_vbid_total[indic:indic+topic-1,.]=hid_vbid;
info_total[indic:indic+topic-1,.]=(dayvar*ones(rows(info),1))...
~info~(weekday*ones(rows(info),1));
stime_total[indic:indic+topic-1,.]=stime;
period_total[indic:indic+topic-1,.]=period;
indic=indic+topic;
else;
endif;
dayvar=dayvar+1;
endo;
/* SAVE OUTPUT MATRICES */
if stock == 1;
save path = /book/oput/adidas/pask_total=pask_total;
save path = /book/oput/adidas/pbid_total=pbid_total;
save path = /book/oput/adidas/vask_total=vask_total;
save path = /book/oput/adidas/vbid_total=vbid_total;
save path = /book/oput/adidas/hid_vask_total=hid_vask_total;
save path = /book/oput/adidas/hid_vbid_total=hid_vbid_total;
save path = /book/oput/adidas/info_total=info_total;
save path = /book/oput/adidas/stime_total=stime_total;
save path = /book/oput/adidas/period_total=period_total;
endif;
if stock == 2;
save path = /book/oput/allianz/pask_total=pask_total;
save path = /book/oput/allianz/pbid_total=pbid_total;
save path = /book/oput/allianz/vask_total=vask_total;
save path = /book/oput/allianz/vbid_total=vbid_total;
save path = /book/oput/allianz/hid_vask_total=hid_vask_total;
save path = /book/oput/allianz/hid_vbid_total=hid_vbid_total;
save path = /book/oput/allianz/info_total=info_total;
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save path = /book/oput/allianz/stime_total=stime_total;
save path = /book/oput/allianz/period_total=period_total;
endif;
if stock == 30;
save path = /book/oput/siemens/pask_total=pask_total;
save path = /book/oput/siemens/pbid_total=pbid_total;
save path = /book/oput/siemens/vask_total=vask_total;
save path = /book/oput/siemens/vbid_total=vbid_total;
save path = /book/oput/siemens/hid_vask_total=hid_vask_total;
save path = /book/oput/siemens/hid_vbid_total=hid_vbid_total;
save path = /book/oput/siemens/info_total=info_total;
save path = /book/oput/siemens/stime_total=stime_total;
save path = /book/oput/siemens/period_total=period_total;
endif;
" "; "Reconstruction (30min) completed for stock";;
stock;
stock=stock+1;
endo;
188 C Order Book Reconstruction
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